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This thesis represents an attempt to characterize
Congressional appropriations for Defense procurement and
research and development between 1953 and 1973. The approach
used involves formulating alternative models of appropriations
as a percentage of requests and deriving point and interval
estimates for parameters using robust statistical procedures.
The results of the analysis lend support to the hypothesis
that the response of the Congress to Defense procurement
and
research and development budget requests has changed consider-
ably, starting in fiscal 1969 and that the Air Force received
uniquely favorable action on its research and development
budget requests in the 1957-1969 time period.
The first chapter explores the institutional setting of
Defense budgeting, from the budget prepreparation stage through
the audit stage. In Chapter II, alternative models are
formu-
lated for appropriations as a percentage of requests,
parameters
are estimated using least squares, and residuals are analyzed.
The following two chapters explore the advantages of robust
alternatives to least squares and include robust point and
interval estimates for the parameters of the models of Chapter
II. The final chapter includes (i) an examination, using
Monte
Carlo techniques, of the operating characteristics of the
statistical procedures employed in earlier chapters and
(ii) a
discussion of the results of dividing the data by groups of
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"The budget process. . . is primarily a system
of communications, regularized and cyclical. Its
purposes fall into two logical categories: first,
the bringing of information to the proper level
for the making of decisions - a category in gov-
ernmental policies, programs and objectives which
we may roughly classify as policy; and, second, the
providing of information both upward and downward
so that those decisions will be carried out - a .
category we may roughly classify as administrative.
*
Frederick Mosher
The topic of this thesis is the regularized and cyclical
system of communications which forms the Department of
Defense budget process. At various points in the budget
cycle, decisions or budget outcomes are recorded for
both
policy and administrative reasons. Some of the data in
these records will be analyzed in order to draw
inferences
about the process of decision-making on the defense
budgets.
Because budget data is basically quantitative data, the
analyses that will be undertaken will use quantitative
tech-
niques to formulate and test hypotheses concerning the
defense budget process. In addition to attempting to
Prac
•Frederick Mosher, Program Budge tlnr^_^h_eory_a^d
tice, Chicago, Public Administration Service, 19^, P- ?

characterize decision-making in defense budget making, this
thesis will try to show the potentialities of quantitative
analysis of public budgeting systems.
Most analyses of federal budgeting have focused on one
or two parts of the federal budget cycle. The program budget
literature has mainly addressed the budget preparation stage,
while either ignoring or treating in a cursory fashion the
Congressional review stage [Hitch, 1965, Hitch and McKean, I960, Novick,1965].
Quantitative analysis of budget preparation has been confined
to the formulation and testing of hypotheses based on infor-
mation about this stage alone. The literature on Congressional
review of budget requests has focused on interactions within
the Congress and between Congressional Committees and agencies
[rennc,1966, Wildavsky, 1964, Horn, 1970]. The budget preparation stage and
budget execution stage have not been considered in this liter-
ature, except to a certain extent by [Wildavsky, 1964]. Quantitative
analysis of Congressional budget behavior has been dominated
by those who have tried to operatlonalize some of the Fenno
and Wildavsky statements concerning Committee-agency inter-
actions. [Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky, 1966,1967,1971,
Johnson, 1972, Davis and Guillot ,1967]
.
The analysis contained in succeeding chapters focuses on
the Congressional budget review stage of the budget process.
More specifically, it deals with Congressional review of
Department of Defense budget requests for aircraft, missiles
and research and development. In contrast to the work of
Davis, Dempster, Wildavsky and others, this study concentrates
il

on Just one agency rather than many, and uses recently developed
statistical techniques to analyze budget data for the years
1953-1973.
The somewhat different focus of this study is the result of
a number of developments that have taken place following the
publication of the first papers of Davis, et al. First, a
recent study by James Jernberg [ Jemberg,1972] shows that different
Congressional appropriations subcommittees have different
interests and different approaches to budget review. Some are
interested in budget components such as personnel and travel
expenditures, while others are interested in outputs or program
objectives. Instead of undertaking the ambitious task of
characterizing all Congressional budget review activity, this
analysis concentrates solely on such activity within the
Department of Defense. Second, a recent and noteworthy develop-
ment is the objection by Johnson [19671 , Kanter [1972] , and
others [Natchez and Bupp,1973l , to the effect that the studies by
Davis et al. have been done at too high a level of aggregation.
The models Davis et al . propose are for total agency budget
requests and total agency appropriations. For Defense budgets,
Kanter and others [Stromberg,1970] have suggested conducting
analysis at a lower level of aggregation such as Navy RDTE
(Research, Development, Test and Evaluation). It is at this
lower level that our study is conducted. Finally, a
methodological development that has gathered momentum since
the publication of the first budgeting articles by
Davis et al. is that of the theory and techniques
of robust estimation [Andrews et al, 1973]. These are
lii

particularly well-suited to the objectives of our analysis
of defense budget data, which Is based on the belief that
Congressional behavior since the early Fifties demonstrates the
characteristics of a succession of regular, stable processes mixed
with a few somewhat unusual events. The data analysis problem is
to separate the two, and to prevent the unusual events from
contaminating or distorting the estimates of the character-
istics of the regular process.
The analysis to be presented omits one aspect of the
budget process which forms a part of the Davis, Dempster,
Wildavsky studies. Little attempt is made to structure
detailed mechanistic models of both the process of agency
budget request formulation, or of Congressional review. One
reason for this omission is that in the Department of Defense,
the process of formulation of budgets has changed consider-
ably since the Fifties with the implementation of planning,
programming and budgeting (PPB) and various revisions to the
PPB system. The avoidance of the detailed process of budget
request formulation could conceivably result in simultaneous
equation problems [Johnston, Ch. 13and 14 , 1963]. However for the
simple models used in this analysis, single equation methods
have been shown to be acceptable [Wold, 1953, Johnston, 19 63, PP 377-
380]. Although the theory of robust estimation has not yet
been extended to simultaneous equation estimation, we do
fairly extensive Monte Carlo investigations of efficiency and
mis-specification problems. Our results reflect favorably
upon the operating characteristics of the robust statistical
estimation procedures put to use.
iv

The chapters which follow combine (a) an analysis of sub-
stantive questions which arise from trying to characterize
Congressional activity in the area of defense budgeting with
(b) a detailed consideration of methodological questions which
arise when trying to apply various statistical estimation
procedures to data like that on defense appropriations.
Chapter I is an overview of the defense budget process from
budget prepreparation to budget execution. The purpose of
the chapter is to place in perspective the part of the process
which is being studied in this analysis and for the first time to
gather into one package a narrative description of the processes and
institutions of defense budgeting as it has been and is
currently conducted. Chapter II reviews the Davis, Dempster,
Wildavsky work and proposes some alternative approaches and
models for Congressional appropriations. Estimates for
coefficients or parameters in these models are studied. In
Chapter III the methodological literature on robust estimation
is reviewed, and new estimates for the models are derived.
Confidence intervals for the estimates are presented in detail
in Chapter IV, together with a discussion of the methods for
constructing the estimates. Chapter V employs Monte Carlo
techniques in order to gain insight into the validity of the
techniques used in earlier chapters. The result of the Monte
Carlo studies in Chapter V also point to some important
substantive conclusions about which of the models best
characterizes what will be termed the regular part of the




Descriptions of the federal budget process in the United
States can focus either on a sequence of events or on the
interactions among the major institutions in the political
system. One can first view the process as an annual sequence
of events which includes budget prepreparation, budget
preparation, budget submission and Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) review, budget submission and Congressional
review, budget execution, audit. Each of these steps or
events, however, represents activities and possibly interactions
of three major political instituions: agency, President and
Congress. When studying the process, the analyst can either
focus on the events and attempt to examine the respective
roles of the institutions at each step, or he can focus on the
institutions and their interactions, with the budgetary
sequence of events providing the setting. The discussion which
follows is concerned with budgeting in the defense sector. It
will be organized, as depicted in Figure 1.1, from the sequential
point of view, describing in succession budget prepreparation,
budget preparation, OMB review, Congressional review, budget












































that at each of these stages all of the three major actors
or institutions have some direct or indirect impact on the
activities which take place.
As was stated in the introduction, the purpose of this
chapter is to convey a picture of the defense budget process
as a whole so that when a selected portion of the process is
analyzed in detail in succeeding chapters, the reader will
have some idea of how the analysis fits into a broad view of
the process. A secondary purpose of this chapter is to




In the Department of Defense, budget prepreparation occurs
during the 18-month Planning, Programming and Budgeting cycle.
Planning, programming and budgeting is an attempt to tie
planned resource usage to objectives or goals [Schick, p. 33].
In simple terms, it is an attempt to budget in terms of out-
puts instead of inputs. For example, program budget decision-
makers who are considering a health-care budget will be
concerned with the budget division between health care for the
elderly and child health care rather than the budget division
between travel expenses (for all programs), rents, and
maintenance. Budget review in terms of travel, rents,
maintenance, etc. is generally considered to be budgeting in
terms of objects of expenditure [Schick, 1972,pp. 20-21, Johnson,1972,
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p. 2]. According to Allen Schick, program budgets are
associated with a planning orientation, that is, the budget
is a forward planning device, while object budgets have a
control orientation, with the budget used as a method of
insuring honesty and integrity [Schick, 1972, pp. 20-23 and pp.
30-36].
When Robert McNamara became Secretary of Defense in 196l, he
and the new Comptroller, Charles Hitch, committed the Depart-
ment of Defense (DOD) to the basic principles of program
budgeting: multiyear budgets cast in terms of outputs [Hitch,
1965, p. 27, Ruefli,1971,PP. 166-169]. The Defense budget was divided










The force levels and dollars allocated to the above programs
for the next five years were called the Five Year Defense
Program. Within each program or mission were program elements
which were supposed to contribute to the objectives or output
of the program (See Table 1.1). In theory, the program
elements are supposed to be substitutes for each other, such
as B-52's, land based missiles, Polaris submarine-launched
missiles within the Strategic Retaliatory Forces program.
Other considerations involved in the decision of where to
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Redeye (Operational Systems Development)
24XXX. Forces (Navy)





2441 IN: Fleet Escort (Major)
24514N: Coastal/River Patrol and Assault Forces
2461 IN: Mine Countermeasuree Ships





2561 3N: Phoenix Missile System (Operational Systems Devel. )








Force Troops (Combat Support)
Base Operations
Helicopter Avionics (Operational Systems Devel.)







F- 111 Squad rons
RF-4 Squadrons
Special Air Warfare Forces (SAWF)
MACE
Tactical Air Control System
Base Operations
28XXX. Other
280110: JCS Directed and Coordinated Exercises
28015N: Deepfreeze
INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNICATIONS
31XXX. Intelligence a.nd Security
310110: Cryptologic Activities
310130: Defense Attache System
32XXX. National Military Command System
3201 IF: National Military Command Center
33XXX. Communications
33111A: STARCOM











pp. 3^-^33. The system of categories, including major
programs and program elements, is called a program structure.
Ideally, a program structure is supposed to assign activi-
ties (program elements) to mutually exclusive programs. For
optimal allocation of resources within a program (presuming
an absence of problems like indivisibilities), it is necessary
that the marginal productivity of a resource allocated to a
program element equal the marginal productivity of that
resource with respect to every other program element within
the program. For optimal resource allocation between programs
which yield different outputs the marginal utility of a
resource allocated to one program must equal the marginal
utility of the resource with respect to every other program.
Program Budget Cycle
Currently, the program budget cycle is an 18-month cycle
conducted in three phases and resulting in the President's
annual budget submission to the Congress in January. The
first phase involves military threat and requirement evalua-
tion. In the second phase, multiyear programs to meet the
threat are derived. These programs and the dollars allocated
to them are listed in the Five Year Defense Program. The
third phase of the cycle is the development of the annual
(next year's) budget.*
*The rationale behind the three phases is discussed by
Hitch in [Hitch, pp. 28-39,1965].
1-6

Since its inception, each phase of the program budget
cycle has included extensive discussion and negotiation
between the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the
military services. The general approach in each phase has
been the issuance of some kind of guidance or constraints by
OSD, such as fiscal or strategy guidance; next the services
respond with proposals; OSD approves, disapproves or modifies
the proposals; finally, some kind of agreement is reached
before the next phase is entered [Kanter and Anger, 1973]. In the
McNamara era (196I-I969), OSD appeared to be controlling the
process [Enke,1963, Crecine,1971]. Under Melvin Laird and David
Packard the role of the military services has apparently
been emphasized and broadened* [Kanter and Anger, 1973,pp. 6-10].
In order to pass from the second phase of the program
budget cycle, programming, into the third phase, budgeting,
or in terms of this analysis to pass from budget preprepara-
tion to budget preparation, it is necessary to translate the
program budget into a different system of accounts. The
Congress does not appropriate funds specifically for the
program elements in the Five Year Defense Program. Rather,
they consider the inputs or resources which produce the
program element force levels. The budget submitted to the
*It is difficult to yet assess the differences between
PPB under Laird and PPB under Secretary James Schlesinger.
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Congress is an input-oriented budget (although it is not




Operations and Maintenance (OMN)
Procurement (PAMN, OPN)
Research and Development (RDTE)
Military Construction (MILCON)
These categories are further subdivided into budget activities
such as Permanent Change of Station Travel (Navy)
,
Since the budget enacted by the Congress is in terms of
dollar allocations for resources or inputs and the program
budget is in terms of dollar allocations for outputs, it is
necessary each year to translate or crosswalk the program budget
into a resource budget.
Crosswalking
Crosswalking is a term applied to the transformation of
the program budget into a line item resource budget, or vice
versa. Translation from a program budget into a line item
budget should be rather straightforward, as the following
discussion will demonstrate.
A program element within the Navy Tactical Air Program
or Mission is program element 2-41-22-N, F-l^ squadrons.
The approved budgets (hypothetical) for F-l^J squadrons for
FY 72 through FY 76, as contained in the FYDP, are (in
*The actual budget submission to the Congress contains
estimates for Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps and Defense
Agencies in most of these accounts and the Procurement
account is further- divided among aircraft, missiles, ships,








millions of dollars): 100, 150, 444.2, 398.027, 240.172.
The following table shows how these dollars are used In terms
of the line item categories
:





RDTE 100 150 30.7
Total: 100 150 444.2 467.987 240.172
*PAMN stands for Procurement Air and Missile Systems Navy,
OPN stands for Other Procurement Navy,
RDTE stands for Research, Development , Test and Evaluation,
OMN stands for Operations and Maintenance, Navy
MPN stands for Military Personnel, Navy
**The above numbers are hypothetical numbers only.
TABLE I. la
These hypothetical budgets will supposedly yield eleven
squadrons in FY75 and forty-four in FY76. The information
contained in the table is called Program Element Summary Data.
To obtain the Navy line item budget in RDTE for FY72 it is
only necessary to sum over all the program elements the RDTE
dollars they require. The same is true for the other line
item categories.
Crosswalking from line item categories to program cate-
gories is not quite as straightforward, since it requires
allocation of an overall budget figure for an input such as
1-9

Military Personnel or RDTE among all program elements. The
problems involved in crosswalking from line item categories
to program categories have been addressed in [Crecine and
Fischer, 1971, Ruefli ,1971] .
If we aggregate dollars for program elements, such as the
F-l^J, into dollars for the major programs of which these
elements form a part, then a crosswalked budget for the
defense department might look something like Table 1.2.
1.2. Budget Preparation
The Process
Phase III of the program budgeting cycle involves the
preparation of the annual budget. As discussed in the
previous section, the budget which will be sent to the Congress
is in terms of line items rather than programs. Budget esti-
mates are submitted by the services to the Secretary of Defense
on or about October 1 of each year. These estimates are then
sent to the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller),
ASD(C), who in turn divides the budget review among director-
ates for military personnel, operations and maintenance,
procurement, military construction, research and development
[Crecine and Fischer," 1971, pp. 46-50] . The Department of Defense
holds its own budget hearings during the budget preparation
stage [Navy Programming Manual, pp. IV-5]. As will be
pointed out later, since 1961 OMB (or until 1969 the Bureau
of the Budget) review of defense budgets has consisted of
participation in these hearings, but their influence has been
limited [Halperin, 1972, p. 317].
1-10
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In theory, budget preparation should be a relatively
simple process which merely requires crosswalking the costs
of approved programs for' the next year into line item cate-
gories. In reality, the budget preparation stage has not
proved to be that simple. Especially during the McNamara
era, many decisions were made during this stage [Crecine and
Fischer, 1971].
Budget Preparation Under McNamara
The discussion in this section emphasizes the fact that
budget preparation in the McNamara era (FY1962 - FY1970) was
not merely a straightforward crosswalking of approved programs
into line items. It is largely based on the analysis of John
Crecine and Gregory Fischer in their paper "On the Resource Alloca-
tion Process in the Department of Defense." [Crecine and Fischer, 1971]
McNamara program budgeting was based on a requirements
approach. The idea was that requirements were to be set and
then programs developed which satisfied the requirements at
the minimum cost. As Secretary McNamara himself said
"The President's charge to me was a two-pronged
one — to determine what forces were required and
to procure and support them as economically as
possible." [Tucker, 1966, p. 14]
"We start with the political objective, the
formulation of which is presented to us by the
Secretary of State and upon which the President
indicates his desires that we develop a military
program that will support the political objective.
As you know, the President has stated the defense
budget is to be established without regard to
arbitrary budget ceilings. We determine the
force levels which we believe are necessary to
support the political objective and then act to
I-li

fulfill the President's second direction to
us. He has indicated that we are to attain
the specific force levels necessary to support
the political objective at the lowest cost."
[Tucker, 1966, p. 27]
Because of this philosophy, the services were never given
explicit fiscal or budgetary constraints in the McNamara era.
However, regardless of budget philosophy, the defense budget
plan must satisfy the following identity, called the "Great
Identity" by Crecine and Fischer:
Defense Expenditures
+ = Tax Revenues + Deficit
Non-Defense Expenditures
If none of the other three terms are controlled by the
Secretary of Defense, then, like it or not, the Defense
Department must operate under some kind of budget constraint.
The research of Crecine and Fischer is largely based on this
observation
.
As Crecine and Fischer point out, tax revenues (estimated)
depend on the state of the economy, as estimated by the
Treasury Department and the Council of Economic Advisors, and
on the tax laws, changes to which must be approved by the
Congress in general and the House Ways and Means Committee
in particular. Non-defense expenditures are, of course,
proposed by the agencies involved and reviewed by OMB.
Another factor related to non-defense expenditures is their
uncontrollabillty . Many government expenditures, such as
Social Security and welfare payments, are made according to
1-13

fixed formulas and require basic changes in legislation if
they are to be changed. Others, like interest on the national
debt, must be paid, regardless of what else is in the budget.
According to the Tax Foundation, Inc., in 1969 over $118
billion in outlays were relatively uncontrollable. Of this
total, $90 billion were outlays in non-defense areas [Tax Founda-
tion, 1973, P. 10]. The other term in the equation is the
deficit. The President, together with the Council of Economic
Advisors, 0MB and the Treasury Department yearly set a deficit
target which they believe will achieve the appropriate balance
between government expenditure requirements and stability of
the economy — low unemployment and low inflation. Violation
of this target will generally be viewed as involving economic
penalties
.
During the McNamara era, the approved set of programs in
the FYDP always implied expenditures higher than would be
feasible under the "Great Identity" [Crecine and Fischer, 1971, p.37 ;
Anger, 1973,p. 6]. Consequently, after receiving the service
budget requests, the directorates in the office of ASD(C) would
submit planning estimates to McNamara which stated how much
they believed could be cut from the budget requests. By this
time (mid-October) , McNamara had a reasonably good idea what
the other terms of the Great Identity were going to be and
could tell the directorates either to cut more or less than
the planning estimates. In the meantime, he negotiated for
deficit increases and for non-defense expenditure decreases.
I-lJ

One wonders how programs requiring resources in more than
one category were pieced back together after the directorates
completed their review. According to Crecine and Fischer,
analysts from the following offices participated in putting
the programs back together in November and December: Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Systems Analysis, Assistant Secretary
of Defense for Installations and Logistics, Assistant Secretary
of Defense, Comptroller [Crecine and Fischer,1971 ,p. 56]. Figure
1.2 is a copy of Crecine and Fischer's flow diagram of this
process
.
The record of budget cuts at the Secretary of Defense
level in the McNamara era is consistent with the view that
significant changes were made in the budget at this point in
the process. The following table gives the percentage
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Crecine and Fischer suspected that because the approved
program (FYDP) would not necessarily be included in the
budget, and because the services had been submitting budgets
in line item categories for years, simple linear models might
explain or predict service budget requests in each of the
line item categories. These models included explanatory vari-
ables like the previous year's appropriation, the difference
in the last two years' appropriations, the difference between
previous year's request and appropriation, and dummy variables
for administration in power and whether or not the nation was
at war. In most cases the models explained well over 95% of
the variance in service budget requests from 1969 back to the
Forties. Although analysis of this kind should be applied
and used with care,* their results appear to indicate that
regardless of budget philosophy at the Secretary of Defense
level, the service budget requests have a remarkable stability,
being related to some rather straightforward and uncomplicated
variables. Crecine and Fischer also formulated simple linear
models for directorate cuts. The results were similar to
those for service requests.
In summary, the total analysis of Crecine and Fischer
leads us to suspect that budget preparation in the McNamara
era was something other than a simple crosswalking of approved
programs into line items
.
^Methodological problems with regression analysis of this





Budget Preparation Under Laird
When Melvin Laird became Secretary of Defense, he and his
Deputy Secretary, David Packard, retained a three phase
program budget cycle. However, they made some basic changes
in emphasis. The Laird system has largely changed the approach
from one which focuses on requirements. A five year budget
constraint is set early in the programming phase, the second
phase of the cycle [Kanter,i973sP .8]. In addition, the military
services were given more of a say in the allocation of
resources to programs [Anger,1973,p. 10]. Laird and his succes-
sors have communicated the 5-year budget constraint, by year,
to the services via either a document called the Fiscal
Guidance Memorandum (issued in the Spring of 1970) or Defense
Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum (Issued in the
late winter or early spring of 1971, 1972, and 1973). The
first budget submission which reflected this new system was
the FY 1972 budget. Table I
.
3 on the next page gives an
example of the budget or fiscal constraint given to the
services. Note that the dollar constraints are given by
program or mission, such as Land Forces or Tactical Air Forces;
the service then puts together a proposal specifying hew its
Land Forces' dollars will be divided among the program elements
under Land Forces. The set of service proposals is called the
Program Objectives Memorandum (POM). The OSD responses or








Fiscal Guidance categories are divided into three groups. Group
I, called "Major Mission. " is made up of the FYDP program elements
containing DoD combat forces and certain special support activities
such as Research and Development (FYDP Program b), Communications:
Intelligence, and Support to Other Nations. Group II, called "General
Support", contains elements from all Defense programs which provide
mission and central support to Group I programs. Group III contains
miscellaneous costs which are a function of management policies not
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Miscellaneous costs are defined by particular Resource Identification Coded (RICs)
drawn from certain program elements; The TOA identified by these RICs are deleted
from the Program Elements in which originally appearing and recategorized by RIC.
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Under the Laird system, by the time the services submit
their budgets in October, they have been specifying programs
subject to a budget constraint for over seven months.
Consequently, one might suspect that OSD cuts of the service
budget requests, following the October submission, would be
minimal. This turns out to be the case. In FY1972, the cut
was .13 per cent and in FY1973 it was 2.06 per cent. By
comparison, the average cut in the FY1962-FY1971 time period
was 18.85? with the lowest figure being 8% in FY1962. These
figures show that under the Laird system, major budget
reductions have not been made during the budget preparation
stage. Also, major program decisions have not been delayed
until November and December; rather, most decisions have been
communicated to the services by August. These two factors,
the small budget cuts and the issuance of PDM's in August,
appear to indicate that budget preparation under Laird has
for the most part become the crosswalking of the budget from
program categories into line item accounts discussed earlier.
Having completed the discussion of the program budget
cycle, and the budget prepreparation and preparation stages,
it might be useful to summarize the chronological sequence of
events. The 18 month program budget cycle for FY1974 began
in June, 1971 with threat analysis and long range planning.
The programming phase began in February of 1972 and continued
through the spring and summer of that year. On October 1,
the Services submitted their budget estimates to OSD. This
budgeting phase (i.e., budget preparation) continued through
1-20

December of 1972. Finally, In January of 1973 the President
transmitted his FY1974 budget estimate to the Congress.
Figure 1.3 depicts this sequence of events in general and
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Policy Analysis Preparation OMB Review Submission
FIGURE 1.3
I. 3 OMB Review
The Budget and Accounting Act of 1921 created the Bureau
of the Budget (later re-named the Office of Management and
Budget by President Richard Nixon) and made the executive
budget part of the federal budgetary process. The Act
provided for Presidential review of the budget and Presidential
submission of the budget proposal to the Congress. One of the
functions of the Bureau of the Budget was to assist the
President in his annual review of agency budget requests. The
Bureau's role as a mechanism for Presidential control became
more clear when Franklin Roosevelt moved it from the Treasury
Department into the Executive Office of the President in 1939
[Redford et al
.














































Sub-It JSOP-Vol I (74-81) Strategy and Fore. Planning
Provide cocmenta on JSOP-Vol I to JCS
Iesue Defense Policy end Planning Culdance
Identify end leeue Selected Anelyele Topics
Iesue Heterlel Support Planning Guidance
Submit commente on Defense Policy and Planning Culdance
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Submit comments on Materiel Support Planning Guidance
Update Five Year Defense Program through FY 1973
Update Five Year Defense Program for FY 1974-1977
Issue POM Guidance
Issue Planning and Programming Guidance Memorandum
Note: Includes (1) Force Planning (2) Fiscal Levels (3) SEA
Assumptions and (4) Materiel Support Planning Guidance
Submit Joint Research and Development Objectives Document (JRDOD)
Provide selected analysis
Submit Joint Force Memorandum (JFM)
Submit Program Objectives Memorandum (POM)
Submit JSOP-Vol I (75-82) Strategy and Force Planning
(CY 1973 cycle)
Issue initial Budget Culdance for preparation of FY 1974
budget estimates
Issue first "Issue Paper" (IP)
Transmit first "Issue Paper" (IP) to SecDef
Issue last "Issue Paper" (IP)
Transmit last "Issue Paper" (IP) to SecDef
Issue Program Decision Memorandum (PDM)
Submit reclamas to PDMs
Issue reclama decisions on PDMs
Issue Defense Policy and Planning Guidance (CY 1973 cycle)
Identify and issue Selected Analysis Topics (CY 1973 cycle)
Issue Materiel Support Planning Guidance (CY 1973 cycle)
Submit annual Budget Estimates and backup Information
Start Budget Hearings
Submit comments of Defense Policy and Planning Guidance
Update Five Year Defense Program
Submit comments on Materiel Support Planning Guidance
Start Issue of Program/Budget Decisions (PBDs)
Provide comments (reclamas) on PBDs
issue revised PBDs based on reclama comrjents
Conduct Joint meetings with JCS and Service Secretaries to
discuss major unresolved budget Issues
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Between the end of the Second World War and the advent
of the Kennedy Administration, defense budget requests were
treated much like other agency requests by the Bureau of the
Budget [Korb,1969, Ch. 3] ; that is, BoB conducted an independent
review of the budget and recommended adjustments (usually
cuts) to the President prior to Presidential submission to the
Congress. The mechanics of this review are discussed in [Ott
and Ott, 1969, Ch. 2]. Table 1.4 contains BoB cuts from 1949
through I960.
Fiscal Army Navy Air Force
Year Amount Percentage Amount Percentage Amount Percentage
1950 5.82 57 5.19 49 4.11 47
1951 0.17 4 0.22 5 0.80 17
1954 0.90 9 1.28 12 3.70 25
1955 1.77 17 1.65 14 1.32 10
1956 1.30 14 1.28 12 1.32 8
1957 0.44 5 1.68 15 2.26 13
1958 2.14 20 0.96 8 2.98 15
1959 0.58 6 0.06 1 1.32 7
I960 2.47 22 2.46 19 1.96 10
1961 0.73 7 0.23 2 2.64 14
(1950-






Since the beginning of the McNamara years during the
Kennedy Administration. BoB and 0MB have not conducted an
independent review of defense budget estimates.
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"It should be noted that the budget of the
Department of Defense is handled somewhat
differently from those of other agencies.
The Bureau of the Budget participates with
the financial officers of the Defense Depart-
ment in a review of the requests of the
various services for budgetary allowances,
but its role here is not quite the same as
with other agencies. It acts more as an
advisor to the Secretary of Defense than as
an arbiter." [Ott and Ott, 1969, p. 23].
The current situation is discussed in the Navy Programming
Manual
,
"The analysts of OSD and OMB normally make a
joint review of the budgets submitted by the
military departments. However, OMB analysts
have authority to submit separate decisions
on the markups." [p. IV-5]
These "separate decisions" mentioned in the above paragraph
apparently are not really decisions, since according to
Morton Halperin,
"Under Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson it
became a matter of tradition that the Budget
Director would have to appeal Secretarial
decisions on the Defense budget to the
President, the reverse of the situation in
all other departments." [Halperin, 1972 ,p. 317]
Other literature conflicts with Halperin' s view of the power
of the Secretary of Defense's decisions under Eisenhower but
is in agreement with his view of the Kennedy and Johnson
years [Korb,1969, Ch. 3]. Currently, the Director of OMB sits
on the Defense Program Review Committee, a committee of the
National Security Council "whose purpose is to keep the
annual defense budget in line with foreign policy objectives"
[Leacocos,1971,p.7]. The influence of this committee is more




In summary, OMB review of defense budget estimates
currently appears to be limited. The Director may play a
part in setting the overall budget ceiling for the Department
of Defense through his membership on the Defense Program
Review Committee. However, this is quite different from the
role which OMB plays in the budget review of non-defense
agencies
.
1.4. Congressional Review of Budget Estimates
Introduction
In most Western democratic countries, the power of the
purse is held by the legislature. (One exception is West
Germany) [Macridis and Ward, 1963 sp. 352]. The Congressional
appropriations process in the United States is probably more
complex than the legislative appropriations process in any
other country in the world [Macridis and Ward,1963]. The process
involves numerous interactions in committees of both houses,
floor debate In each house, and negotiation between the
houses. Also, for most agencies, Congressional scrutiny
occurs not only when appropriations are being considered, but
also when authorizations are being examined. The purpose of
this section is to discuss the basics of Congressional
consideration of Defense budget requests.
Before discussing Congressional budget review in detail,
the importance of the Congress in the overall defense budget
process should probably be discussed briefly. Research on
1-25

Congressional appropriations for defense has been sparse . Recent
notable exceptions are [Korb,1973, Kanter,1972, Goss,1970]. The
classic studies of Fenno and of Wildavsky have explicitly
been confined to non-defense areas as were the quantitative
models of Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky. One of the reasons
for this paucity of research might be the record of Congres-
sional changes in defense budget requests between FY1954 and
FY1968. The following table gives the percentage and
magnitude of changes, cuts or increases, made by the Congress
in that period.
Fiscal Year % Millions of $
1954 -3.9 -1089
1955 -3.6 -1063
1956 -1.1 - 350
1957 +1.5 + 493
1958 -1.8 - 639
1959 + 2.0 + 933
I960 -0.1 - 2k
1961 +1.7 + 660
1962 +O.58 + 268
1963 +0.48 + 230
1964 -3.66 -1797
1965 -1.51 - 717
1966 -0.18 - 81






Source: Office of Assistant Secretary
of Defense (Comptroller)
By comparison, in the 1962-1968 time frame, the Secretary of
Defense cut service budget requests by an average of 18.6% with
the lowest cut being 8% in 1962. Mote from the previous
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table that Congressional cuts of Presidential budget requests
in 1962-1968 never exceeded 3 . 66%
.
One of the reasons for the increasing amount of research
on Congress and defense appropriations is the record of
Congressional cuts since FY 1969
.








Source: Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller)
Richard Fenno in his analysis of non-defense appropriations has
argued that Congressional changes of less than 5 percent are marginal
or insignificant [Fenno,1966,p.353]. Since 1969, changes to the
defense budget request were greater than 5 percent three
times and in the other two years they were three and four
percent respectively. It should also be noted at this point
that in the 1962-1973 time frame, Congressional changes to
procurement and RDTE requests were higher than the figures in
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 [Korb J 1973,p.l6].
Important Terms
Three important terms that arise in any discussion of
budgeting are authorization
,
appropriation , and outlay or
expenditure . An authorization by the Congress gives approval
of functions or activities of an agency. In other words, the
Congress passes legislation authorizing or approving activities
1-27

such as defense research and development. For many agencies,
the authorizing legislation specifies a maximum amount that can
be appropriated [Ott and Ott, 1972,pp. 51-52] , and in essence
says the agency can now seek appropriations for its approved
programs. Theoretically, substantive issues such as busing
or anti-busing provisions, program cancellations, and so
forth should be settled in the authorization bill since the
appropriations bill is supposed to "appropriate not legislate."*
In reality, the line between appropriation and legislation is
somewhat unclear, and consequently substantive issues are
often addressed in appropriations bills [Harris , 1964,p. 87].
An appropriation is the authority to obligate or commit
the government to certain expenditures. Appropriations are
generally defined as new obligational authority (NOA)
.
Obligational authority may be granted for one, two or some
specified number of years, that is, the agency may have one,
two or some specified number of years to obligate the appropri-
ations. In some cases, an agency may have no year accounts,
which are available for obligation until the purpose of the
spending is accomplished. An agency's total obligational
authority (TOA) includes not only NOA but also unobligated
balances from prior years' appropriations. In the Department
of Defense the following time limits are in effect for the
* Authorizations can in effect appropriate if they provide
funds through "backdoor financing" [Fenno, 1966.p. 114]. However,
this is definitely the exception rather than the rule and is











**SCN refers to Shipbuilding
and Conversion, Navy
TABLE 1.7
Expenditures or outlays are defined as the payment of
liabilities incurred by the government, or the actual cash
flow.* Expenditures in a particular year for the Defense
Department may be different from appropriations. For example,
NOA in 1970 was $69.4 billion while outlays were $76.3 billion
[Korb.,1973jP.27]. The reason for this is that an obligation
might be incurred when a contract is signed, but payment may not
be completed until the item is delivered. Agencies generally
have two years after the expiration of obligational authority
to complete the financial transactions associated with that
authority [31 U.S. Code, 701-706]. If an agency has obligated
funds but not expended them, these funds are referred to as
unspent obligations. The term unexpended balances refers to
*The Navy Programming Manual defines outlays as "the
amount of funds that must be drawn from the Treasury for goods




the sum of unobligated balances and unspent obligations.
In 1971, unexpended balances for the Department of Defense
totalled $35.2 billion of which $11.5 billion was unobligated
balances [House Report 92-1389]. Figure 1.5 summarizes these
relationships
.
TOA = NOA + Unobligated balances
Unexpended TT ,, . . , .. , , , ... ..
n*-i •>««««.
= Unobligated balances + unspent obligations.
Figure 1.5
Although Congressional appropriations are defined as NOA,
unobligated and unexpended balances can have indirect effects
on Congressional budget review. For example, if an agency has
unobligated balances for which the obligational authority is
about to expire, the Congress may extend the obligational
authority for one or more years but cut the NOA request by
an amount equal to the amount of the extended obligational
authority [House Report 92-666, p. 84], Every year, the House
Appropriations Committee includes the dollar figures for
unexpended and unobligated balances in their report and
occasionally comments on the magnitude. An extensive discus-
sion of unobligated balances for RDTE is contained in the
House Appropriations Committee report on the FYI969 Appropri-
ations bill [House Report 90-3^9, PP . 51-52].
Because of uncertainty about just exactly when funds will
be obligated, especially in procurement accounts, and when
checks will be drawn, it is impossible to say for certain when
1-30

a certain amount of obligational authority will be expended.
For planning purposes, the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Comptroller) has published the following table for relating
Department of the Navy outlays to TOA during the 1972-1976
time span. The table is based on data for outlays and TOA
for the past ten years
. Suppose one wanted to compare the
expenditure rate for military personnel with the expenditure
rate for shipbuilding and conversion in the years 1972 and
1973. Based on the table, it was estimated that 99$ of the
1972 TOA would be spent in 1972 while .90$ would be spent in
1973. This picture is quite different from the picture in
the slow expenditure account shipbuilding and conversion where
it was estimated that 6% of the TOA would be spent in 1972
while 21$ would be spent in 1973.
(As percent of estimated total payments)
In In In In In
Appropriation First Second Third Fourth Fifth
Year Year Year Year Year
Military Personnel, Navy 99.00 .90 .10
Military Personnel, Marine Corps 96.5c 3.30 .20
Reserve Personnel, Navy 85. 00 14.50 .50
Reserve Personnel, Marine Corps 92.00 7. 00 1.00
Operations & Maintenance, Navy 82.50 16.00 1.50
Operations & Maintenance, Marine
Corps 81.00 17.50 1.50
Procurement of Aircraft & Missiles,
Navy 16.00 53.00 22.00 7. 00 2.00
Procurement, Marine Corps 10.00 40.00 30.00 13.00 7.00
Shipbuilding & Conversion, Navy 6.00 21.00 23.00 27.00 23.00
-Other Procurement, Navy 26.00 47.00 17.00 6.00 4.00
-RDT&E, Navy 54.00 38. 00 6.00 1.50 .50
Military Construction, Navy
(Dir. Prog. Only) 7.00 40.00 30.00 13.00 10.00
Military Construction, Naval




Note : The above rates relate to gross payments within a fiscal year pro-
gram; they are not net outlay rates which may vary substantially because
of changes in the volume of reimbursable transactions. The above rates
are representative and are subject to change.
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Now that the terms authorization, appropriation and outlays
have been defined the role of the Congress in the consideration
of defense budget requests can be discussed. In the following
two sections, authorizations and appropriations will be
discussed respectively. The direct role of the Congress in
examining and/or limiting outlays has been minimal and will
not be discussed specifically. Control of outlays has been
only in the form of setting an expenditure ceiling on the
entire federal government through the Revenue and Expenditure
Control Act of 1968. Aside from that one instance, the Congress
has not legislated on the matter [Maxon, 1972] .
The Authorization Process
"No funds may be appropriated after December 31,
i960 to or for the use of any armed force of the
United States for the procurement of aircraft,
missiles or naval vessels unless the appropria-
tion of such funds has been authorized by legis-
lation enacted after such date."
Section 412(b)
Military Construction Act of i960
(Public Law 86-149)
Prior to the enactment of P.L. 86-149, only Military
Construction required authorization as well as appropriation
by the Congress. With the enactment of that law, procurement
of aircraft, missiles and naval vessels came under authoriza-
tion as well as appropriation scrutiny. Later, other procure-
ment accounts and RDTE also were required to have authorizations
1-32

prior to appropriations action.* Currently, only operations
and maintenance, military personnel and some small procurement
accounts** may receive appropriations without prior
authorization.
As with non-defense agencies, authorizations for the
Defense Department are first examined by the substantive
committees, in this case the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees. Prior to 1961, the House Armed Services Committee
was characterized as a "real estate committee" [Dexter,1963] since
its annual review of the Defense Department was confined to
the Military Construction Authorization. Today, the Armed
Services Committees annually authorize aircraft, missiles,
naval vessels, tracked combat vehicles, other weapons, RDTE
and military construction. An actual authorization contains
upper limits on appropriations for each of the services in the
relevant categories, together with any special legislative
provisions that may be deemed necessary — such as a ban on
shipbuilding in foreign shipyards. Authorization acts do not
contain detailed breakdowns of the subcategories under broad
categories of aircraft, missiles, and so forth which are
listed above.*** However, if a committee wants funds to be
*RDTE in fiscal 1963, Tracked Combat Vehicles in fiscal
1968, Other Weapons in fiscal 1970, Torpedoes in fiscal 1971.
**Other Procurement Army, Other Procurement Navy and Other
Procurement Air Force and the Army's ammunition account are
the procurement accounts not requiring authorization.
***Occasionally, the statute will contain a statement about
a specific program. This has been the case with the Safeguard
anti-ballistic missile system. However, such specific language
is seldom found in the statute Itself.
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cut from a specific program, such as the CH ^7 cargo transport
helicopter, it will generally say so in its committee report,
which forms part of the legislative history of the authoriza-
tion. The legislative history is used later to determine the
intent of the law and actually forms as important a part of
the authorization as the actual statute [Harris,1964,pp. 90-95].
The authorization process begins with the House and the
Senate Armed Services Committees' hearings on the defense
budget requests in the procurement and RDTE areas . The actual
authorization bill has generally been introduced in each house
by the chairman of the Armed Services Committee for that house.
After a committee's hearings are concluded, it marks-up
(modifies) the bill in executive or closed session and writes
a report. The committee's bill is then reported to the Floor
where it is debated and sometimes amended prior to passage.
If the House and Senate versions of an authorization statute
are in disagreement, a Conference Committee composed of members
of the Armed Services Committees meets and works out a compro-
mise. There are only two votes in Conference, the House vote
and the Senate vote. A compromise requires the approval of a
majority of the House members and a majority of the Senate
members. The Conference Report summarizes the compromises
that have been reached by the Conference Committee. Once the
report is approved by each house the compromise version of the
bill is sent to the President for his signature. Occasionally
one house sends its conference representatives to Conference
with instructions, that is it instructs the representatives
I- 3 '4

not to back down on a particular provision. Such action is
rare, however, since it makes it more difficult to reach a
compromise [Redford, 1965,pp. 419-420].
Some authors have argued that the authorization role of
the Armed Services Committees is related to an increasing
concern on the part of the Congress over national security
policy. Raymond Dawson, in the early 1960's, expressed the
belief that Section 412(b) opened a new era in Congressional
oversight of foreign and military policy [Dawson,1963]. A decade
later, Arnold Kanter argued that Congressional behavior in the
1960-1970 period was "policy oriented" [Kanter, 19 72]. Interviews
of Armed Services Committee staff members indicate that they
believe that they have developed expertise in certain military
areas such as tactical air warfare [Berry and Peckham,1973]*
•
On the other hand, other authors have noted very little
change in the approach of the Congress toward the defense issues
[Kolodzei,1963, Goss,1970]. Recently, Leslie Korb has argued that
even recent large cuts in Defense budgets do not reflect a
policy orientation on the part of the Congress [Korb, 19731-
Appropriations
Appropriations bills originate in the House of Represent-
atives. The Constitution specifies that revenue bills must
originate in the House, and this has been extended by tradition
*This information is based on interviews by Berry and
Peckham which were not discussed in their thesis.

to appropriations bills, probably because appropriations and
revenues were originally considered simultaneously' by the
Congress [Harris , 1964 ,p. 52]. In the defense area, military
personnel, operations and maintenance, procurement and RDTE
are all funded by one appropriations bill, the Defense
Appropriations Bill. Military Construction is funded
separately .
*
After its introduction in the House, the Defense Appro-
priations Bill is referred to the House Appropriations Com-
mittee which in turn refers it to the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee. The Subcommittee holds hearings, marks-up or
modifies the bill and reports it to the full committee where
it is usually reported to the full House without further
changes [ftenno,1966,p.l34]. As with Armed Services Committee
reports, Appropriations Committee reports form an integral
part of the legislative history of the appropriation and are
used to determine the intent of the Congress. Changes to
appropriations bills on the House Floor are rare. Richard
Fenno has discussed in considerable detail the reasons for this
phenomenon [Fenno, 1966, pp. ^33-^3^3 - When they do occur,
they are usually minor. Of 591 non-defense bills in the early
Sixties examined by Fenno, 517 were passed without amendment
[Fenno, 1966,p. 450]. Between 1961 and 1972, 7 defense bills were
^Military Construction, which comprises a very small
proportion of the defense budget, will not be discussed
specifically in this analysis.
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passed without amendment, while three were passed with just
one amendment. Two of those three included amendments
introduced by George Mahon, Chairman of the Defense Appropri-
ations Subcommittee and were supported by the Subcommittee.
The other two years, the defense bill was passed after two
amendments were approved [Congressional Quarterly Almanacs,
1961 through 1972]. Of the seven amendments approved in this
time frame, two amendments prohibited the construction of
ships in foreign shipyards, two amendments prohibited any use
of appropriated funds for a domestic peace corps, one amend-
ment reduced funds for the Army by $10 million since a price
change had occurred since the Subcommittee had considered the
budget request, one amendment included funds for a new
destroyer which had not been included in the Subcommittee's
version of the bill since Senate authorization of the destroyer
had not been completed, and one included increases in operations
and maintenance funds for Army, Navy and Air Force of $50
million each, an amendment introduced by Mahon.
After House passage, the Defense Appropriations bill is
brought to the Senate where it is referred to the Senate
Appropriations Committee and subsequently to the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee. It should be noted, though, that
the Subcommittee has usually been holding hearings on the
original House bill for quite some time, even though the bill
has not yet been formally referred to the Senate. The
following table gives the average number of days between the
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opening of Senate hearings and the passage of the Defense
Appropriations Bill in the House for the 1946-1949, 1952-1955
and 1962-1965 time periods
1946-1949 1952-1955 1962-1965
+26.2 -48.0 -90.8
[Note: "+" means bill passed before hearing started.]
TABLE 1.9
In recent years, the Senate Defense Appropriations
Subcommittee and Senate Armed Services Committee have been
holding joint hearings on procurement and RDTE
.
After hearings are concluded and the House passes its
bill, the Subcommittee marks up the final House bill and
writes its report. The full Appropriations Committee then
refers the Subcommittee bill to the Senate Floor. Since
1961, twenty amendments to defense appropriations bills have
been adopted on the Senate Floor. Some of these amendments,
especially in recent years, have involved significant changes.*
Even these totals, however, probably do not adequately capture
the role of Floor consideration in the Senate. For example
in 1970 only one amendment was offered and it was adopted,
*For example, in FY1971, a floor amendment provided $500
million to Israel of which $250 million was for the purchase




but Congressional Quarterly states, "Many members had prepared
floor amendments to trim the bill if the committee had not
done so." [Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1970, p. 419]
After Senate passage, a Conference Committee composed of
some or all of the Defense Appropriations Subcommittees'
members meets to iron out differences between the House and
Senate versions of the bill. As with authorization bills,
the Conference reaches a compromise agreement and writes a
Conference Report
. After House and Senate approval of the
Conference Report, the compromise bill is sent to the
President for his signature.
Like authorizations , appropriations acts set dollar
limits for broad categories like Navy RDTE, and Army
Aircraft procurement. Specific programs are seldom, if
ever, mentioned in the actual legislation. The Congress and
the Defense Department know how the cuts in budget requests
are to be allocated (unless the cut is an undistributed or
nonspecific reduction) by the legislative history of the
appropriations act. Most important in this legislative
history are the Committee reports . Study of these reports
yields significant information about the reasons for budget
reductions and the intent of the Congress. For example,
since budget prepreparation took place over 18 months prior
to Congressional review, the Department of Defense itself
will often recommend reductions because of factors such as
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schedule slippages.* In the budget execution stage Committee
reports are important sources of information for determining
the legality of switching dollars between different accounts.
1.5 Budget Execution
The passage of an appropriations act by no means marks
the end of the budget process. In fact the budget execution
stage, which begins with the passage of the act, is one of the
most important of all the budget stages. During budget execu-
tion, funds are apportioned, allocated and allotted by OMB,
OSD, and the Services to those levels of the Defense estab-
lishment which will obligate and spend the appropriated funds.
Also, during this stage the Services frequently seek and obtain
authority from the Secretary of Defense and the Congress for
transferring appropriations from one account to another — a
process called reprogramming . The budget execution stage as
discussed here includes all the activity between the signing
of the appropriations act and the actual expenditure (outlay)
of appropriated funds. Activity in this stage is affected by
myriad rules and regulations; consequently, only the selected
portions or elements will be discussed.
History
A traditional budgetary problem has been the problem of
deficiencies; that is, overobligation by an agency and then
*For example, REDEYE missile in 196'!. [House Report 1329,
p. 35, April 17, 1964]
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presentation to Congress of a "fait accompli." As one member
puts it, the departments "can make these deficiencies and
Congress can refuse to allow them; but after they are made
it is hard to refuse to allow them." In order to address
this problem, Congress passed the Anti-deficiency Act of 1903
which provided for agency apportionment or allotment of
obligational authority, generally on a quarterly basis. It
also provided for penalties for exceeding the apportionments
or allotments [U.S. Code 665 (a)-(I ) ] . Later, in 1921 the
Budget and Accounting Act vested apportionment power in the
Bureau of the Budget (later OMB). To this day, "0MB reflects
Presidential control and can restrict the rate or purpose of
obligations as provided for by law." [Navy Programming Manual,
P • -L * "" I J
In the Department of Defense, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense becomes very much involved in the apportionment
process. Apportionment decisions have actually been the joint
responsibility of the OMB and OSD. During the 1960's impound-
ments (refusal to apportion Congressionally approved obliga-
tional authority) were the result of OSD decisions.*
The Apportionment Process
The apportionment process resembles the budget preparation
stage of the budget process. As the Navy RDTE manual states
*The classic example is Secretary McNamara's refusal to
apportion funds appropriated for the B-70 bomber.
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"The bureaus, systems commands and offices
conduct their reviews of apportionment programs
in much the same manner as budget estimates are
reviewed. The review and apportionment program
to OSD is the same as for budget estimates."
[Navy RDTE Management Guide, p. 5-2].
Preparation of apportionment proposals or requests begins
well before the passage of the appropriations act. The
Service Comptroller offices generally obtain all the appor-
tionment requests within one week after the passage of the
appropriations act while the final request is submitted to
OMB within fifteen days after the passage of the act.*
Hearings are held on the apportionment request by the
Services, OMB and OSD [Navy RDTE Management Guide, pp. 5-2
to 5-33.
The reason for all this paperwork is two-fold. First of
all, by the time the apportionment request is acted upon
approximately two years have elapsed since the budget pre-
preparation stage for the fiscal year in question. During
that time the threat may have changed, priorities may have
changed, projects may have fallen behind schedule, costs may
have changed. A second reason is that the Congress has
generally cut the appropriations request (in line item
categories) and those cuts must be applied to individual
programs in the absence of specific Congressional instructions.**
*The apportionment request is submitted on for DD1105.
Final authorization is approved on approved form DD1105 and
on form SD-MO.
*For example, in 1968, 1969 and 1970 the Congress made




As the fiscal year progresses, needs may change, some
projects may fall behind schedule, new projects may arise or
any number of unforeseen eventualities may surface. The
device for handling this problem during the budget execution
stage is called reprogramming . Reprogramming is the shifting
of funds from specific uses originally planned to others
where these funds can theoretically make a greater contribution
to organizational or military effectiveness. In other words,
it is using money for reasons other than those for which it
was appropriated. Reprogramming in the Defense Department
plays a very important part in the budget process. However,
it is not always looked upon favorably by the Congress. For
example, in 1971 Representative Whitten of the Rouse Defense
Appropriations Subcommittee stated in a hearing on defense
reprogramming, "We tend to give money for a high priority
project and then you... come in and say you want to use it for
a low priority project." [House Appropriations Committee
Hearings on Defense Appropriations, 1971, Part II, p. 603]
Reprogramming procedures have been well-defined in the
Defense Department since the early Sixties [Parker, 1973, Ch. 2].
Following the passage of the appropriations act, the Services
submit to the Congress, via OSD, their Base for Reprogramming
Decisions. This document (DDl^l'i) "identifies the purposes
in terms of budget subactivities of the .. .appropriation and
the amounts for which funds have been authorized and
appropriated." [Navy RDTE Guide, pp. 5-6] It also reflects
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the application of cuts made by the Congress. For example,
the Congress may make an across-the-board 3-percent cut in
operations and maintenance. The Base for Reprogramming
decisions will show how this reduction was applied to specific
programs
.
Suppose the Services desire to reprogram. Specific
approval is required by SECDEP and the Armed Services and
Appropriations Committees if the reprogramming involves any
programs or functions specifically reduced by Congressional
action or items which the Committees have expressed an interest
in.* The latter can be determined by a review of the legis-
lative history of the authorization and appropriations bills:
hearings, committee reports, floor debate. Approval of SECDEF
and notification of the Congressional Committees is required
if the reprogramming action involves an increase of $2 million
or more in any budget subactivity or the addition of a new
subactivity line item the cumulative cost of which is estimated
to be $10 million or more over a three year period. Because of
the way the procedures are set up, the Services obtain maximum
flexibility the more programs they fund under each line item
(rather than increasing the number of line items) since
reprogramming is based on "fences" drawn by the line items.
On the other hand, the Congress increases its control by
drawing more "fences" or requiring more specific breakdowns
of budget estimates.
*A reprogramming request together with its justification
is transmitted on a form DDl'415.

Twice each year the Services transmit to the Congress a
"Report on Programs" which summarizes all reprogramming
approved during a 6 month period, including those actions
which did not require SECDEF or Congressional approval. The
Report, called a DDl4l6, includes columns reflecting the
original program (appropriations) as approved by Congress that
was earlier transmitted on the 001414, all approved reprogram-
ming actions since that time, all reprogramming actions that
were taken which did not require reprogramming and the current
program (as modified by reprogramming)
.
Most reprogramming requests are handled by the chairmen,
ranking minority members and senior members of the Defense
Appropriations Subcommittees and the Armed Services Committees.
As Stephen Horn, a former Senate Appropriations staff member
has said, "Most junior members of Senate Appropriations are
unaware of the vast reprogramming responsibilities held by
their senior colleagues. . .the requests and the disposition
of them almost never become known to others on the subcommittees
or full committee." [Horn,1970,p. 194] Occasionally, a reprogram-
ming request will stir up controversy, such as a reprogramming
request seeking funds for the STEP program in the Sixties.*
Members who are worried about potential reprogramming without
Congressional oversight will often seek an amendment to the
appropriations or authorization bills or at least will try to
*STEP was a program to train individuals who failed to
pass armed services qualification tests. [Horn, 1970,p. 1951
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generate floor debate which will cover a particular item. A
good example of this are the amendments to Defense Appropri-
ations bills introduced by H. R. Gross and passed by the House
in the mid-Sixties which prohibited the Department of Defense
from using appropriated funds to establish a domestic peace
corps. With the passage of these amendments any attempt to
reprogram funds (no matter how small the amount) into a
domestic peace corps program would have required Congressional
Committee approval. However, if Congressman Gross's
amendment were opposed by Committee members, a reprogramming
request which might subvert the purpose of the amendment could
have been approved without being brought to the Floor of the
House or the Senate.
An important question that comes to mind when discussing
reprogramming concerns its magnitude. How much money is
reprogrammed yearly? Statistics for DoD are scarce since some
of the reprogramming documents are classified. During the
four fiscal years 1961 through 1964, over $8.8 billion in
Defense reprogramming was undertaken for missiles, ships, and
RDTE alone
.
[Report of House Armed Services Committee, July 8,
1965]. The approved procurement and RDTE budgets for these
years totalled approximately $83 billion.
A recent study by Commander John T. Parker [Parker, 1973 jPP.
90-91 and 97-98], includes the following figures for
reprogramming. Unfortunately some of these figures do not
reflect what is termed "below threshold reprogramming" —
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that is reprogramming for which official notification of
SECDEF and/or the Congress is not required.













TABLE I. 10 (in billions)
Note: *196l-1963 data is only RDTE and Aircraft-Missile
reprogramming
.
**1968-1972 data is only above threshold programming
1.6. Audit
The final step of the budget process is the audit. The
General Accounting Office undertakes audits for the Congress
while various components within the Defense Department and
the Services undertake them for the executive branch.
The legislative audit undertaken by the General Accounting
Office (GAO), includes not only an examination of accounts for
accuracy and adequacy but also includes scrutiny of the legal
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basis for expenditures in order to ascertain whether or not
they were made in accordance with the letter and intent of
the law. As might be suspected, the intent of the law is
usually determined by examining the legislative history of
the appropriation against which the obligation was charged.
A comprehensive discussion of GAO, its history and its
functions is contained in [Harris , 1964, Chapter 6],
GAO was established in 1921 by the Budget and Accounting
Act. Until 1921 auditing of governmental accounts was done
• by auditors in the Treasury Department. The Budget and
Accounting Act declared GAO to be independent of the executive
department. The Comptroller General is appointed by the
President to a fifteen year non-renewable term and can be
removed only by a joint resolution of Congress. During the
first three decades of its existence, GAO was attacked by
executive agencies as being unduly restrictive in its
accounting and financial management requirements. Finally,
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1950 called for reform in
accounting and auditing methods. Cooperation between GAO,
the Treasury, and the Budget Bureau in the area of accounting
and auditing followed this legislation [Harris , 1964 ,p. 135].
GAO has the power of disallowance. Consequently, an
executive officer may be subject to penalties if GAO does
not agree that an expenditure was within the letter and intent
of the law. To protect themselves, many executive officers
seek advance GAO rulings on questionable expenditures
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[Harris ,1964 ,p . 145]. Also, at times the Congress has granted
exemptions to agencies which state that decisions on the
legality of expenditures by executive officers are final,
which means that GAO cannot disallow these expenditures.
Occasionally certain Defense activities have been exempted,
especially during wartime [See Harris, 1964 ,p. 147, for an example]
In addition to auditing agency books, the General
Accounting Office has in recent years assumed the role of
investigator for the Congress. Every year numerous reports
on the financial management systems of all or part of various
federal agencies are submitted to the Congress.* Every agency
is not audited every year, but GAO can decide to audit or
investigate it at any time. The audit or investigation may
be authorized by GAO on its own authority, by a Congressional
Committee or by an individual Congressman.
The National Security Act Amendments of 1949 established
the internal audit of defense accounts as a function to be
performed by the offices of the Comptrollers of the Services
and the Comptroller of the Department of Defense. Since GAO
does not audit all DoD accounts every year, internal audits
are both protective and constructive, attempting to detect
items that might be of interest to GAO and to provide manage-
ment with information related to economy and efficiency.
The audit stage is seldom included in discussions of
Defense budgeting. Nevertheless, it is important to realize
'Recent examples include studies of the DD963 and the C5A
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that the audit function Is_ performed and that it places some
limits on Service activities; for example, unreported repro-
gramming is likely to be caught by GAO. This in turn means
that the Services have some incentive to try to insure that
appropriations are granted for the items they believe to be
important. In other words, the Services can in general not
take an appropriations estimate "off a license plate" and expect
to be able to reprogram with impunity later, given the pre-
viously mentioned reprogramming reporting requirements and
the possibility of GAO audit and disallowance.
1.7. Summary
In this chapter, the defense budget process has been
outlined, beginning with the budget prepreparation stage, and
terminating at the audit stage. This description is a
necessary preliminary to the more technical analysis contained
in the later chapters. These chapters will focus on the
Congressional review stage and will attempt to characterize
the response of the Congress as a whole to the President's
budget request for Defense procurement and research and
development. The discussion of this chapter hopefully will
have impressed the reader with the numerous factors behind
and the background of the budget request of the President and
likewise the numerous elements which affect final Congressional
action on that request. Although any given year's budget
process may be viewed as a sequence of events, budget execution
for year t-2 may affect the budget preparation for the budget
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of year t. Thus any attempt to formulate deterministic
models of even part of the process does not appear to have
much chance of success unless the models contain an exception-
ally large number of variables. The analysis to be undertaken here
abstracts from many of the potential variables that might
affect Congressional action in any one year in order to
formulate, and estimate parameters for -simple, probabilistic
models. These models are designed to characterize Congressional
activity on the average and to identify departures from this





The literature on Congressional budgeting is extensive,
with major contributions dating back to Arther MacMahon's
classic discussion of Congressional oversight [MacMahon, 19*33-
Other works include those of Huzar, Carroll, Smithies,
Wallace, Harris. Since I960, the two most frequently
cited
studies of Congressional budgeting have been those of
Wildavsky
[Wildavsky, 1964] and Fenno [Fenno,1966] . These two works are
similar in many ways. Both are narrative discussions of
Congressional budgeting based on interviews with Congressmen,
Senators and staff members. Both conclude that, faced
with
complex and detailed budget requests, the Congress
(appropri-
ations subcommittees in particular) adopts simple approaches
to budget review. These approaches are best
characterized as
incrementalism and sampling [Wildavsky, 1964,pp. 14-15, and Fenno,1966,
PP. 332-340]. By incrementalism it is meant that
the Congress
often makes marginal, percentage-like decisions on budget
requests. [For example, an incremental decision rule
might,
as a rule, grant 90 percent of the budget request.] By
sampling it is meant that the Congress will select some
item,

often a small, Insignificant and familiar one, and examine it
in great detail [Fenno,1966,p
.
336].. If the item is justified,
other items will be approved. If not, the item will be cut,
possibly eliminated, and another item will be examined.
As a sequel to Wildavsky's work, Davis, Dempster and
Wildavsky [Davis, et al., 1966,1967, 1971] formulated a number of
simple linear models of budget requests and Congressional
action on budget requests in the non-defense sector. The analysis
to be presented here was partially stimulated by examination
of these models. The Davis, Dempster, Wildavsky (DDW) models
choose as their level of analysis the total agency budget,
that is the budget of agencies or bureaus such as the Bureau
of Land Management in the Department of the Interior. The
models and data considered here refer to a lower level of
aggregation.
Recently it has been suggested [Kanter ,1972] that the Fenno
and Wildavsky analyses and the DDW models do not apply to
Defense appropriations. The argument has been made that
Congressional action in this area is motivated by concern over
questions of national security [Kanter ,1972, p . 138]. Another
author has argued that Congressional action has been motivated
by fiscal or economic concerns [Korb, 1973] . On the other hand,
a 1970 Rand study [Stromberg,1970] attempts , with some success, to
apply DDW models to Defense budget data from the years 1953
to 1968.
The purpose of the analysis done here will not be to




Stromberg. However, it should be pointed out that those
studies are not necessarily totally inconsistent. For example,
it is possible for the Congress in general and the House and
Senate defense appropriations subcommittees in particular to
be making specific cuts in specific procurement programs such
as the F-1^4 aircraft for fiscal or policy reasons. Yet, at
the same time, it is possible that these subcommittees have
implicit (or possibly explicit) target figures for the
appropriations in the general categories like procurement
aircraft and missiles Navy (PAMN)
.
In this chapter and in subsequent chapters, appropriations
at the level of PAMN will be analyzed using several simple
models. The data is comprised of requests and appropriations
for aircraft and missile procurement for the Army, Navy and
Air Force, and research and development (RDTE) requests and
appropriations for the Army, Navy and Air Force. The analysis
was limited to these categories since they are the ones in
which Congressional cuts (or additions) have been most frequent
and of the greatest size [Korb ,1973,P . 16].
The purpose of the analysis will be to characterize the
average or usual results of Congressional appropriations activity
(at the levels of aggregation reflected in the data), and to
identify as vividly as possible departures from the usual or
average results. A number of behavioral explanations exist
for the characterizations presented in the following chapters,
including incrementalism, sampling, and policy and fiscal
concerns at the program level. However, the focus of this
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analysis is not on the behavioral explanations of the budget
process but rather on the results of the process.*
The analysis In this chapter begins with a discussion of
the question of how one might construct a model of appropria-
tions as a percentage of budget requests . Next the methodol-
ogy employed by DDW and Stromberg in their studies is reviewed
and the methodology adopted in the data analysis reported
later in the chapter is presented. The data; its sources and
organization, will be explained and results of the analysis
of the data, using a variety of analytical techniques, will
then be reviewed. The final section is a summary of the
major conclusions of the chapter.
II. 2. Modelling Appropriations as a Percentage of Request.
In any one year, after the Congress appropriates funds,
one can look back on the request and note that the appropria-
tions are some percentage of the request — or
yt
= 3 f x.
where y, is the appropriation
in year t
x, is the request In year t
3. is the percentage or
average, of the request
that is appropriated.
If one is attempting to model the regular or usual results
of Congressional action, a potential approach would be to say
*This is similar to the focus of a recent study of Atomic




that the percentage is a constant, depending neither on the
request or the year. In other words, in order to sort out
usual budget outcomes from unusual ones, one might contend
that on the average, the appropriations are a fixed percentage
of the request. However, since such a simplified approach
leaves out numerous intricacies of the budget process which
in any one year may affect the final budget outcome, a
reasonable modification of the above might include a stochastic
error component which in some sense symbolizes other factors
not a part of the simple percentage statement. These other
factors, or errors, can be modelled in several ways. For
example, they can be viewed as being unrelated to the percent-
age, 3, and unrelated to the request. This would lead to a
model of the form:
y f
= Bx, + e, where e, is a random
disturbance.
On the other hand, one might view the percentage in any given
year as random, with it being the result of the interaction
of a fixed and a random component. This might be modelled







where u<_ is a random
" disturbance,
*The exponential form will enable us to use standard
estimating procedures after taking logarithms.
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The percentage In a given year might also be viewed as
random but the result of the additive effect of a random
disturbance on a fixed component:
y t
Note the difference between y./x. = 3 + e. and
u







3/3! + ... . Thus, the random
component (the sum of all the terms after 3) is related to
the size of 3.
One point which has not been addressed is that another
way of looking at appropriations as being a percentage of
requests that this percentage as having some regular or
usual component to it is to view the percentage as being










where [£x. a~ ] represents the percentage of the request
appropriated. This representation resembles a graduated
income tax scheme (if < a <"1) in that as x, gets larger
the percentage of the request appropriated gets smaller.
More specifically, since the elasticity of [Bx. a~ ] equals
(a-1) the above equation implies that if the request changes
by z percent, the percentage of the request appropriated
will change by (a-l)z percent.* Again, other factors
discussed earlier may cause the percentage not to be exactly
3x. . Thus, a random component might be included in the




= 3x, e where u, is a random
x
t disturbance
In the above paragraphs, four somewhat different ways of
characterizing appropriations outcomes have been discussed.
These were formulated into the following equations:











































t(2.5) yt = 3xt e
*
The equations are the result of different ways of thinking
about the routine, percentage aspect of Congressional
appropriations. As discussed earlier, they do not imply
that Congressional decision-makers always, or even ever,
think in precise percentage terms. (Although they might.)
Rather, they are different ways of characterizing the usual
end-product or overall results of Congressional action and
may provide insight into what outcomes are unusual or
irregular.
Up to this point, nothing has been said about the
statistical questions involved in estimating 3 (and a) from
sets of data. It turns out that the equations just formulated
also appear to be alternatives one might consider when faced
with the problem of estimation and the assumptions that
necessarily underlie the computation of estimates . The
discussion that will follow will concentrate mainly on the
statistical aspects of the problem of characterizing Congres-
sional appropriations as a percentage of requests. The
methodology of DDW and Stromberg will be discussed first.
Then alternative approaches will be suggested and the results





Prior analysis of budget data by Davis, Dempster, and
Wildavsky and by Stromberg have generally commenced with the
assumption of a simple model for Congressional budget behavior






where y, = appropriations in year t
x. = request in year t
e. is a stochastic error or disturbance term
2
assumed to be distributed N(0,a ) with the
sequence {e
fc
} being one of independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d.) random
variables
.
The constant coefficient 3 is then estimated using least
squares and some criteria like R , the "coefficient of
determination," is used to judge the adequacy of the "fit"
of the model to the data [DDW,1971,P. 536, Stromberg, 1970,pp. 21-
25] .* In most cases [DEW,1971,p. 537] the R 2 was very high
and thus more complex models employing additional variables
seemed unnecessary. Both DDW and Stromberg attempt to deter-
mine breakpoints — years in which the coefficient 3 shifts — by
performing a hypothesis test originally suggested by Chow[Chow, I960],
*"The principal selection criterion (among alternative
models) is the_ criterion of the maximum adjusted correlation
coefficient, R" [DDW,1971,p. 536].
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II. 3.1. Methodological Problems
There are several problems with this methodology. The
difficulties can be classified under three subject headings
labelled problems with (i) the model, (ii) fitting techniques,
centered around the use of least squares, and (iii) goodness
2
of fit criteria, exemplified by the use of R as a criterion
of closeness of fit.
(i) Model Specification Problems
One of the first problems is that the model specified in
(2.1) assumes no interdependence between either 3 and x or
between e and x. As suggested earlier, if Congress were
using a percentage appropriation or percentage cut decision
rule, it may conceivably be the case that the percentage
changes with the size of the request. The problem would not
be noticeable if all requests for a particular agency (in the
case of DDW) or for a particular functional category (in the
case of Stromberg) were of approximately the same magnitude.
In the Stromberg study, however, requests for Procurement
Aircraft and Missiles, Navy, for example, ranged between $380
million in 1953 and $3.06 billion in 1963. Certainly it will
be desirable to let available data speak for itself on this
issue of interdependence between size of request and magnitude
of the percentage appropriated, and on others to be discussed.
Another type of interdependence is that between e and x.
As will be discussed later and as is well known [Scheffe,1959],
the optimal properties of least squares depend on the sequence
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{e.} being uncorrelated, Identically distributed, and having
var(e.) = a , a constant. Under such conditions the Gauss-
Markov theorem is applicable, guaranteeing efficiency of
least squares estimates among the class of estimators linear
in the observations. Were this condition to be true, and
considering a model of the form of (2.1), then as the
request gets larger the spread of actual data points or
variance around the regression line remains unchanged. Both
DDW and Stromberg view the error term, e. , as a random shock
or variation from the usual percentage associated with
"special events and circumstances relevant to particular
years." [DDW, 1971, P • 53^, and Stromberg, 1970, p . 8]. However,
it is likely to be the case that the "special circumstances"
that affect a $380 million request are neither the same nor
create the same distribution of external affects, as the
circumstances that affect a $3-06 billion request.
(ii) Least Squares Problems
The Gauss-Markov theorem insures that if the e. are
i.i.d. then least squares estimators are best (minimum
variance) linear unbiased estimators. If (2.1) were
the true underlying model, then provided that an
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estimate that is linear in the data is desired, the least
squares estimate would appear to be a logical choice.
However, as mentioned previously, one obvious form of
plack of homogeneity of variance of error terms — a changing
with x. — is certainly possible. In fact, since the regression
line passes through the origin in equation (2.1) and negative
appropriations are not possible, there is a lack of
homogeneity of the error variance built into the model.
Another problem is the presence of cutting or spending
moods on the part of Congress. Perhaps the residuals in the
nineteen fifties decade are predominantly positive, and those
in the sixties negative. One way DDW try to take this








where ^ = pe t_ 1 + vt
and the sequence {v. } is one of independent
identically distributed random variables.
However, in most cases they were only dealing with 8
observations (at the most 16 and at the fewest 3).
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Both DDW and Stromberg attempted to detect changes in the
coefficient 8, changes which could be associated with a cutting
or spending mood on the part of the Congress and the public.
















where the first equation is for the first n years of data,
the second equation is for the second n~ years of data and
the* third equation is for the pooled (n
n
+n =n years) data.
The value of n, was allowed to vary between 3 and n-3 so that
all possible break points were tried. In addition to the
problems with using this approach on data sets
numbering 8 or fewer, there is the added difficulty that the
test assumes the error terms are normally distributed.
Simpler approaches, such as examination of residuals, may
be more informative.















(the request) for the first n, years of data and zero
for the remaining years and x~. = x. (the request) for the
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last n 2 years of data and zero otherwise. He then ran a
t-test for the equality of g. = gp. In his formulation the
{e. } are assumed to have the same distribution before and
after the shift in the parameter 6.
In many cases least squares may be more of a hindrance
than a help to inference and achieving an understanding of
the data. One grossly outlying observation may seriously
affect the least squares estimate. As an illustration,
consider the situation portrayed in Figure II. 1, when the




The upper^point in Figure II. 1 may be a genuine outlier
For example, the President may have sent to Congress an
urgent request for more funds. This request, occasioned by
an international crisis, may have been made in March after
the budget was submitted and consequently was not reflected
in the budget request data analyzed. Because least squares
11-14

minimizes the squared deviations from the regression line,
the resulting estimate of 3 in certain situations is apt to
be a meaningless compromise. Least squares will produce a
line with a slope larger than the true 3 in order to avoid
the one extremely large deviation.
Another situation that might arise is depicted in





Even if the previously discussed problems are not present
and the error terms are i.i.d., the Gauss-Markov theorem only
insures that least squares estimators are the best from the
class of estimators that is linear in the observations.
Anscombe [1967] and Huber [1973] have proposed so-called
robust * estimators which are modifications of the least squares
estimators but which are not linear in the observations.
These estimators appear to be especially appealing when
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assumptions of equality of the variance of the disturbances
are not satisfied and when long tailed error distributions
are suspected to be in operation.* Robust estimators will
be discussed in more detail in later chapters.
(iii) The Use and Interpretation of R
_?
Davis, Dempster and Wildavsky propose the use of R , the
coefficient of determination, adjusted for degrees of freedom,
as the criterion for the closeness of fit of the data to
their models. There are two major problems with this
criterion. One was pointed cut by Stromberg; the other has
apparently not been discussed before in the context of the
subject matter being investigated.
2
The usual computational formula for the estimate of R






s (y t -y)
2
t=i z
where e, is the t residual from the fitted function, y t
is the t observation on the dependent variable, and y is
the sample mean of the dependent variable. Dividing the
numerator and the denominator of equation (2.6) by T, it is
*Anscombe [1967] and Ruber [1973] contend that in practice
it is difficult to distinguish between the effects of hetero-




to see why R is usually proposed as a criterion and given
an interpretation of 1 minus the unexplained variance as a
percentage of total variance of the dependent variable, or
the explained variance as a percentage of total variance.
Stromberg [1967, pp. 21-24] has pointed out that when per-
forming regression with an intercept forced to be equal to zero as
^t 2in equation (2.1) the interpretation of —=— as the (sample)
unexplained variance is not correct. Regression with an
unconstrained term insures that the e~, the mean residual,
will be identically zero since when the partial derivative
p
of the function to be minimized (£e, ) with respect to the
intercept is set equal to zero, the resulting "normal"
equation automatically sets e equal to zero. However when
a, zero " intercept is assumed, this normal equation is not
a result of the least squares minimization and e either may
or may not equal zero. Injecting e into equation (2.5) won't
2help since then one could theoretically obtain a large R
when the average error around the regression line was large
but the spread around the average small.
Stromberg [1967,p. 24] and the BIOMED statistical package
[BIOMED, 1965, p . 233] have addressed the problem by computing
a somewhat different number than that in equation (2.5)-












The interpretation given is that W gives 1 minus the
unexplained variation about zero as a percentage of the total
variation of the dependent variable about zero. The problem
here is that when performing regression under the assumption
of a zero intercept, zero appears to be chosen as the point
around which variation is computed more for convenience than
for any other reason. Also, suppose that e~ happens to equal
zero or be near zero (which will be the case if regression
with an unconstrained intercept would have yielded a zero or
near zero intercept) then with positive y , ' s (which will
always be the case with budget data) W will be larger than
2the corresponding R value and could be somewhat misleading
2to someone used to thinking in terms of R .
2Another problem with R is associated with the question
of its usefulness as a tool in analyzing budget models
similar to (2.1). The model (2.1) states that appropriations
equal a percentage of request — plus' some random error term.
There should be no difference between this statement and
the statement — on the average Congress cuts a certain









In fact, if (2.1) is a correct model, then 3 should equal











= (1 " Y)x
t " C t
DDW and Stromberg have always tested equations similar to
equation (2.1) and In general reported that the models were
2 2
appropriate since the R (or W ) values were .98 or .99.
A simple test of equation (2.8) on data which yields a
2 2
.99 R for equation (2.1) will reveal a much reduced R .
(For example, data which yielded a .98 R for equation (2.1)
achieved only a .26 R^ for equation (2.8).)
The point of the discussion is that the value for the
2
measure of fit, R
,
is going to be sensitive to the way the
model for appropriations is formulated because changes in
location of the dependent variable alter the distribution
2 2
of R . As a result, one should probably not use R as an
absolute measure of fit and should instead consider it in
a probabilistic context.
II. 3. 2 A Description of the Methodology Employed
Methodological problems with analysis of appropriations
behavior were divided into model specification, least squares,
2
and the use of R as a criterion of closeness of fit of the
data to the model. The methodology of the analysis of this
chapter was designed to address these problems.
Plotting
The first approach to the data involved constructing
scatterplots of appropriations and requests. Scatterplcts
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graphically Indicate the range of the data and the character
of the relationship between the variables, whether it be
linear or curvilinear. Scatterplots also reveal potential
outliers. Stem and leaf plots* of the appropriations and
the requests were also constructed to display the range and
variation of the data. In addition to being revealing,
scatterplots and stem and leaf plots are relatively easy
to construct, for example using the SNAP/IEDA computer
package from Princeton University.
Plots of the logarithms of the data were also analyzed.
These plots were useful for consideration of the models
2.3 through 2.5.
Alternative Models and Estimation Procedures
Five alternative models were chosen as potential repre-
sentations of appropriations as a percentage of requests.
These were the models (2.1) through (2.5) discussed in
section II. 3. It should be noted that the models, except
for (2.1), are proposed in order to take into account
systematic interdependence between the request, x. , and the
percentage appropriated, the error component, or both. They
are not designed to take into account cutting or spending
moods, or eras in the mood of Congress.
*Stem and leaf plots are discussed in Appendix A
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Our attitude towards the models is that (a) they cannot
be universally or perpetually valid — one can specify repre-
sentations of more complex behavior on the part of Congress —
,
but (b) such simple models do aid in understanding the
phenomena underlying the data. In particular, estimation of
model coefficients by various techniques, and subsequent
examination of the residuals around the fitted relationship
is a procedure that brings to attention certain historical
periods and possibly certain programs that differ from the
average or "usual." The fact that such periods (or eras) and
programs exist should give pause to those who would attempt
to mechanistically predict future appropriations behavior on
the basis of simple models fitted to historical data. On the
other hand, simple fitted models can provide a starting point
for future discussions of amounts to be appropriated [Senate
Report 93-688].
The simplest model of appropriations behavior, that given
by equation (2.1), was estimated using ordinary least squares.
The residuals were analyzed using scatterplots , and stem and
leaf plots of both the residuals themselves and their absolute
value
.
The model specified in equation (2.2) was analyzed in two
ways. The least squares estimator for $ is the mean value
for the ratio y,/x . However, the median y.»-/x+- ratio was
also utilized in order to provide a robust estimator of £5
[Andrews, et al.,1972], and to allow outliers to reveal
themselves more clearly. The residuals for both estimates
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were compared on the basis of scatterplots and stem and leaf
plots, both of the residuals themselves and of their absolute
value .
Equation (2.3) specified a percentage type model, in some
ways similar to equation (2.1), except that the error term is
multiplicative. It is also similar to equation (2.4) except
that the percentage of the request that is appropriated does
not change with the size of the request. The coefficient B
was estimated in two ways. The first method, which yielded
the least squares estimate, was to use the mean difference of
In y . - In x. as the estimate of In B. The second approach
was to use the median difference. Residuals for both
estimates were compared.
The model specified in equation (2.4) is linear in the
logs. Consequently logarithms were taken of both sides of
(2.4) and the coefficients a and In B were estimated using
least squares . Residuals were analyzed as in the case of the
other models
.
If one takes logarithms of both sides of (2.5) the
resulting equation is:
(2.9) In yt = In 3 + a In x t + u fc In xt
As suggested in [Johnston, 1963, P . 211 ], estimates of a
and In B were computed by applying least squares after
dividing both sides of equation (2.9) by In x. .*
*Since none of the values for the x. ' s were equal to 1.0,
division by In x. was always possible
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In the cases of (2.3) - (2.5) it should be obvious that
P was not estimated directly; rather, estimates of In 3 were
derived. The exponential of this estimate was used as the
estimate of 8.
It should be pointed out that the goals of estimation at
this point in the analysis are exploratory and tentative.
One question to be answered was: which methods tolerate and
reveal these outliers more effectively — the log transformed
data or the basic numbers, mean estimators or median estimators.
Another question to be answered was whether or not any of the
approaches (analysis of the logs, use of medians or means)
revealed cutting or spending moods.
II. I*. Data
Two basic batches of data were analyzed. The first were
procurement requests and appropriations for the years
1953-1973. The following categories were analyzed as a group:
Procurement Equipment and Missiles, Army (PEMA)
Procurement Aircraft and Missiles, Navy (PAMN)
Procurement Aircraft, Air Force (AF A/C)
Procurement Missiles, Air Force (AF Missiles)
Twenty one years of data and ^ observations per year should
yield Sk total observations. However, from 1955-1958 either
PEMA requests or appropriations or both were zero and
consequently were not included in the data. Thus, to start
with, 80 observations were analyzed. The above four categories
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constitute roughly three quarters of annual Defense Department
procurement requests and appropriations. The only major
category not included which is comparable in size to these
is Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy. The high and low






















HIGH AND LOW APPROPRIATIONS FOR PROCUREMENT
APPROPRIATIONS IN THE PERIOD 1953-1973
The data from the years 1953-1968 were taken from
Stromberg [Appendices A and B] . Stromberg took the appropri-
ations categories of 1968 as given; he then traced all
category changes back to 1953 (there were few in the procure-
ment area) and thus reconciled the data with the 1968
categories. The 1969-1973 data were reconciled with the 1968
categories (there were several changes in the Army procurement
categories in 1972) by the author. The basic data was
obtained from [U.S. Senate, Budget Estimates and
Appropriations, 1969-19731.
The second batch of data analyzed was the Research and
Development (RDTE) requests and appropriations for 1953-1973




RDTE Army $1,839 1972
RDTE Navy 2.5^5 1973
RDTE Air Force 3.632 1963
TABLE II.
2
observations. The high and low appropriations figures for





HIGH AND LOW APPROPRIATIONS FOR RDTE
IN THE YEARS 1953-1973
The data sources for RDTE were the same as for the Procurement
data. A listing of the data can be found in Appendix D of
this chapter.
II. 5. Results
Analysis of the procurement and RDTE data using the
approaches discussed earlier yielded some notable differences
in results depending on which approach was used. These
differences can be summarized under the categories of differ-
ences in coefficients, residuals and outliers, and closeness
of "estimated" appropriations to actual appropriations, i.e.
predictability. Each of these topics will be taken up in turn
II. 5.1. Coefficients
The three models (2.1) - (2.3) all say that
on the average, appropriations are a constant percentage of










component enters their specification. The estimated
coefficients using the different approaches for procurement







ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OF REQUEST
APPROPRIATED USING (2.1) - (2.3)
Although it is difficult to assess the differences among the
various "estimated" percentages without some measures of
stability or variability of the estimates or without examining
how close the estimated appropriations are to actual appropri-
ations both for the set of data analyzed and for an independent
set, some differences stand out immediately upon examination
of Table II. 3. The least squares estimates for the percentages
in (2.1) and (2.2), that is .959, and .993, for procurement are
different from the other estimated percentages which are
about .975. Confidence intervals computed in Chapter IV will
allow us to assess the importance of such differences.
A seccnd interesting aspect of the estimated coefficients
is that for the RDTE data the least squares estimates for
(2.2) and (2.3) are greater than 1.0, being 1.09 and 1.03
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respectively. In other words, according to these results the
Congress has increased the appropriations over and above the
request by seme percentage figure. This result is somewhat
at odds with the current view of Congressional activity in
the RDTE area, that is, the view that the Congress is carefully
scrutinizing and cutting RDTE budget requests. These and
other points will be pursued further in the discussion of
outliers and closeness of fit.
The two models (2.4) and (2.5) both say that the percentage
of the request which is granted depends on the size of the
request. The difference between the two is in the specifica-
tion o f the error component . The estimated coefficients for





TABLE 1 1. 4
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS FOR (2.4) AND (2.5)
The coefficients themselves are not immediately informative.
More informative are the percentages they imply. For example,
what percentage of the request do the estimated coefficients
imply would have been granted for a request of 3 billion













case, 3.0. The following table gives the average, maximum
and minimum percentage of the request that the estimated
coefficients imply would have been granted for the procurement
and RDTE data that was analyzed. This provides a method of
comparison of the estimated percentages from the approaches
(2.1) - (2.3) with the results of the estimation of coeffi-
cients for (2.4) and (2.5).
Model Procurement RDTE
High Average Low High Average Low
I (2.4) 1.14 .981 .91 1.35 1.03 -91
(2.5) 1.06 .975 .93 1.56 1.03 .85
TABLE I I.
5
ESTIMATED PERCENTAGE OP REQUEST GRANTED
FOR DATA ANALYZED
Appendix C to this chapter contains stem and leaf plots for
the percentages for procurement and RDTE using the approaches
of (2.4) and (2.5) .
An interesting question is: How does the "estimated"
percentage of the request granted change with changes in the
size of the request? As the request gets larger does the
percentage granted increase or decrease? (Of course the
approaches in (2.1) - (2.3) assume the percentage remains
the same.) This sensitivity of the percentage granted to
the size of the request can be investigated using the
elasticity of the percentage with respect to the request or
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i£» / — . The following table gives the "estimated"
elasticities for (2.4) and (2.5). Note that these elasticities








ELASTICITY OP PERCENTAGE OF REQUEST
GRANTED WITH RESPECT TO SIZE OP REQUEST
What these elasticities say is that for a 100 percent increase
in the request there is an estimated 5.2 percent decrease in
the percentage of the request granted (in the case of procure-
ment, with Model (2.4)).
II. 5. 2. Residuals
As discussed in the methodology section, for each approach
residuals were calculated and these residuals were then
studied. An initial study of the residuals was undertaken
(i) by making stem and leaf plots, and (ii) by making scatter-
plots of the residuals versus the request for (2.1)-(2.2) or
scatterplots of the residuals and logs of requests for (2.3)-(2.5)
11-29

The residuals studied were the results of the following
arithmetic computations for each approach.















(2.5') nTT^- a - In B GIn x. In x.
The stem and leaf plots and scatter plots are
contained in Appendix B of this chapter. The results for the
procurement data will be discussed first, followed by a
discussion of the results for the RDTE data.
Discussion of the Procurement Analysis:
Residuals and Outliers
For each model, as applied to the procurement data, the
following items or data points produced residuals whose
absolute values were more than twice the mean absolute















ITEMS PRODUCING LARGE RESIDUALS
These results reveal some interesting aspects of the
phenomena giving rise to the data. First, 195^ probably is
not part of the same population as the rest of the data.
Appropriations for fiscal 195^ were approved shortly after
the signing of the Korean truce and appear to be affected by
this event. (The high positive residual for 195^ PEMA —
representing a Congressional appropriation of over $2 billion
after the Army requested only $1 billion — either represents
a desire to replenish Army stocks at the close of the war o_r
possibly is related to the very large cut of the 1953 PEMA
request - a cut of almost $700 million). Until I960, PEMA
is a very unstable category. In 1957 and 1958 during the era
when "massive retaliation" and "brinksmanship" were the
popular foreign policy doctrines [Crecine and Fischer ,1971 ,PP
•
25-26] there were neither requests nor appropriations for
PEMA. The large positive residuals for fiscal 1962 PEMA and
fiscal 1963 PAMN reflect the increasing emphasis on conven-
tional weaponry in the early 1960's and may very well be
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related to Congressional concern over the unsuccessful Bay
of Pigs invasion of April 1961 and the growth of the Military
Assistance Command, Vietnam.
A second interesting aspect of analysis of the residuals
is that almost all post-1969 items yield negative residuals;
also, these are of approximately equal magnitude. In other words,
the various simple model approaches imply that recent appropri-
ations have been higher than they actually were. For example,
using the approach of (2.1) on procurement data, thirteen of
the twenty most negative residuals were for post-1969 items.
This grouping of the post-1969 items suggests that decision
rules changed in 1969 and the Congress began cutting a larger
percentage of the request. In other words, there is some
evidence that an era terminated and the mood of Congress
changed. Since the data analyzed represent total Congressional
activity, this analysis does not pinpoint whether the change
was associated with any special Congressional Committee. Other
research [Laurance,1973lndicates that the Senate Armed Services
Committee began to closely scrutinize defense authorization
requests at this time. The only peculiar aspect of the fiscal
1969 budget picture v/as that since it was acted on in calendar
1968, it was an election year budget. Also, fiscal 1968
represents the low point in President Johnson's popularity and
a low point in public support for the Vietnam war [Gallup ,1968] .'
One notable difference in the residuals for the different
approaches is associated with the pre-1960 items of less than





grouped together a number of
pre-1960 items that were under $2 billion, several being under
$1 billion, as the most negative residuals. The other
approaches, which used the original untransformed numbers
did not group these residuals together. For example, under
the approach of (2.4) 1953 PAMN with a request of $124.5
million and appropriations of $113 million produced the 5th
most negative residual. Under the approach in (2.1), the
residual was slightly negative and ranked 33rd (of 80) among
residuals ordered from most negative to most positive. A
similar result occurred for 1956 PAMN with a request of
$945 million and appropriations of $80*1 million.
The particular phenomenon observed here resembles one
discussed by Daniel and Wood[1971,P. 25] as part of a general
discussion of the distribution of data points. The plot of







As Daniel and Wood point out, if least squares is used
on data similar to that in Figure II. 3, the cluster at the
right acts as essentially one point in determining the slope.
The slope Is, thus, highly dependent on the extreme values
at $100 and $800 million. Thus, the residuals for those
items will tend to be small. If the approach of (2.3) is
used and the median difference between In y and In x. is
employed as an estimator for In B, then all of the points
have equivalent Importance in determining the estimate.
In the discussion of coefficients it was pointed out that
the .959 coefficient obtained by using least squares on (2.1)
was somewhat different from the coefficients produced by the
other approaches. In the stem and leaf plot of the residuals
(p. B-*0 note the large number of residuals in the 0-300
range. There are thirty-three negative residuals and forty-
seven positive ones. The other approaches yield distribu-
tions of residuals which are somewhat more symmetrical
around zero. For example note the stem and leaf plot (p. B-15)
for the approach of (2.4). There are forty-two negative and
thirty-eight positive residuals. The pattern of the residuals
and the estimated coefficients indicate that when least
squares was applied to (2.1) a few large cuts, that is
appropriations significantly smaller than requests, pulled
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the estimated line down slightly; hence the smaller slope
and different pattern of residuals. In later chapters
we will explore estimation procedures which are not as
sensitive as least squares to a few extreme observations.
Discussion of the RDTE Analysis'
Residuals and Outliers
As was true in the case of procurement, the residuals
produced by applying each of the various approaches to
RDTE data were examined in detail. The items which produced
the largest negative residuals under each of the approaches
were 195*1 Army, Navy and Air "Force. It should be noted that
for the approach of equation (2.2), regardless of whether
the mean or median of the ratio of appropriations to request
were used, the result failed to yield a negative residual
that was larger in absolute value than twice the mean of
the absolute value of residuals.
The largest positive residuals under each of the
approaches were produced by 1955 Navy, 1962 Air Force and
I960 Air Force.
The procurement data showed a marked tendency for post-
1969 items to have negative residuals for each model-fitting
approach. However, the RDTE data do not yield such definitive
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results for all approaches. The approaches of (2 .1) - (2
. 3)
,
especially (2.1) , show this tendency; in each case,
after the residuals were ordered from most negative to most
positive, 13 of 15 post-1969 Items yielded residuals in the
lower half of the ordered set. However, this was not true
for the variable percentage approaches of (2.4) and (2.5).
Under these approaches the most negative residuals were
recorded for the pre-1960 items, where the request and cut
were both small in absolute terms but the cut was large when
considered relative to the request. For example, under the
approach of (2.5) the seventeen most negative residuals were
for items less than $1 billion, prior to I960.
Insight can be gained into this pattern for the approaches
of (2j\ ) and (2.5 ) by recalling the elasticities presented
in Table II. 6. Under the approach of (2.5) the estimated elasticity
of the percentage of the request granted with respect to the
size of the request was -.148. Consequently, the percentage
of a 500 million dollar request that is appropriated was
estimated to be .148 larger than the percentage of a 1 billion
dollar request that is appropriated. The RDTE data varied
between requests of $54 million and $3 billion. Any items
for which the request was less than $1 billion and
which did not show appropriations greater than the request
yielded large negative residuals when the approaches of (2.4)
and (2.5) were used.
One feature of the analysis of RDTE residuals which did
not appear in the analysis of the procurement data was the
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almost exclusive domination of the extreme positive residuals
by the Air Force. No matter which approach was used, the
residuals for the Air Force were among the most positive.
Re-examination of the data reveals that except for small
reductions in 1966 and 1968, between the years 1957 and 1969
the Air Force either received almost exactly what it requested or,
more often, received more than it requested. This pattern
is not present for the Army and Navy. This leads one to
suspect that the Air Force data for the 1957-1969 period may
be part of a population different from the Army and Navy data
of the same period. On the other hand, the 1970-1973 data
reveal no notable differences between Congressional action
on Air Force RDTE requests and Congressional action on Army
and Navy requests.
A final point of interest is associated with the distri-
bution of residuals under the various approaches. The
stem and leaf plots in Appendix B show two interesting
features. First, cnce again the approach of (2.1) yields
many small positive residuals. Note the large number of
residuals in the to 150 range. This is very similar to the
pattern that appeared in the procurement data. The second
interesting feature is associated with the difference in the
distribution of residuals for the mean and median when used
as estimators for the coefficients in the approaches of (2.2)
and (2.3). Recall, that the mean and median yielded
different estimated coefficients (1.09 to .99 for (2. 2) and
1.03 to .99 for (2.3)). Next, note that when the mean is used
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as the estimator almost all of the residuals are negative —
small in absolute value but negative nevertheless. In fact,
when the mean is used as the estimator for the coefficient
for the approach of (2. 2), 57 of 63 residuals are negative.
When the median is used exactly half are negative and half
are positive, with one residual being zero.*
Closer examination of the data indicates that at least
one apparent outlier, 1955 Navy, where the request was $6l
million and appropriations were $419 million, is significantly
affecting the least squares estimate — the mean — both for
the approach of (2. 2) and the approach of (2.3).
The scatterplbts of the residuals versus the predicted
values and of the dependent variable versus the independent
variable (see Appendix B) for approaches (2.4) and (2, 5) are
also revealing. In both cases, for small predicted values
the residuals tend to be negative while for large predicted
values they tend to be positive.
A careful examination of the log x
fc
versus log y scatterplot
for the approach of (2.4) on page B-33, however, reveals that
there is one extremely large positive residual associated with
a very small value for the independent variable. That is, the
scatterplot and the estimated regression line look something
like Figure II. 4.
*For the approach of (2.3) 48 of 63 residuals are negative
when the mean is used as estimator while half are negative and







This data point was, again, 1955 Navy RDTE for which the
request was $6l million and appropriations were $^19 million.
It appears that this outlier, which is affecting the least
squares estimates for (2.2) and (2 3 ). is also affecting the
least squares results for the approach of (2.4).
II. 5. 3. Predictability
The numerical values of the residuals under each of the
approaches are, of course, not directly comparable. For
example, the residuals from the approach of (2.1) are found












where the B's were estimated using the techniques discussed
earlier.
In the past section the distributions of the residuals
under each of the approaches were compared, as were the items
associated with extreme residuals under each approach. But
the numerical values of the residuals were not compared.
Some assessment of the proximity of what might be called
the predicted appropriation under each approach, Bx, , for
(2.1) - (2.3) and Bx
t
a for (2.4) - (2.5) and the actual
appropriation (i.e. y , ) is useful and informative. Consequently,
the difference y. - gx. (or y, - Bx. ) was computed for each
item under each approach, both for the procurement and RDTE
data. Then both the mean and median of the absolute value
of this difference were computed. (The mean of positive square
roots of the squared differences could have been used, but
the mean of the absolute differences was considered to be
less sensitive to one or two large values. The median of
the absolute differences was of course even less sensitive
to extreme values.) Tables II . 8 and II. 9 contain the results
of these computations.
For the procurement data, all of the approaches yield a
comparable mean absolute difference with the median as
estimator for equations (2.2) and (2.3) yielding the smallest
values by a narrow margin.* The values for the median of
absolute differences, |y, - Bx, | , and examination of the stem
and leaf plot for the absolute differences indicate that when the
*Since absolute differences are being used, it is to be
expected that the median will fare better than the mean under
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median was used as estimator for (2. 2) and (2.3) most of
the absolute differences were small while an obvious few were
quite large. It is worth noting that the mean absolute
differences are very close for the approach of equation (2.1)
and those of equations (2. 2) and (2.3) (with the median as
estimator) but the median absolute differences are considerably
different.
Examination of Table II . 9 for the RDTE data reveals that
the mean and the median absolute difference are very large for
the approach of equation (2.2) when the mean of the
appropriations/request ratio is used as the estimator for 3.
This is consistent with the discussion in the last section of
the problems with this estimator for the RDTE data. The median
used as an estimator under the approaches of equations (2.2 )
and (2.3) and the approach of equation (2.1) all yield
comparable absolute differences. This is to be expected, of
course, since the estimated coefficients under each approach
were nearly identical. Earlier, problems with the application
of least squares to equations (2.4) and (2. 5 ) for the RDTE
data were discussed. The results in Table II..Q' 1 are consistent
with that discussion. The mean and median absolute differences
are considerably larger for (2.4) and (2.5) than for equations




Each approach was used on both the procurement and RDTE
data, and was evaluated by examining (i) the estimated
coefficient or percentage of the request which was appropriated,
(ii) the pattern of the residuals, and (iii) the closeness of
the "predicted" appropriations to actual appropriations. For
each approach the results will be summarized.
(2.1) y t = Bxt + et
The least squares solution, i.e. estimate of B for (2.1),
produced an estimated coefficient for procurement which was
different from those produced by other approaches . A more
complete assessment of such differences will be possible after
confidence intervals arc constructed in Chapter IV.
Examination of residuals for this approach reveals rather
disturbing patterns. For example many of the residuals are
positive, which indicates that the classic least squares assump-
tions possibly are not being satisfied. Also, the distribution
of data points is such that it appears that least squares
forced the line directly through the low value data points.
The closeness of fit of the predicted appropriations to actual
appropriations for this approach was comparable to that of
approaches (2.3) and (2.2) when the median was used as the
estimator for these approaches, closeness of fit being
measured by the mean |y. - Bx. | . The median | y . - Bx. | was
larger for the approach of (2.1). In summary, by the three
standards used for evaluating the estimates, while the least
11-^3

squares approach of (2.1) did not produce the worst estimates,




(2.4) y t = Bx t e
z
This is a "variable percentage" approach where the
percentage of the request that is granted varies with the size
of the request. Estimates of the coefficients were derived by
applying least squares to the equation in the logs. The
estimated coefficients for the procurement data were reasonable;
they implied percentages that went from .91 to 1.1*1 depending
on the size of the request, with an average of .98. However,
the estimated coefficients for the RDTE data implied percentages
that went from .91 to 1.35 with an average of I.03. It is
difficult to imagine that for a request of a certain size the
Congress would consistently vote an increase of 35 percent.
This approach yielded larger residuals for requests that were
small in dollar magnitude than any other approach except for
that of (2.5). However, for the RDTE data, the residuals had
a disturbing pattern, being negative for small requests and
positive for large requests. The least squares line appears
to have been unduly affected by some outliers. Insofar as
closeness of fit is concerned, for the procurement data, the
average |y, -8x. a | difference when this approach was used was
comparable to that yielded by other approaches. However the
median absolute difference was larger.
11-44

For the RDTE data the closeness of fit was not as good
as that for (2.2) and (2.3) — when the median was used — nor
as that for (2.1). However it was better than that for (2.2)
and (2.3 ) when the mean was used as an estimator.
(2.2) y t = gxt + e t x t
For this approach first the median and then the mean of
the ratio y,/x, were used as estimators of B. For the procure-
ment data the estimates yielded by the mean and the median
were comparable. However when the mean was used on the RDTE
data the estimated 6 was 1.09. Examination of the data showed
that this estimate, a least squares estimate, was also unduly
affected by an outlier. For the procurement data, the
residuals' pattern was reasonable and similar for both mean
and median as estimator — separating out some early 1950' s
items — and pointing to a possible change in Congressional
attitude after 1969, since many post-1969 items had negative
residuals. For the RDTE data the least squares estimator,
the mean, revealed almost all negative residuals with a few
large positive ones. The residuals when the median was used
as an estimator appeared reasonably distributed. For example
there were as many positive as negative residuals. Insofar
as closeness of fit is concerned, for the procurement data,
the median showed the smallest mean (and median) absolute
error or |y, - gx, | of all the approaches, except for the
median using the approach of (2.3). The mean also showed a
small absolute error. However, for the RDTE data, while the
11-^5

median again showed small mean (and median) absolute errors
the mean showed the largest. As mentioned earlier it appears
that a few outliers seriously affected the estimates when the









This approach is very similar to that of (2.4). Coeffi-
cients were estimated by taking the logs of both sides,
dividing the equation by log x, and applying least squares.
The results are comparable to those for the approach of (2.4).
Coefficients imply reasonable percentages for procurement data
but not for RDTE data. Residuals show an undesirable pattern,
from the standpoint of least squares, for RDTE data. The








The coefficient was estimated by using the median -and the mean
of In y , - In x. as an alternative estimate for In 3 . The estimated
coefficients are comparable to those of the approach of (2.2)
for both procurement and RDTE data. In other words, both the
median and mean yield reasonable estimates for the procurement
data but the mean estimate for the RDTE data is affected by
outlier values, although not as much as the mean for the
approach of (2. 2) .* Closeness of fit results are also
comparable to those of (2.2).
*3 using the mean as estimator for (2.2 ) is 1.09, while




This chapter represents an effort to analyze historical
data under the general working hypothesis that Congressional
action on budget requests usually results in percentage
adjustments at the appropriations level of aggregation. In
the first section the problem of modelling appropriations
as a percentage of requests was discussed. The second section
was devoted to methodology. The prior work of Davis, Dempster
and Wildavsky and of Stromberg was reviewed and problems with
their approaches were pointed out. The methodology used in
this study was then presented. Alternative formulations of,
or approaches to, the percentage adjustment hypothesis were
analyzed by examining estimated coefficients, residuals, and
closeness of fit of the "predicted appropriations" to the
actual appropriations. Each approach produced somewhat
different results. The most consistent results, on the basis
of various criteria discussed in section II. 5, were produced by
the following approaches when the median (of the appropriations
request ratio or the logarithm of the ratio) was used as the













The other approaches, which all Involve least squares
estimators in one form or another, produced at one time or
another results which were either unreasonable or inferior
in some way to the results of the approaches (2.2) and (2.3)
when medians were used as estimators.
The analysis of the residuals combined with an examination
of scatterplots for the approaches if (2.2) and (2.3) — and to
a certain extent for the other approaches for that matter —
produced three very interesting substantive results. First,
the 195^ data, coming as it did at the end of the Korean
conflict, may not be part of the same population as the
other data. Second, the post-1969 items, especially for
procurement, show a definite pattern of negative residuals
which indicates that the percentage adjustment very likely
changed in 1969 . Finally, in the RDTE data, the 1957-1969
Air Force RDTE items dominate the positive residuals which
indicates that decision-making on Air Force items may have
been different from decision-making on Army and Navy items
during that period.
The chapters which follow will be devoted to analysis of
the same set of data using an alternative estimation
procedure. The results of using this alternative procedure




Stem and leaf plots are a method of quickly summarizing
a large set of numbers. They are discussed extensively by
John Tukey in his forthcoming book, Exploratory Data Analysis
[Tukey]. The basic technique is best described by means of
an example. Suppose one wants to summarize the following set
of numbers which might be percentages of requests appropriated
using (2.4) for various sizes of the request:
.981 .965 .921 .972 .991 .985
.995 .998 .9^3 .946 .993 .986
.990 .943 .954 .988 .964 .981
.982 .986 .955 .985 .966 .942
.976 .987 .968 .973 -987 .990
.995 .997 -994 .998 .991 .993
TABLE A.l
A stem and leaf plot of these numbers with the stem being
the first two digits and the leaves being the third digit is










The plot reveals that the distribution is somewhat skewed




This appendix contains scatterplots and stem and leaf
plots for residuals for each of the equations which were
subjected to analysis in this chapter. It should be noted
that in this appendix the term "residuals" refers to the
following:
(2.1') y t - 3xt
y+.
(2.2') — - $
x
t
(2i3') In y. - In x, - In p
u
(2.4' ) In yt - aln xt - In 3
In v. ~ ^ ,





Since in many cases the plots are not identified explicitly
on the page on which they appear, the following list identifies
each plot and gives its page number. For the In x. versus In y.
1 In yt





In x. In x
for (2.5) the least squares lines are included. These are
indicated by the symbol "YY". The pages containing the stem
and leaf plots of the residuals contain a complete listing
of the residuals in addition to various measures such as mean,








(2.1) yt = 6xt + e t
Scatterplot* x versus y
Stem and leaf of residuals
Scatterplot x versus residuals
(2.2) y = Bx, + £x.x (Median of ratio as estimate)
Stem and leaf of residuals B-6 B-25
Scatterplot x versus residuals B-7 B-26
(2.2) y, = Bx, + c.x (Mean of ratio as estimate)
Stem and leaf of residuals B-8 B-27
Scatterplot x versus residuals B-9 B-28
(2.3) y. = Bx.e (Median of In ratio as estimate)
Stem and leaf of residuals B-10 B-29




= Bx.e (Mean of In ratio as estimate)
Stem and leaf of residuals B-12 B-31
Scatterplot In x versus residuals B-13 B-32








Scatterplot In x versus In y
Stem and leaf of residuals
Scatterplot of ln~ y versus residuals
Scatterplot of ln^ x versus residuals
*The small circles on the scatterplots indicate that more













Stem and leaf of residuals
In y.
Scatterplot of (= -) "predicted"
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This appendix contains summaries (stem and leaf plots, means,
medians and so forth, for "so-called" predicted percentages
of requests which would be appropriated when the requests are
of the size of the data analyzed in the chapter. These
a / -I \
predicted percentages are obtained by computing 3x,
where 3 and a were estimated using (2.1) and (2. 5 ). The
following list states which values for 3 and a were used and
identifies the pages on which the summaries can be found:
Equation Number 3 a x. data set Page
(2.4) 1.473 .948 Procurement C-2
(2.,4) 2.028 .903 RDTE C-3
(2.5) 1.242 .969 Procurement C-4
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In the previous chapters, the institutional background
of our analysis of Congressional defense budget activity was
discussed, alternative approaches to models for characterizing
this activity were presented, coefficients for characteristic
equations were estimated and residuals analyzed. For example,
it was pointed out that if the relationship between request
in year t , x. , and appropriation, y is modeled as
(2.2) y t = Bxt + etxt
then the median of the^ratio y t/x t is a useful
estimator for
S; that is it is superior under certain circumstances to
a
least squares estimate because of the median's de-emphasis
of extreme values.
Following the work of Andrews, Tukey , and others [Andrews,
et al.,1972], this chapter explores the usefulness of an
alternative robust estimator for the five different approaches
discussed in the previous chapter. The estimator is the
Huber »M» estimator [Huber, 1973] . This estimator was
originally proposed for use in the estimation of a location

parameter [Huber, 1964]. However, it has recently been extended
to and asymptotic properites have been derived for the regression
problem [Huber, 19731. The format of this chapter will be the
following: first, the basic problem of concern in robust
regression will be discussed, with examples taken from the
analysis of the previous chapter; next, the technique and
rationale of Huber "M" estimates will be outlined; estimates
for defense budget data for each of our five basic equations
will be presented, discussed and compared with non-robust,
least squares estimates. Finally, residuals and outliers
will be analyzed.
III.l The Problem
It may be useful at this point to re-state the five basic
equations that have been used in the analysis of defense budget
data in the previous chapter
(2.1) y t = 3xt + c t




(2.3) y t = 3xt e
(2.4) y t = 3x t
a
e
u In x t





stands for appropriations in year t, %t stands for
the









disturbances which are assumed to be independent and
identically distributed.
In the previous chapter, results (especially for the
RDTE data) indicated that for (2.2) and (2.3) the median
y*./x. ratio and ln(y,/x.) ratio were more useful estimators
for B and In 3 than were the least squares estimators. This
is because (i) for both (2.2) and (2.3), the mean gave
coefficient estimates which were basically suspect. They
indicated that the percentage of the request appropriated
is greater than 1.0, a result which even a casual glance at
plotted data did not support, and (ii) stem and leaf plots
of the residuals and scatterplots of y t versus xt and In yt
versus In x. showed that a few extreme observations were
having a disproportionate impact on the estimates. The
robustness of the median as opposed to the mean is not
particularly surprising since (2.2) and (2.3) reduce (when
appropriate transformations are made) to a location parameter
problem of the form:
v = + e where e is a random variable with
a given distribution and
6 is a fixed constant
Andrews, Tukey et al. found the median to be more robust
than the mean for the location parameter problem [Andrews,
et al., 1972]. Also, see [Mosteller,1973, PP • 248-250].
The problem with the mean is that it is particularly
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susceptible to extreme observations or outliers. For






+ q —1— e" *?
n** yzz
where p+q = 1. If one compares the variance of the mean, y,
as an estimator for 6, to the variance of y, the median,
also an estimator of 8, he finds that as a gets large,
greater than 9 in the case of p = .9 and q = .1, then the
variance of y becomes smaller than the variance of y.* Thus
for this model of random error the median is more efficient
than the mean.
Regression problems, e.g. analysis of data in terms of
relations like (2.1), (2.4) and (2.5), also involve outlier
difficulties. However the analogue to the median in regression
problems is not as easy to calculate.** Also, even in the
location parameter case, although the median is not as
susceptible to "wild shot" or extreme observations as the
mean, it is only Sk percent efficient if the distribution of
the error component is normal. What is desired for each of
the equations (2.1) - (2.5) is an estimator with robustness
properties similar to the median but one which is relatively
efficient under normality assumptions.
*This is not a contradiction of the Gauss-Markov theorem
since the median is not linear in the observations. For a
more detailed discussion of this so-called "wild shot"
problem, see Appendix I.
*The estimator is that which results from minimizing




III. 2. The Technique and Rationale of Huber "M" Estimates
Huber [1964] proposed a robust alternative to the mean
and the median in the location parameter problem. The
estimate is obtained by solving the equation
T
(3.1) I <f>(y. - 9) = for e
t=l t
(3.2) where <j>(z) = z for |z| < c
= c for z >_ c
=-c for z £ -c
and c is a constant.
This estimate is not linear in the observations unless c is
very large, in which case it reduces to the least squares
estimate. Huber [1964] derived the asymptotic properties
of the estimator as T-*°°, and in tests run by Andrews et al.
[1972] it performed well in terms of robustness compared to
the sample mean. It was more efficient than the sample mean
in the case of long-tailed error distributions and almost as
efficient when the error distribution was normal. The reason
for the term "M" estimate is that, in general, maximum
likelihood estimates are the result of solving an equation
like (3a), where $(z) = f j A and f(z) is a density function
For example, for <j>(z) = z (c = °°) the solution to (3.1) will
yield a maximum likelihood estimate where e is N(0,1). The
specification of $(z) in (3.2) corresponds to a distribution
with fatter tails than the normal distribution. In other
III-5

words, between -c and +c the assumed distribution is normal
except for multiplication by a constant; however, beyond ±c
the assumed distribution resembles an exponential, with tails
fatter than the normal.* An error model of this type means
that a "wild shot" observation is more likely than in the
strict normal distribution case; consequently it is not
given as much weight in the calculation of the estimated
location parameter as in least squares, which is maximum
likelihood if the distribution is normal.
Other functional forms for
<f>
have been proposed by
Andrews, Hampel and Tukey [Andrews, et al.,1972] which allow
the function $ to go to zero as z becomes large. For
example the
<J>
suggested by Hampel i«
<j>(z) = sin(z/c) for |z| <_ ttc
= for \z\ > ttc
while the 4» suggested by Tukey is
<Kz) = z(l - (z/c)
2
) |z| 1 c
=0 |z| > c
Note, that when a normal distribution is assumed and the
corresponding <j> used, each observation has an effect directly
proportional to (y. -6) on the maximum likelihood estimator.
*See Appendix B for a derivation of the distribution
corresponding to the <j> proposed by Huber.
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For Huber' s estimator each observation has an effect
proportional to (yt - 6) for values of |y.-6| < c and an
effect proportional to c for values of |y. -e| > c . For
U —
-
Andrews, Hampel and Tukey estimators, values |y.-6| which
are greater than c have no effect on the estimate. The choice
of c for these estimators involves a trade off between
Gaussian efficiency (if f is really normal) and robustness
(if the true distribution is really a longer tailed distri-
bution than the normal).* The Andrews, Hampel and Tukey
estimators will not be discussed further in this chapter.
Rather, attention will now focus on the application of the
Huber "M" estimate to the regression problem. In particular,
the application will be to the DOD budget data previously
discussed.
Huber [1973] proposed an analogue to the M estimator for
a location parameter as a robust estimator of regression








the proposal was to find B = (B1> • • • »B± » • • • »Bp )
that is the
solution to the equations







x it <^t "
-f hHt* = °
T p *
t f x
Xpt * (y t -
1 f 1
Vit 3 = °
where <J>(z) = z for |z| < c
(3.4) - c for z > c
=-c for z
_< -c
The estimates will not in general be linear in the observa-
tions. Note that for very large o, the estimator becomes,
in effect, the least squares (or maximum likelihood if normal
residuals are assumed) estimator. However for smaller c, the
estimator reduces the impact of extreme observations.
Huber regression estimates can also be viewed as the result
of solving the following minimization problem:
T p *
(3.5) min Z p(yt - I B,x ,. )
t=l z 1=1
where p(z) = hz for |z| < c
= cz - he for z >_ c
2
=
-cz - *sc for z < -c
Note as c gets large the minimization in (3- 5 ) becomes
simply a least squares problem.
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Huber [1973] derives the asymptotic properties for
estimators yielded by solving the system (3-3) under quite
general conditions for defining
<J>. In other words, his
asymptotic results are not confined to a f of the form of
(3.U).
There are two computational difficulties with Huber
estimates. First, they are not one step estimates. In order
to define the function
<J>
, some value for £ Is needed. Once
the function is defined a new value for 8 can be found, and
so forth. Huber [1973] has suggested an algorithm for solving
the equations.* It is not immediately clear that when the
algorithm stops a global minimum to (3.5) or a global maximum
to the likelihood function has been achieved. In fact the
optimization properties are not discussed by Huber.
Fortunately, the algorithm is relatively easy to implement
and given some rather weak conditions on <j> (and consequently
on p) the stopping conditions specified by Huber are necessary
and sufficient for a global minimum to (3.5). This is discussed in
Appendix C to this chapter. The second problem is that
usually in a regression problem, it is not desirable to
assume that e is distributed like a N(0,1) random variable
between +c and -c . Rather, the standard assumption is that






is distributed N(0,a ) between +ca and -co. This
complicates the problem since a, a scale parameter must be
estimated. Thus one additional equation which involves
B must be solved and the system (3-3) is modified by
replacing
(y t - i?1
B i
xit ) wlth c<yt -
if1
^it x it )/a]
III. 3. Comparison of Huber M Estimates and the
Estimates of Chapter II
Huber "M" estimates were calculated for the procurement
and RDTE data for equations (2.1) through (2.5). Estimates
were calculated for c values of 2.0, 1.5, and 1.0. Only
the results for c values of 2.0 and 1.0 are shown. The
values for c = 1.5 lie between these. Tables III.l and
III. 2 present the results and the corresponding results
from Chapter II.
*See [Huber, 1972, Andrews et al
.
, 1972 , Huber, 1973








B a B a
961 NA .962 NA .969 NA
(2.2) yt = Bxt + e t x .969 NA .974 NA .993 NA
.97^
(median)
(2 .3) y t = Bx fc e
u,




(2.4) y t = 3xt
a
e
fc 1.110 .982 1.181 .975 1.473 -948
u^ln x.
(2.5) y t = Bxt
a
e "
.997 .996 1.04l .991 1.242 .969
TABLE III.l (NA = not applicable)
Procurement Estimates
Estimates for B in (2.3) through (2.5) are derived by taking
exp(ln 6). For (2.3) through (2.5) actually In B was estimated
The estimates for In B are in Table III. 1.1.
c=1.0 c=2.0 Least squares
(2.3) -.033 -.029 -.023
(-.027)
(median)
(2.4) .108 .169 .384
(2.5) .0025 .038
TABLE III. 1.1
Estimated In B for Procurement Data
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c=1.0 c=2.0 Least squares
3 a 3 a 3 a





(2.2) y^. = 3x^ + e^x^ .989 NA .990 NA 1.093 NA
.989
(median)





t-(2.4) y t = 3xt e
* 1.061 .990 1.076 .988 2.028 .903
u.ln x
(2.5) y t = 3x t e
r 1.029 .994 1.005 .998 2.877 .852
TABLE III. 2 (NA = not applicable)
RDTE
Again, for (2.3) through (2.5) it was In 6, not 3, that was
estimated. The estimates for In 3 are in Table III. 2.1.
c=1.0 c=2.0 Least squares
( .3) -.012 -.011 .024
-.011
(median)
( .4) .059 .072 .702
( .5) .028 .005 1.056
TABLE III. 2.1
Estimated In 3 for RDTE Data
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Some of the most interesting results are those for
equations (2.4) and (2.5) both for procurement and RDTE data.
Before addressing those results, salient features of the
results for (2.1) through (2.3) will be pointed out. First,
for the procurement data all of the techniques estimated
coefficients — estimated percentages of the budget request
that are granted — which were equivalent. The only
exception to this statement is for equation (2.2) for which
the least squares estimate was .993 while the median y+/x.
estimate and the Huber (c=2.0) estimates were .97^, and the
Huber (c=1.0) estimate was .969. In other words, the least
squares estimate implies that over 99$ of the budget request
is appropriated, while the others say about 97$ of the request
is appropriated. It is difficult to assess' these
differences without some measure of stability or variation
of the estimates. This topic will be taken up in Chapter IV.
Also of interest is the fact that for the procurement data
the results were similar when c=1.0 and c=2.0.
The RDTE results for (2.1) through (2.3) are of even more
interest. Recall that in the previous chapter it was observed
that certain data points appeared to be affecting the least
squares estimates for (2.2) and (2.3). For example, the least
squares estimator for (2.2) implied that 109$ of the budget
request is appropriated. Using the median y t /x t value as an
estimator in model (2.2), and the median In (y t //- t ) value as
an estimator in (2.3) produced results which appeared more
reasonable than the least squares results. The application
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of the Huber "M" estimator to (2.2) and (2.3)yielded results
that were almost identical to those achieved by the use of
the median. The result was not particularly surprising
since, as mentioned in section III.l of this chapter, estima-
tion for (2.2) and (2.3) was really a location parameter
problem. Andrews, Tukey and others have already noted that
both the median and the Huber "M" are useful estimators in
location parameter problems when the error distribution is
non-normal. Huber "M" is more efficient when near-normality
of errors holds. It is interesting to note that the extra
computational effort involved in computing the Huber "M"
in (2.2) and (2.3) did not yield results different from
the "easy to compute" median. As with the procurement data
the importance of small differences such as that between the
least squares estimate and the Huber "M" estimates for (2.1)
using RDTE data must await the analysis of the stability of
the estimates in the following chapter and analysis of
residuals in the next section.
In the case of both the Procurement and RDTE data -
but especially for the RDTE data - the results of applying
least squares and the Huber technique to (2.4) and (2.5)
appear to be different. For example, for the RDTE data, in
(2.5) B is almost three times as large when least squares is
used as when Huber "M" estimates are computed. Again the full
impact of the differences must await an analysis of (i) the
stability of the coefficients in the next chapter, (ii) examina-
tion of the residuals. However, it is possible to sharpen
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our intuition about the differences between the results for
(2.4) and (2.5) by viewing them in another way.
Since the percentage of a request granted for a request of
size x, is modelled in (2.4) and (2.5) as being equal to 3x
t
/a~ ,




taken and 3x. a was computed (i) when In 6 and a were estimated
via least squares and (ii) when they were estimated using Huber's
method. Thus, for the same x t values it was possible to compare
the percentages estimated to have been approved when least
squares was used and the percentage estimated to have been
approved when the Huber "M" estimate was computed. Tables III.
3
and III. 4 contain stem and leaf plots of the percentages.
Before discussing the tables it should be noted that since
a < 1.0 under all estimation techniques each of the techniques
estimates that as xt , the request, increases
the percentage of
the request granted will decrease.
Examination of Table III. 3 highlights the fact that the
Huber "M" estimates the percentage of the request granted to be
smaller than does least squares. For (2.4), the estimated
and a under least squares imply that for 17 of 80 values tried
it is estimated that Congress would be appropriating greater
than 100% of the request. On the other hand, when Huber "M"
estimates are used (c=2.0) it is estimated that for only one
of the 80 x, values tried would Congress be appropriating
greater than 100% of the request. (99^ for c-1.0). For 80
x values tried, the estimated percentage of the request
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(2.5) similar differences are noticeable. When the Huber
"M" approach is used, these percentages are mostly between
.96 and .98 (c=2.0) or .96 and .97 (c=1.0). The mean
estimated percentages of the requests that would be granted
for the eighty x
fc
values tried are given in Table III. 3.1.
c=1.0 c=2.0 Least squares












The differences between the estimated percentages of the
request that will be granted when least squares as opposed
to Huber "M" estimates for 3 and a are used are even more
noticeable in Table III. 4 for the RDTE data.
The results in Table III. 4 probably reflect better than
any other information presented so far the implications of
the differences between the Huber "M" estimates for B and a
for (2.4) and (2.5) and the least squares estimates. For
equation (2.4), the least squares estimates for $ and a imply
that for a low enough request the estimated percentage of the
request appropriated is greater than 1.10. The Huber estimates
for 3 and a in (2.4) imply a maximum percentage of 1.025 for the
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The least squares estimates for 3 and a imply that, for three
of the x
fc
values, as much as 150% of the request was granted.
The largest value, for the x. values tried, when the Huber "M
approach was used was 100.5%. Table III. 4.1 contains the




c=1.0 c=2.0 Least Squares








When trying to assess the reasons for the differences
between the least squares and Huber "M" results which are
reported in Tables III. 3 and III. 4, it is useful to recall
that scatterplots of In y. versus In x. in Chapter II reveal
that the least squares results were dominated (distorted) by
a few extreme or outlier observations.
III. 4. Residuals
One of the interesting features of the Huber "M" approach
is that it provides an easy way to examine residuals. Recall




Min Z p(y - E B.x, J
3 t=l z 1=1 1 lfc
where
p(z) = 'sz for |z| < ca
= cza - %(ca) for z >_ ca
p
-cza - ^(ca) for z
_< -ca
and a is a scale parameter.
P
We can label the residuals for which |y. - I B.x... | < ca
** A — "I 111/
P
as Group 1 residuals, residuals for which y, - I 8 x > ca
t .
=1 i it _
as Group 2 residuals and those for which y. - I B.x < -ca
Xj 4— T lit/ —
x —
1
as Group 3 residuals
.
III. 4.1. Group 2 and Group 3 Residuals
The items or appropriations accounts which were in the
Group 2 and Group 3 residuals were approximately the same for
each of the different models (2.1) through (2.5). However,
the rank order of these residuals varied between approaches.
For example, 1955 Navy RDTE, where the request was $6l million
and appropriations were $419 million, produced the largest
positive or Group 2 residual for (2.2) through (2.5), and only
the third largest positive residual for (2.1). However, the
rank order of the Group 2 and Group 3 residuals is not nearly
as important as the order of the residuals when ordinary
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least squares is used. When least squares Is used, each
p *
observation receives a weight proportional to |y - E B H x . . |t 1=1 i it
in the calculation of 3, while when the Huber "M" approach
is used, Group 2 and Group 3 residuals receive a weight
proportional to cc
.
The following table gives, for c=1.0, the items corresponding
to Group 2 and Group 3 residuals common to all the models, (2.1)
through (2.5), and the budget request and final appropriations
for each: The tables reflect no particular rank order since




































Procurement Group 2 Residual Items
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There were minor differences between the Group 3 residuals
for (2.1) and for the other equations. These involved two
items, not in the table, which are different in the set of
Group 3 residuals for (2.1).
Item and Year REQUEST APPROPRIATION
1954 AF Aircraft 4283-0




1959 AF Missile 1722.1
1970 PAMN 3235.5
1969 PAMN 3222.0
1973 AF Aircraft 3255-7
1970 PEMA 5069.1
1969 PEMA 5626.0

















*Not a Group 3 for (2.1).
**Because of the magnitude of the request and because the (2.4)
and (2.5) results imply that the percentage of # the request
granted decreases as request increases, these items do not
appear as Group 3 residuals for (2.4) ana [2.5 J.
TABLE III.
6
Procurement Group 3 Residuals
111-23

Note that the Group 2 residuals contain items from the early
1960's and late 1950' s except for 1954 PEMA. Air Force items
are particularly noticeable in the Group 2 residuals. On the
other hand, the Group 3 residuals are dominated by items from
the early 1950' s and post-1969 items. This is consistent with
the discussion in the last chapter of a possible change in
Congressional decision rules starting in 1969
.
Item Request Appropriations
1955 Navy 6l.O 419.9
I960 AP 750.0 1159.9
1962 AF 1637.0 2403.2
1959 Navy 641.0 821.2
1957 AF 610.0 710.0
Group 2 Residuals RDTE
The Group 2 residuals for (2.1) also contained more Air










*Not part of Group 3 for (2.4) and (2.5)











The Group 3 residuals for (2.4) and (2-5) also contained
the item "1953 Navy", where the request was 75-7 and the
appropriations 70.0. Despite the fact that this was only a
5 million dollar cut, (2.1) and (2.5) imply that a small
request should generally be cut very little if at all. Thus
1953 Navy appears as a Group 2 residual for (2.4) and (,2.5)
indicating the appropriation was much less than expected.
The Group 2 and Group 3 residuals for RDTE demonstrate
patterns similar to those noted for procurement. That is, the
late 1950' s and early 1960's items are noticeable in the Group
2 residuals, while the early 1950' s and post-1969 items
dominate the Group 3 residuals.
In summary, the items producing the largest residuals when the Huber
"M" technique was used resemble those producing the largest
least squares residuals. However, the magnitude and distribu-
tion of the least squares residuals differ. For the RDTE
and procurement data analyzed, use of the Huber method allowed
the residuals to stand out more dramatically. This is because,
heuristically speaking, the Huber method does not try as hard
as least squares to avoid having a few very large residuals.
III. 4. 2 Distribution of Residuals
Both the least squares and the Huber "M" techniques assume
that the distribution of the stochastic disturbance is
symmetric about zero. One way of examining the appropriateness
of an estimator is to examine whether or not the residuals
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which result when that estimator is used are symmetric or
nearly symmetric about zero. There are certainly many other
ways to probe whether or not the assumptions underlying the
estimation technique are satisfied; such as, for example, constructing
histograms, stem and leaf plots and making probability plots
(Wilk and Gnanadesikon,1968]. However the simple technique of
counting positive and negative residuals will quickly reveal
some of the basic information being sought. The following
tables III. 6 and 111.7, show the number of negative residuals
as opposed to the total number of items for (2.1) through (2.5)
when the Huber "M" approach, with c=1.0, and when least squares
were used.
Huber M, c=1.0 Least squares
(2.1) y t
= 3xt + et 33/80 33/80
(2.2) yt = Bxt + Etxt 35/80
42/80
(2.3) y t = Bxt e
Ut
36/80 42/80












Procurement - Number of negative residuals
divided by total number of residuals
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Huber M, c=1.0 Least squares
(2.D y t = Bxt + e t 23/63 28/63
(2.2) yt = 0x t + e t xt 32/63 57/63
(2.3) y t = Bx t e
c 30/63 4 8/6 3





(2.5) y t 3xt e
z c 31/63 28/63
TABLE III.
6
RDTE — Number of negative residuals
divided by total number of residuals
The results in Tables III. 5 and III. 6 reveal a few marked
differences between overall residual patterns resulting from
the application of least squares as opposed to the Huber "M"
estimator. For the procurement data, least squares applied
to (2.5) yields a large percentage of negative residuals —
1 4 more than one-half — while the Huber "M" yields a percentage
slightly smaller than one-half. A similar but net quite so
noticeable difference results for (2.'l). On the other hand,
for (2.1)-(2.5) using the Huber "M" the fraction of negative
residuals is always less than one-half. For the RDTE data the
major differences between the two approaches, in terms of
positive-negative symmetry of the residuals, is for (2.2)
and (2.3), the location parameter problems. Least squares
applied to (2.2) yields an estimate for B which results in
57 of a possible 63 negative residuals as opposed to the
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Huber "M" which yields 32 of a possible 63. For (2.2), least
squares results in 48 negative residuals while the Huber "M"
results in 30 negative residuals. The similarity between the
numbers of positive and negative residuals when least squares
and the Huber "M" are applied to (2.4) and (2.5) is somewhat
deceiving. An inspection of the individual items which
correspond to the positive and negative residuals reveal
marked differences between the two approaches. For example,
for (2.5) the residuals of a total of twenty-eight items had
signs which were different when the Huber "M" approach was
applied than the signs resulting when least squares was applied.
In order to look into this matter a little more closely, recall
first that for (2.4) and (2.5) the least squares residuals were
mostly negative (except for a few large positive ones) for small
values of log x, and mostly positive for large values of logxt









Thus despite the fact that the numbers of positive and
negative residuals were nearly equal, they bore an undesirable
relationship to x
t . As reported in Table III. 6, the residuals
resulting from the application of the Huber "M" approach to
(2.4) and (2.5) are also symmetric around zero but do not show
a relationship to x
fc
like that in Figure III. 2.
III. 5 Summary
This chapter commenced with a discussion of the problem
of robust estimation when a linear regression can not be
reduced to a location parameter problem and when one is not
prepared to pay for the lack of efficiency of the sample
median if the error distribution is normal in the location
parameter problem. The need for a robust estimation
technique was especially evident in Chapter II upon
examination of scatterplots, least squares coefficient
estimates, residual patterns for the models (2.4)
and (2.5), and, to a lesser extent for (2.1). The Huber "M"
estimator has been proposed and utilized as a robust alternative
to least squares. The logical basis for the estimator, and
its relationship to maximum likelihood estimation, were
discussed. Section III. 3 contains a comparison of Huber "M"
and least squares estimates for the coefficients in (2.1)
through (2.5) for both procurement and RDTE data. The results
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were noticeably different for (2.4) and (2.5) both for
procurement and RDTE and for (2.2) and (2.3) for RDTE data.
The final section, prior to this summary, contains a discussion
of the Group 2 and Group 3 residuals produced by the Huber "M"
approach and a comparison of the distribution of the residuals
under least squares and Huber "M" estimation.
At this point a short assessment of what has been
accomplished is in order. The Huber "M" approach yielded
results, for (2.4) and (2.5) for procurement and RDTE and for
(2.2) and (2.3) for RDTE, which appear to be more reasonable,
substantively, and more consistent with the assumptions
underlying the estimation technique than those produced by
least squares. However, the implication for the defense
budget question is possibly even broader. No claim has been
made in this analysis that Congressional action on defense
budgets is completely deterministic and predictable. Rather,
the analysis has been based, more or less implicitly up to
this point, on the view that embedded in the process of
Congressional consideration are certain regular elements which
resemble the outcomes which occur when simple rules of thumb
are applied and certain irregular, and unusual elements which
do not appear to be the product of the application of fixed
decision rules or simple rules of thumb (or may be the result
of the application of different decision rules). The robust
regression approach, through the specification of Group 2 and
Group 3 residuals, has allowed us to distinguish or separate
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out of these two sets of elements. One might argue that
analysis of least squares residuals would do the same thing.
However, the robust regression approach has in some sense
diminished the contamination of the estimation of what is
going on in the fixed or regular area by the data generated
by unusual or irregular occurrences. Such a contamination
can be considerable when least squares is used.
Several questions still remain unanswered. For example,
how stable are the coefficient estimates — both least squares
and Huber "M" estimates? That is, can reasonable confidence
limits be placed on estimated coefficients? How do (2.1)
through (2.5) compare among themselves in terms of stability
of estimates and prediction intervals? It may not be possible
to answer these questions by only re-analyzing the data at
hand, since the theory underlying interval estimation is not
well-developed for the Huber "M" . Thus, data might have to
be constructed which provide a standard against which to
compare results for the data at hand. One reasonable procedure
is to synthesize such data, i.e. by sampling from a suitable
disturbance distribution.
Several questions have been addressed and partially
answered, but need further analysis. What can be said about
what appear to be the "irregular" elements of the process.
Are they completely inexplicable or are there as many different
explanations as there are different budget items and years.
Certain observations have already been made, such as the
post-1969 "cutting" mood of the Congress and the generosity
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of the Congress to the Air Force between 1957 and 1969 •
Possibly some models are more appropriate for parts of the
data than others. These and other questions will be addressed




The Mean and Median as Location Parameter Estimators
A.l. The Wild Shot Problem
The classic location parameter problem is one with the
following form:
(l) y t = e + et
where 6 is a location parameter and the e. are independent
and identically distributed, E(e )=0 and var(e,)=a 2
. The
Gauss-Markov theorem [Scheffe,1959] says that the least-squares
estimator, in this case the sample mean, is the best (minimum
variance) unbiased estimator which is also linear in the
p
observations. If the et are N(0,a ), then the least squares
estimator is a best (minimum variance) estimator.
Unfortunately the sample mean is susceptible
to extreme observations, since the value of a least squares
estimator, 6 is proportional to the absolute difference
|y.-e|. The following example demonstrates this point.
If the £, are N(0,1) then for a sample of 10 observations
the variance of y is 0.1. However, suppose








* N(0,1) with probability p
Ht
* N(0,a 2 ) with probability q = 1-p




(3) f (x) = ^=- + 2® _-
t ^2tt y2.T\o d






) = p + qa
2
pSuppose p = 0.9 } and q = 0.1 and c =10. Then, on the average,
one observation out of 10 comes from a distribution with




) = 0.9 + (0.1)10
= 1.9
and the var(y) equals 0.19. Note what has happened: when
one out of ten observations comes, on the average, from a




A. 2 The Median as a Location Parameter Estimate:
The Normal Case
The median is an alternative estimator to the mean in
location parameter problems when disturbanc distributions
are symmetric. It can be shown that as the sample size, n,
gets large, then for a distribution that is symmetric around
zero, the following statement can be made about y, the





where f is the density from which a sample is being taken,
Thus if e. is N(0,1), then
var(y) ~ |j = =-^ (as n gets large)
while var(y) = -
Thus the median has an efficiency, with respect to the
mean, of roughly j-^y =0.64. In other words, if the e t are
N(0,1), then it will take 1.57 as many observations when
using the sample median as opposed to the sample mean in
order to achieve the same variance for the estimator.
III-A-3

A. 3. The Mean Versus the Median: The Wild Shot Case
The relationship between the variance of the sample median
and the variance of the sample mean reverses when the e. are
not normally distributed but are distributed according to (2).
The variance of the sample median, when the e. are











Thus for n = 100, var(y) s .0168 and var(y) = .019.
This "robust" behavior of the median as compared to the
mean is noticeable in the case of many long-tailed error






The Huber "M" Estimator as a
Maximum Likelihood Estimator
B.l. Basic Concepts and the Normal Case as An Example
For the discussion that follows, assume that what
is being sought is an estimate for B in the model
(1) y t = 8xt + e
where e, is a random variable and the e 's are independent and
identically distributed. The following discussion can be
generalized to the case in which B and x. are vectors . Let






then the log likelihood of the sample is given
by
T
(3) L = E log p(y - Bx. )
t=l t
Z
A maximum likelihood estimate for B, B, is an estimate
which maximizes the likelihood, which is equivalent to




aL T p'(y t -Bx.)






E x. <j>(y. - Bx. ) = , where
't
yw t M "t
The maximum likelihood estimate, 3, satisfies equation
(4). We recognize the possibility of multiple roots,
disregard the complication for the present.
If the £. are assumed to be N(0,1) then cf>(z) = z
This is easily seen since
PC) - j^.e-^ 2














B.2. A Distribution That is Implied by the Huber "M" Estimator
The Huber "M" approach, replaces cf>(z) = z , by
(-c for z < c
= j z for | z | < c
for z > +c::
It is possible to find a distribution for which the
likelihood is maximized when the following equation (6) is
solved for 3 and when certain restrictions, such as continuity.
are placed on the distribution.
T
(6) £ x. <}>(y<- - B*. ) = °
t=l t t
where $ is as specified in (5).
The density function (and distribution) is defined over
three disjoint regions of interest: (-°°,c], (-c, + c), [c,»).
Call these Regions 1, 2, and 3 respectively. For
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For these regions, the specification
<J>
in (5) implies the
following differential equations, where p., refers to a density
defined over region i.


















. If one desires the distribu-
tion which is being derived to be symmetric around zero, then
K.. =Kp. Call this constant K. Also, to simplify matters, let
K=K*c, so that p 1 (z)
= K*ce cz and p.(z) = K*ce~ cz . The constants
H and K* must satisfy certain conditions. First,
-C +C , 2 oo
(7) / K*ce cz dz + / He~^
z dz + / K*ce cz dz = 1.
-oo
_C C
Next, It is attractive (but not essential) that the
density p, which is being derived be continuous. This will
be the case if
(8) P 1 (-c)
= p 2 (-c)
(9) P 2 (c) = P 3
(c) .
Equations (8) and (9) are not independent. However, (7) and
(8) are. Consequently they can be used to derive K* and H.
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First, using equation (8) it follows that
2 2
K*ce~ c = He _!sC
and
(10) K* = 5 e +i5C
c
Substituting in equation (7) yields the following













+ H y° e~hz
2
dz = x .
The second term in equation (10) can not be put into
closed form so that a closed form expression for H can be





for / e~^ dz by using the standard normal tables to
-c
get the area under the standard normal density between -c and
+c and then multiply this value by ^J2n




2e~ li ° +/2Tc( *(c)-*(-c) )
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Returning to the original problem, the Huber "M" approach
yields a maximum likelihood estimator for 3 when the density
of e. is of the form
(13) p(z) = <
[K e+cz z < -c




where K = K*c and K* and H are found using (11) and (12).
This solution assumes that any scale parameter is already
implicit in c. If a scale parameter also needs to be estimated,
the formulas change slightly, however the basic results remain
the same: p(z) is like a normal density between (-c,+c) but
has "fatter," exponential tails than a normal density beyond
-c and +c.
Of course, the distribution defined in (13) is not the
only distribution implied by the Huber "M" estimator. For
example, if one wanted p(z) to behave exactly like a normal
density between -c and +c, H could be made equal to , in
which case p(z) would not be continuous unless c had a value




Algorithm for Deriving Huber "M" Estimates
and a Proof of Optimality
C.l. Iterative Algorithm for Deriving Huber "M" Estimates
In Appendix B it was shown that the Huber "M" estimator
is a maximum likelihood estimator. It is also true that the
Huber "M" estimator is the solution to the problem
T
(1) min Z(B) = Z p(y - Bx, )
3 t=l Z Z
2
-cz-^c z <_ -c
o
where p(z) = %z |z| < c
2
cz-%c z > c
Notice that (1) is a modified least squares function.
However, intuitively, the influence or effect on the estimate,
3, of observations for which |y t - Bx, | >_ c is not
proportional to |y. — 3x. | as in the least squares case.
The procedures for solving (1) which have been proposed
are iterative procedures where an estimate of B at step i
is used to obtain a new estimate at step i+1 [Huber, 1973,
Andrews, 1973]. One of these algorithms [Huber, 1973] will
be discussed in detail in this appendix.
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The algorithm requires the following steps.
(a) Start with an initial value of B, for example the least
squares estimate; call this g' 1 )
. The i th estimate is
B
(1) (i=l,2,...).
(b) Based on the current estimate of B, partition the
observations into three groups, T,' 1 , Tp 1 ', T^ 1 ' .




















If the partition is identical to that achieved for B '
then stop. Use 3 as the estimate for B. Otherwise go to
step (c).
(c) Minimize, if possible the function Z.*(3) with respect
to B where Z.* is defined like Z except that the partition
(T]l ,Tp ,To ) is held fixed or in other words is not allowed
to change as B changes. Call the solution B . Go to
step (b).
C.2. Some Properties of the Huber Algorithm
Very little is said about the algorithm in [Huber ,1973]
•
The literature on robust regression apparently does not
contain statements concerning the characteristics of the
*The only problem that could arise is if a minimum of
Z*(B) can not be determined, that is, if T 2 is empty in
which case the solution to the minimization of Z* is unbounded
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algorithm, except that it appears to work. Two questions
which will be addressed here are: Is the stopping rule a
true optimality condition? Does the algorithm achieve a
global optimum or can it stop at a local optimum which may
be far away from the global solution?
Proposition : The function Z is differentiable with respect
to 3, and
T T













-c if yt - 3xt < -c





) if |y t -Bxt | < c
+ c if y t - xt > c
Proof: This Is an immediate consequence of the chain rule,
since Z is a sum of composites of differentiable functions.
The next result shows that satisfaction of the algorithm's
stopping condition automatically satisfies a necessary
condition for a minimum to Z(g) .
Proposition : When the stopping condition is invoked, then
Z'(B) = .
Proof: Let r (i ^ = (T^ i) .T^
1







(i+l) is the B which
minimizes Z*(B) . Thus
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The left hand side of (4. a), together with the inequalities
in (IJ.b) correspond to the definition of Z'(B) while
equation (4. a) itself says Z'(0) = 0.
Since Z'(8) = when the stopping condition is invoked,
the necessary condition for a minimum to Z(6) is satisfied
If satisfaction of the algorithm's stopping condition
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satisfies not only necessary but also sufficient conditions
for a minimum of Z(B), then it is not necessary to worry
about potential local minima or stationary points when the
stopping condition is satisfied. The approach to proving
sufficiency is based on proof of an interesting characteristic
of Z(B). This characteristic and the proof to it not only
are useful for the present analysis, but also indicate a
type of function p for which necessary and sufficient
conditions for a minimization like (1) can be stated for an
algorithm like Huber's.
Proposition : Z(B) is convex in B.
Proof: By the definition of p(z), P is convex in z. Thus
p(a+bz), where a and b are constants is also convex in z.
Theorem : When the stopping condition is satisfied necessary
and sufficient conditions for a minimum are satisfied.
Proof: The theorem is true since Z'(B) = is a necessary





In the previous two chapters, defense budget data were
analyzed using equations which were designed to describe or
represent general tendencies and characteristics of Congres-
sional appropriations action, as a function of requests. In
addition, some attempt was made to identify situations in
which these tendencies or characteristics are not found or
present. Different techniques were employed in estimating
the coefficients in these equations, some robust and others
not so robust. In Chapters II and III, coefficient estimators and
residuals were compared both for analysis using least squares
and analysis using Huber "M" estimates. In Chapter V,
the implications of the patterns of the residuals will be
discussed further. However, before that discussion begins
the discussion of estimation begun in the previous chapter
will be completed.
Up to this point our attention has focused on obtaining
point estimates. The purpose of this chapter is to expand
on the work of earlier chapters by deriving some measures of
variability or stability of the point estimates andby estimating
confidence intervals for the coefficients in equations (2.1)

through (2.5). The first section of this chapter poses the
problem of determining the variance of an estimator. In
section two, the jackknife is proposed as a possible solution
to this problem. Finally, results of jackknifing least
squares and Huber "M" estimates are summarized and discussed.
The appendices contain discussions of the problem of biasedness
of estimators for 8 in equations like (2.3), and of the
rationale behind probability plotting, together with probability
plots for jackknifed estimates.
IV. 1. The Problem
IV. 1.1. Background
The basic questions that are addressed in this chapter
are the result of the fact that estimators (least squares,
Huber, etc.) are modelled as random variables.
Since estimators are random variables, important questions
arise concerning their properties. What is the expected
value, what is the variance, what is the distribution of a
particular estimator? If the expectation of the estimator
equals the true value of the parameter being estimated, the
estimator is said to be unbiased [Kendall and Stuart, I,
1963, p. 222], If as the sample size gets large the estimator
converges in probability to a generate random variable which
equals with probability one the value of the parameter being
estimated, then the estimator is said to be consistent
[Kendall and Stuart ,11 ,1951 ,p . 33. Different estimators of
the same parameter are often compared by examining their
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variance. If the estimators are unbiased, this is done by
computing their relative efficiency [Kendall and Stuart ,11,
1951, PP. 5-6], which is defined as the ratio of the variance
of the estimators. Numerous other characteristics of
estimators become important when the estimation problem is
put into a decision theoretic context [Ferguson, 1967]
•
Unfortunately, It is not always possible to obtain an
unbiased, consistent, efficient estimator, and sometimes even
when one is found, these properties are sensitive to certain
assumptions made about the problem (such as the normality
of e.). The wild shot problem of Appendix A of Chapter III
gives an example of an estimator which suffers when certain
assumptions are not met.
If there are competing estimators - and competing problem
formulations, such as (2.1) through (2.5) - it is useful to
ask and attempt to answer certain questions. Is the variance
of the estimator large? Consequently, the question of how
this variance should be estimated arises. Another question
is associated with the distribution of the estimator. Is
it normal? What about large sample behavior?
Not all of these questions will be answered fully in what
follows. However, estimates will be derived for the standard




Huber "M" approach and least squares. This will allow us to
construct interval estimates for g (and a where applicable)
in (2.1) through (2.5).
IV. 1.2. The Problem in the Least Squares Case
The problem that is of interest at this point is twofold.
First there is the question of the bias of the estimator;
secondly, there is the question of how to estimate its
stability, as measured by the variance.
Least squares applied to (2.1) yields an unbiased
estimator for g. This is shown in most standard textbooks
[Johnston, 1963, p. 15]. Also, least squares applied to (2.2),
after dividing through by x.
,
yields an unbiased estimator
for g. However, there are some problems when estimating
comparable parameters in (2.3) through (2.5). In each case
logarithms are taken and In g is estimated. The least
squares method applied to the transformed equations yields
unbiased and maximum likelihood estimators (assuming
independent normal residuals) for In g and a. However, as
A In 6
shown in Appendix C, the estimator for g given by g = e
is not unbiased.
When the least squares method is applied to (2.1), the
variance of the estimator for g, if it exists, given in






where a is the variance of e^
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(4.2) a 2 = t=l_ ±
where e^ = y t - 3x fc , and substitute a
£ for a in (4.1).
Similar formulas can be derived for var(3) in (2.2) and
var(a) in (2.4) and (2.5).
It is possible to derive an expression or estimator for
3 which for large T is nearly unbiased and also to derive an
approximate expression for the variance of the estimator
as T, the sample size, gets large. The method is the Tukey-
Quenouille-Miller jackknife, and it will be discussed in
Section IV. 2.
If the e, (or u, ) are assumed to be normal, then £ in
(2.1) and (2.2), In 3 for (2.3) through (2.5) and a in (2.4)
and (2.5) are also normal. However, if this assumption is
not made, the estimators are in general not normally
distributed. Asymptotic normality can be shown to hold






IV. 1.3. The Problem in the Huber "M" Case
Small sample properties of the Huber "M" estimators have
not been determined analytically. Most studies comparing
the properties of these estimators with those of least
squares estimators have employed Monte Carlo techniques
[Huber, 1972, Huber, 1973, Andrews, et al.,1972].
Huber has derived asymptotic results which show that
the "M" estimators are asymptotically normal under certain
mathematical conditions. Approximate expressions for the
variance of the estimator as the sample size, T, gets large
have also been derived [Huber ,1973]* Nevertheless, existing
mathematical results give no precise guide to action in the
finite sample case except to use a finite sample version of
the asymptotic variance. An especially thorny problem is
what to use as an estimate for var(B) in (2.3) through (2.5).
In the next section the jackknife will be proposed as a
method of obtaining estimates of the variances of estimates
for 3 and a. In the case of least squares the appropriateness
of the jackknife has been established, however the same is
not true for the Huber "M" . This question of the appropriate-






IV. 2. The Jackknife
The jackknife is a technique which was originally proposed
by Quenouille [1949] for reducing bias in estimation problems.
Tukey extended the use of the technique by pointing out that
it could be used to obtain approximate confidence intervals
in situations for which standard statistical procedures do
not exist, or are difficult to apply. Miller [1964] analyzed
the utility of the jackknife for obtaining confidence intervals
and presented examples to illustrate occasions when such a use
is not appropriate. He also showed the conditions under which
some jackknife estimators (jackknifed transformations of the
sample mean) are asymptotically normal. Recently, the proper-
ties of jackknifed least squares estimators have been analyzed
[Miller, 1974].
The jackknife procedure is based on dividing the data into
groups, obtaining estimates from combinations of the groups
and then averaging the estimates. More specifically in its
use in this analysis , a jackknifed estimator is formed in
the following way. First, successively leave out one
observation and compute
3_t
= TB - (T-l)BT_ t
where B is the estimate when all the data are used, BT_ t is
the estimate when all the data but the t observation are











(i|.8) 6 = ^
B is the jackknifed estimator. Tukey has been reported as
suggesting that under certain conditions the pseudo-values are
approximately independent and that




would be an appropriate estimate for the variance of 3 [Miller,1964].
A major part of the attractiveness of the jackknife in
this analysis stems from the fact that Miller has derived
/\ /\ A
results for the case where 3 = f(6) and 6 is a least squares
estimate in a regression context [Miller, 1974]. In particular, suppose
"• 1 n 8
3 = e . Miller's results show that under suitable conditions , to
be specified later, an approximate t-statistic and confidence
interval can be constructed for 3, using (4.3) and (4.4).
Although the properties of jackknifed estimators have not
yet been proven for the Huber "M" and other robust estimators,
their use in order to obtain an estimate of 3 and to obtain
a useable estimate for a~ appears reasonable and is one of
the few attractive options for computing variance estimates
for "Huberized" estimators. Huber [1972, p. 1053] has pointed
out that each pseudo-value is a finite sample version of the
influence of a single observation on a complicated estimation




a useable estimate for the variance of a robust estimate,"
and that this estimate of the variance can then be used to
produce an approximate confidence interval.
In the following section results of the application of
the jackknife both for least squares and Huber "M" estimates
will be presented, together with estimates of oZ and a".
p a
Approximate confidence intervals will also be presented.
IV. 3. Results
IV. 3.1. Basic Results
Revised estimates of (J and a were computed by jack-
knifing. This was done for (2.1) through (2.5)
both when using least squares and when using the Huber "M"
approach, with c=1.0. In addition, estimates for the variance
of 6 and a were computed, as suggested by Miller in
[Miller ,197*0 • All computations were performed both on the
procurement and the RDTE data.
Several important questions arise in the course of
analyzing the results. First, since jackknifing was originally
proposed as a technique for bias reduction, how do the jack-
knifed estimates for the coefficients compare with the
"non-jackknifed" estimates, especially for B in (2.3) through
(2.5)? Secondly, how do the variance estimates compare -both




First, comparison of jackknifed versus non-Jackknifed
estimates for 3 and a, using least squares and the Huber "M"
approaches, is contained in Tables IV. 1 (procurement) and
IV. 2 (RDTE).
As discussed earlier, least squares when applied to (2.3)
through (2.5) in logarithmic form yields biased estimates
for 3. The jackknifed estimates for (2.3) do not appear to
differ very much from the unjackknifed estimates. This is
true for both least squares and Huber "M" estimates. On the
other hand, there is a marked difference between jackknifed
and unjackknifed estimates for 3 in (2.4) and (2.5). While
jackknifed and unjackknifed estimates for 3 differ, the
estimates for a appear to be equivalent.
The Huber "M" estimates demonstrate some interesting
characteristics. For RDTE, the jackknifed and unjackknifed
estimates for 3 in (2.4) and (2.5) are nearly the same.
However, for the procurement data, the jackknifed estimates
differ considerably from the unjackknifed estimate although
not as much as is true for the least squares estimates.
Reasons for these differences will be suggested later.
A final interesting point about Tables IV. 1 and IV.
2
deals with the estimate for 3 obtained by using least squares
A.
on (2.2) with the RDTE data. The unjackknifed 3 was 1.09
while the jackknifed 3 was .908. One result estimates
Congress on the average to grant 109% of the request while
the other says they grant 91% of the request. This point
will be pursued further after the estimates for c~ and c~
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(2.1) y t = Bx t + «
(2.2) yt = B xt + e t xt




Least Sq uares Huber "M"


















(2.4) y = 6x ae z 1.272 .994 .967t H t 995(1.471) (.948) (1.111) (.982)




.761 .970 .765 1.021
(1.242) (.969) (.997) (.996)
TABLE IV.
1
Jackknlfed Least Squares and Huber "M" Estimates
(Top estimate is jackknlfed estimate. Bottom estimate, in
parentheses, is junjackknifed estimate.)
RDTE
Least Squares Huber "M"
3 a 3 a
(2.1) y = 3x. + e. .982 NA .973 NA
t r r (.982) (.977)
(2.2) y, = ex. + e.x. .908 NA .984 NA
t t t t (1.093) (.989)
(2.3) y^ = 3x^e z 1.017 NA .987 NAt p t
u
(1.025) (.989)
(2.4) y. = 3x. ae t 1.584 .893 I.036 .990
z z (2.028) (.903)(1.06l) (.990)
u. In x.
(2.5) y. = 3x. ae z z 1.377 .837 1.022 .990
z z (2.877) (.852)(1.029) (.994)
TABLE IV.
2
Jackknlfed Least Squares and Huber "M" Estimates
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are presented since these estimates are relevant to the
question of why there are some large differences between
Jackknifed and unjackknifed results.
Tables IV. 3 and IV. 4 contain the Jackknifed estimates
for 3 and a together with estimates for oT, and o" . These
p a
estimates for the standard error were obtained by computing
the square root of the sum of the squared differences of the
pseudo-values from the jackknifed estimate and then divided
by T(T-l).
The results in Tables IV. 3 and IV. k are consistent with
the results in Tables IV. 1 and IV. 2 In the sense that both
highlight estimation problems for equations (2.4) and (2.5).
The estimates for o~ and a" in (2.4) and (2.5) are very
p a
large, both for RDTE and procurement. Thus, the confidence
intervals will be very wide. For the procurement data the
estimates for a~ and a" are large both when least squares
p ex
and when Huber "M" estimation techniques are used, although
the Huber "M" standard errors are approximately one half the
size of those associated with least squares estimates. For
the RDTE data, the Huber "M" standard errors (in (2.4) and
(2.5)) are less than one-seventh the size of those of the
least squares estimates.
Also worthy of note is the size of the estimated standard
error for the least squares 3 in (2.2) when the RDTE data was
used. Recall, that the unjackknifed least squares estimate




Least Squares Huber "M"
3 a 3 a
(2.1) yt = 3xt + e .961 NA .948 NA
(.016) (.012)
(2.2) y = gx. + e.x. .955 NA .962 NAZ Z Z Z (.023) (.012)
(2.3) y«. = gx.e ° 1.011 NA .950 NAt p "t
u a
(.020) (.011)
(2.4) y<_ = 8xt
a
e
t 1.272 .994 .967 .995
r Z (.593) (.048) (.259) (.028)
u. In x,




.761 .970 .765 1.02
Z t (.794) (.066) (.337) (.038)
TABLE IV.
3
(Estimates of standard errors are
in parentheses.)
RDTE
Least Squares Huber »M"
















( 2.1) y t - 8xt + e
(2.2) y t = B xt + e t xt
u
t
( 2.3) y t 3xt e
(2.4) y+ . = Bx "e
Ut
1.584 .893 1.036 .990
* fc (1.238) (.110) (.142) (.018)
(2.5) y^ - 3x "e
Ut Xt
1.377 .837 1.022 .990





IV. 3. 2. Variations or "Data Snooping"
In the results just reviewed two things caught our
attention. First, the differences between the jackknifed and
unjackknifed estimates for B in (2.4) and (2.5) were noticeable.
This held for both least squares and Huber estimates when
procurement data were analyzed, and held only for least
squares estimates when the RDTE data were analyzed. Also,
least squares applied to (2.2) yielded different jackknifed
versus unjackknifed estimates for B when RDTE data was used.
A second interesting result was the size of the estimated
standard errors for B, again in (2.4) and (2.5). The estimates
were large for both least squares and Huber "M" estimates for
the procurement data. Least squares estimates yielded large
estimated standard errors for B in (2.2), (2.4) and (2.5)
for the RDTE data.
The reasons for the results for (2.4) and (2.5) may have
been the same both for procurement and RDTE data. However,
the fact that the Huber "M" estimates demonstrated the same
overall characteristics as the least squares estimates when
procurement data was used, and different overall characteris-
tics when RDTE data was used, leads one to suspect otherwise.
In order to further explore the question, the pseudo-values,
scatterplots and the original data were examined.
Examination of the pseudo-values for the procurement data
revealed one which stood out. It was the pseudo-value
corresponding to the item 1953 PAMN: the request was
$124 million, and appropriations were $113 million.
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These numbers are an order of magnitude smaller than the rest
of the numbers In the data set, most of which are in the
$2 to $3 billion range. In Table IV. 5, the pseudo-values
for this item both when least squares and when Huber "M"
techniques were used are compared to the jackknifed estimate.
Least Squares Huber "M 1
a B a
-35.18 -.670 -16.48 2.80





jackknifed 13-02 5.80 -25-14 3-88
estimate .76 .97 -764 1.02
Table IV.
5
Pseudo-Values for 1953 PAMN
The figures in Table IV. 5 indicated that it might be
wise to compare B (and a) when the full sample was used to
B (and a) when 1953 PAMN is omitted from the sample. This






























Tables IV. 5 and IV. 6 indicate the significant impact of
one observation on the estimates. One of the puzzling facts
is that this impact is strong not only when least squares is
used but also when the supposedly robust Huber "M" procedure
is used. This raises some questions about the Huber "M"
procedure.
Examination of scatterplots of the data indicate that for
the full data set both least squares and the Huber "M"
procedure appear to be the victims of what might be called a
"straggler-effect." The "straggler-effect" was discussed
briefly in Chapter II. It is characterized by a scatterplot




FIGURE IV. 1. The"Straggler Effect"
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The estimated line with 1953 PAMN as part of the data is
line number (1). The estimated line with 1953 PAMN omitted
is line number (2).
Application of the Huber "M" technique does not solve
this problem. Recall that the technique acts like least
squares as long as | In y . - (In B+ aln x, )| < c . If the
absolute value of the difference is greater than c then a
particular observation, t, does not receive as much weight
as it would under least squares. This affords "protection"





Effect of an Outlier
(broken line is least squares estimate,
unbroken line is Huber "M" estimate.)
If the "straggler" is in the Group 1 residuals (i.e. it
is one of the observations for which |lny t ~ (InB + alnxJ 1 c)
then it has received as much (in fact more) weight under the
Huber "M" approach as it would have under least squares.
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To summarize at this stage, the preceding discussion has
led to two useful insights. The first is that the Huber "M"
procedure is not particularly robust in at least one situation,
the case of the "straggler," if the "straggler" is not forced
into the Group 2 or Group 3 residuals.* The second is that
jackknifing and an examination of pseudo-values is useful for
spotting this situation. It should be added that examination
of the original data will alert the analyst to the possibility
that a "straggler" effect problem may exist, however examina-
tion of the pseudo-values is helpful in determining how
serious it is.
Table IV. 7 contains the revised estimates of the coeffi-
cients and standard errors for equations (2.4) and (2.5) when
the "straggler", 1953 PAMN, is purged from the data. Of
course, elimination of this point, where both request and
appropriation are very small will limit generalizations that
can be drawn from the data to situations where procurement
requests and appropriations are larger than $100 million.
In fact it limits generalizations to situations where requests
and appropriations are greater than $800 million. This is
not a very serious limitation, however, given the size of
procurement requests over the last fifteen years. Also
included in the table are the unjackknifed estimates. Table
IV. 8 repeats the information in Tables IV. 1 and IV. 3; that
is, it presents estimates when 1953 PAMN is not removed from
the data in order to contrast these results with those in Table IV.
*Estimates based on functional forms for $ similar to





Uhjackknifed Jackknifed Unjackknifed JackknlfedBaBaBaga
(2.4) 1.93 .912 1.782 .912 1.337 .959 1.346 .955
v =Qv aA (.532) (.002) (.269) (.023)yt p*t
(2.5) n 2.01 .908 1.829 .908 1.328 .960 1.263 .963u
t
inx
t (>652) ( _ 002) (>262) (>Q25)V^t e
TABLE IV.
7
Results when 1953 PAMN is not used.




uhjackknifed Jackknifed Ihjackknifed JackknifedBctBaBaBa
(2 i\) 1.47 .948 1.272 .994 1.11 .982 .967 .995
a
u
t (.593) (.048) (.259) (.027)
y = Bx^e
(h k)
.997 .996 .761 .970 1.24 .969 .765 1.02





Results with 1953 PAMN Included in data.




There are some interesting differences between the results
in Table IV. 7 and Table IV. 8. Without 1953 PAMN included, the
estimates for a In Table IV. 7 indicate that the effect of the
size of the request on the percentage of the request that was
granted is more important than the results in Table IV.
8
(where 1953 PAMN is included) Indicate. For example, for
equation (2.4) the jackknifed least squares approach estimates
a to be .995, when 1953 PAMN is in the data set. An a of 1.0
says that the percentage of the request granted does not, on
the average, change proportionately as the size of the request
changes.* When 1953 PAMN is left out of the data, the estimated
a is .955 for the jackknifed least squares estimate. When
using the jackknifed Huber estimate, note that for equation
(2.5) the estimated a is 1.02 in Table IV. 8, which implies
that the percentage of the request granted increases as the
request increases. In Table IV. 7, the comparable estimate
for a is .908.
The differences between $ in Tables IV. 7 and IV. 8 are
considerable also. Note for the jackknifed Huber the 3 of
1.263 in Table IV. 7 compared to a B of .765 in Table IV. 8.
Insofar as the estimated standard errors are concerned,
in every case but one (the standard error for 3 in equation
(2.4) when a jackknifed Huber estimate is used), the standard
errors are smaller when 1953 PAMN is not part of the data set.
*Recall that a may be interpreted as the elasticity of





The estimates for equations (2.4) and (2.5) for the
procurement data raised questions both when least squares
and when the Huber "M" approaches were used. However, the
estimates for equations (2.2), (2.4) and (2.5) for the RDTE
data raised questions only when the least squares method was
used. Again, inspection of pseudo-values for theRDTE data
and re-inspection of scatterplots helped to clarify these
questions. It appears that one data point, 1955 RDTE Navy,
for which the request was $61.2 million and appropriations
were $419.9 million, was seriously affecting the estimates.
The situation resembles that depicted in Figure IV. 2.
As discussed in previous chapters, the effect of any one
observation on the estimated line, when least squares is used,
is directly proportional to the magnitude of the residual.
However, the Huber "M" technique does not give this observation
as much weight, and the result is as depicted in Figure IV. 2.
Insofar as equation (2.2) is concerned, the estimated 6,
using least squares, is seriously affected by this one obser-
vation, 1955 Navy RDTE, because the estimator is the sample
mean y^/x. ratio. The effect of extreme observations on the
sample mean as a location parameter estimator has been well-
documented in Andrews, et al . [1972].
Table IV. 9 contains the revised estimates after 1955 Navy
RDTE was eliminated from the data set. Also included are the
unjackknifed estimates and estimates of the standard errors.
The least squares method was used to obtain these estimates.
Table IV. 10 contains the same information as Table IV. 9,






6 a @ a
(2.2) y t = 3xt + ex .999 NA .999 NA
( .016)
(2.4) y = ex. e z 1.006 .945 .914 1.01
(.143) (.02)
u. In x
(2.5) yt = 6x
a
e








6 a 6 a
(2.2) y. = 6x. + e.x, 1.093 NA .908 MA
t t t c (.095)
(2.4) y. = ex^e fc 2.028 .903 1-584 .893
r r (1.238) (.110)
u In x,
(2.5) y«. = Bx"e t
t 2.877 .852 1.377 .838
t t (2.77) (.188)
TABLE IV. 10
1955 Navy RDTE part of data
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Tables IV. 9 and IV. 10 reveal some rather dramatic differ-
ences between the results when 1955 Navy RDTE Is part of the
data set (Table IV. 9) and when it Is not part of the data set
(Table IV. 10). On the average all of the estimated standard
errors are smaller in Table IV. 9 by about a factor of 10.
The coefficients also differ. For example,.- in
.
Table IV. 10 both the estimates for a are less than one. In
Table IV. 9 the jackknifed a estimates are close to 1.0. The
large discrepancy between the jackknifed and unjackknifed a
(and B) for equation (2.5) in Table IV. 9 appears to be due
to a combination of "straggler effects" and outliers.
Examination of the pseudo-values revealed three more items
which appeared to be influential in causing the differences
observed.
Item Request Appropriation
1954 Army 475.0 345.0
1953 Navy 75-7 70.0
1954 Navy 58.6 74.9
(in millions)
Table IV. 9(a) contains revised estimates for a,3 and the
standard errors when the least squares method was applied
(unjackknifed and jackknifed). Notice that the unjackknifed
and jackknifed estimates are not as different from each other
as in Tables IV. 9 and IV. 10.
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(2.2) y t = 6xt + et xt
u A
Unjackknifed Jackknlfed






















When examining differences between the estimates for g in
(2.2) and (2.4)-(2.5), it should be recalled that (2.2) and
(2.4)-(2.5) s when a ^ 1, are different characterizations of
appropriations behavior. In (4.2) appropriations are charac-
terized as a constant percentage of the request while in
(2.4)-(2.5) that percentage changes as the size of the
request changes. In the next chapter, we will investigate
whether the estimates for 3 would be different among (2.1)
through (2.5) if the true model is (2.3).
Confidence regions:
The recent work of Miller [1974] has shown that under
certain conditions, in large samples, when f(3) is jackknifed
(6 being a least squares estimate) a t-statistic confidence
interval can be constructed for f(6), using the jackknlfed
estimate of the standard error of f(B).
Two of the assumptions that must be met in order to use
Miller's results are: (1) the fourth moment of e t (or u fc )
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must be finite, (2) f must have bounded second derivatives
in an open interval around 0. These assumptions are satisfied
if the e
t
are assumed N(0,a ) and if f(B) equals 0, or e
,
as in the models used for this study. (3) The other assumption
T
deals with whether ~L » Z , a positive definite matrix as
T-*"*> . If convergence takes place, then Miller's results
hold, given the other two assumptions.
Although Miller's results have not been extended to
jackknifed Huber estimates, following the lead of Huber
concerning jackknifed estimates [Huber, 1972, p . 1053] we
decided to compute confidence intervals for the Huber
estimates that are analogous to those computed for least
squares . *
For both the least squares and Huber estimates the number
of degrees of freedom was large enough to permit the use of
the normal approximation for the t distribution. Confidence
intervals based on a standard normal interval of (-2 .0a, + 2.0a)
were constructed, yielding a nominal confidence level of .95.
Based on the considerations discussed in the previous section,
the straggler observation 1953 Navy PAMN was omitted from the
data when computing the confidence intervals for 3 and a in
*Huber [1973] suggests some possible estimates for a~ in
(2.1). The suggestion was expanded upon for the purposes of
deriving confidence intervals for in (2.1) through (2.5).
Estimated intervals and hew they were derived are discussed
in Appendix D of this chapter. Apparently there has not been
determined any way of finding out whether the jackknifed
Huber or the approach followed in Appendix D produce the
better interval without conducting some sampling experiments.
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equations (2.4) and (2.5) for the procurement data. Also,
the RDTE outliers 1955 Navy and 1954 Army and the stragglers
1953 Navy and 1954 Navy were omitted from the data when the
least squares estimates were used in setting up the confidence
intervals for the parameters in equations (2.2), (2.4) and
(2.5).
Tables IV. 11 and IV. 12 contain the confidence intervals
for 3 and a for procurement and RDTE data, both when least
squares was used and when the Huber "M" approach was used.
Among the most noticeable aspects of Tables IV. 11 and
IV. 12 is the fact that for the procurement data the intervals
for all the Huber "M" intervals are smaller or the same size
as the least squares intervals. For the RDTE data, the Huber
"M" intervals are smaller for (2.1) - (2.3). E°r (2.
(!) - (2.5)
j
the least squares intervals (with 4 points not included in
the data set) are slightly smaller than the Huber "M"
intervals (with all the data included) . Since a theory of
confidence intervals for jackknifed Huber "M" estimates has
not yet been derived, one ought to be cautious in drawing
inferences from the differing sizes of the confidence
intervals for least squares and the Huber "M" estimates.
The sampling experiments reported in the next chapter
shed
more light on this question. A second fact Is
that all of
the intervals for the coefficients in (2.1) through
(2.3)
are considerably smaller than those for (2.4) and (2.5)
and
those for (2.4) are slightly smaller than those
for (2.5).






3 a 3 a
(2.1) yt = Bxt + et (.93 , .99 ) NA (.92 , .97.) NA


































(.98 ,1.04 ) NA (-97,1-00) NA
(2.3) yt =Bxte


















IV. 4 . Summary
This chapter commenced with a discussion of the problem
of estimation of the variances and construction of confidence
intervals for Huber "M" and least squares estimators. The
jackknife was proposed as a technique for estimation of the
variances. Next, jackknifed estimates were computed using
the procurement and RDTE data. For the procurement data a
"straggler," 1953 PAMN appeared to be having a disproportionate
affect on the jackknifed Huber "M" and least squares estimates.
For the RDTE data, four observations, especially 1955 Navy
RDTE, were having a disproportionate affect on the least
squares estimates. Confidence intervals were found for
parameters in (2.1) - (2.5) both on the basis of jackknifed
least squares and on the basis of jackknifed Huber "M"
estimates. In Chapter V some of the sampling properties
of Huber "M" and least squares estimates will be explored
when the error distribution is Cauchy. The coverage of the
jackknifed Huber "M" confidence intervals will also be
addressed. Finally, questions raised in Chapters II and, to
a certain extent, in Chapter III, concerning the possible
existence of special eras of Congressional activity and
special Congressional treatment of the Air Force in the




In Section IV. 3, it was stated that a straggler observa-
tion disturbed the jackknifed least squares and Huber "M"
estimates for the procurement data and at least one outlier
observation disturbed the jackknifed least squares estimate.
It was noted at the time these statements were made that
scatterplots, pseudo-values and the raw data were of assist-
ance in identifying stragglers and outliers. Normal plots
provided another data analytic aid.
As mentioned in the body of the chapter, it has been
reported that Tukey has suggested that under certain conditions
pseudo-values are approximately independent and normally
distributed [Miller, 1964] . If this were true, then









.\ is the t ordered pseudo-value and Y r t \ is th©
t
th
order statistic from a distribution which is U(0,1).
Under these circumstances, it is reasonable to consider the
regression of the tth ordered pseudo-value versus E(*" (Y/^x))
where T is the total sample size [Wilk and Shapiro, 1965]
•
However E($_1 (Y, <.)) must be determined by numerical
methods [Teichrow,1962] . In its place, what has teen found
to provide a good approximation is the standard normal inverse
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of the expected value of the t order statistic of a
sample of size T from a uniform, U(0,1) distribution, or
*"1(
TTT ) ^Blom > 1 958,pp.
70-71].
For jackknifed least squares and Huber "M" estimates,
so-called "probability plots" were made of B_( t ) versus
$-l(_t_) # Although the plots did not (and were not meant to)
provide a means of formally testing the normality of the
pseudo-values, they were useful as a means of examining
characteristics of their distribution.
Appendix B contains some of the typical probability plots




The changes in slope associated with
very high and very low
values for f 1^) are more dramatic for some of the plots
than for others. Plots like those
in Figure IV. A. 1 are
frequently associated with distributions
which, though
symmetric, have thicker, fatter tails




the double exponential and the Cauchy [Wllk and Gnanadeslkan,
1968]. This is easily seen by noting that the increasing
slope with increasing values of | $~ (rfnrr) I can be associated
with the fact that for high values of | $
-1
(rp!y)| the values






The plots contained in this appendix are a subset of
the plots which were made. However they do indicate general
characteristics of all the plots since they become more
linear when (1) straggler and outlier observations are
omitted (e.g., compare pages B-2 and B-3) and (2) the Huber
"M" technique, as opposed to least squares is employed
(e.g. compare pages B-2 and B-4j also compare pages B-5
and B-6)
.
This appendix contains normal plots for the pseudo-values
of jackknifed least squares and jackknifed Huber "M"
estimates. The rationale behind these plots is discussed in
Appendix A of this chapter. For ail plots $~ (f+T^ ls
plotted as the horizontal component while B_( t )> the t
ordered pseudo-value, is plotted as the vertical component.
The following is a listing which identifies the plots.
Least Squares Huber M
Page Page
(2.2) y t = Bxt + e t xt
RDTE B-2 B-4
RDTE (59 observations) B-3
u x
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where y, is the appropriations in year t
x. is the request in year t
u. is a random variable with expectation of and
2
variance of a
One method of estimation of 3 is to take logarithms of
both sides of the equation to yield:




The least squares estimator for In 3 is
y
t-
In 3 = I ft-5-
t=l
*• In 8
If the estimator for B is taken to be 3 = e , then
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' s are assumed to be independent and identically
distributed. Thus, in general the estimator is biased since
u
tE(e ) is not equal to 1.0 for any nondegenerate distribution
of u for which E (u
fc
) = 0, for by Jensen's inequality




E[u^ = i .
In fact, by the Taylor series expansion of the exponential
u. n 2
ECe 1 > H- y .




In the body of this chapter, confidence intervals were
developed for the coefficients in (2.1) through (2.5) by
jackknifing Huber "M" estimates. Huber [1973, PP. 814-815
and p. 8l8] has suggested using the following as an estimate
of a£ in an equation like (2.1) 3 y. = Bx. + e. :
T-N(T



















where T is the total sample size, s is the estimated scale
parameter, B is the estimated coefficient, N(T± ) is the number
of items in the Group i residuals. This estimate, is based
on the theoretical value for the variance of the estimator
derived by Ruber [1973, PP . 812-813].
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Confidence intervals were constructed for (2.1) through
(2.5) based on Huber's suggestion. For those cases where
A In 8
6 = e , that is equations (2. 3) and (2.5), confidence
intervals were constructed for In 8 and the upper and lower
limits of these intervals were then transformed into upper
and lower limits for 8. In other words, if we let the upper
limit of the confidence interval for In 8 be designated as
+
(In 8) then the upper limit for 8 , which is designated as
+ + ( In 8
)
8 was computed by taking 8 = e .
The estimated confidence intervals are contained in






















e (.94 ,.99 ) NA
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(2.5) y t = Bxt e
(.81 ,1.52 ) (.94 ,1.02 )






*Estimates computed without 1953 PAMN in data set.
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(2.1) yt = Bxt + e 1





























The estimates In Tables D.l and D.2 differ somewhat from
those In Tables IV. 11 and IV. 12. This is especially true of
the estimates for (2.4) and (2.5). However, the intervals
are very similar for (2.1) through (2.3). The question of
which approach, the jackknife or Huber's suggestion, produces a
higher coverage rate, and on the average , smaller intervals will
be addressed in the next chapter where artificial data are






In the previous two chapters least squares and Ruber "M"
estimates were computed and compared using five different
equations which were designed to represent general tendencies
on the part of the Congress in the budgeting of defense. In
Chapter III point estimates were derived, while in Chapter IV
confidence intervals were constructed. At this point in the
analysis, there are some important unresolved questions.
Which of the equations best represents the Congressional
tendencies we are trying to characterize? How do Huber "M"
and least squares estimates compare when the error distribution
is known to be a long-tailed one, such as, for example, the
Cauchy . How sensitive are least squares and Huber "M" to
specification error? For example, suppose the "true" model
were given by equation (4.2) but equation (4.4) was used for
estimation purposes. Since there is as yet no formal theory
which supports the jackknifing of Huber "M" estimates, how do
jackknifed estimates, both point and interval estimates,
behave when computed for artificially generated data? These
are questions which will be addressed in this chapter.

This chapter is divided into four basic sections. The
first section discusses the background and rationale of Monte
Carlo studies which were designed to examine questions such
as the ones just raised. In the next section, the specifics
of the Monte Carlo techniques used are presented. Results
of the studies are presented in the third section. The final
section re-examines some questions raised in previous chapters
concerning "eras" in Congressional behavior, and similarities
and differences between action on the three services' requests.
These questions are discussed in the light of results from




V.l.l. Small Sample Properties
Asymptotic properties for Huber "M" estimates have been
derived by Huber in [1973]. To date , however, there have apparently
been no formal studies of the small sample properties of the
estimates. Results of certain Monte Carlo studies were
reported in [Huber, 1973] and [Andrews, 1973]. Since the
estimation procedure was applied to five different equations
using RDTE and Procurement data, we have sought to investigate
sampling properties of the estimates for relatively small
samples of size 63 (the same as that for the RDTE data) for
each of the five equations. Also since the RDTE data contained
some unusual or extreme observations, representing Congressional
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appropriations much larger (or smaller) than usual, the
artificial data generated was based on samples from a
long-tailed error distribution, the Cauchy
.
Among the results sought from the Monte Carlo studies
are answers to questions concerning the distribution of the
estimates, and the expectation and variance of the estimates
where these concepts are meaningful.
V.1.2. Specification Error
A major difficulty which arises when trying to estimate
coefficients in regression equations is the problem of
specification error. Among the problems generally referred
to as specification error are incorrect functional form and
non-independent error terms
.
The problem of an incorrect functional form can best be
explained using an example. Suppose tentatively that the
"true" model is (2.1) - that is, y. = gxt + e t - but equation
u
(2. A), y. = gx.
a
e is chosen by the analyst to depict the
appropriations process. Can one count on the estimates for
a and g for (2.4) to generally be near the values of 1.0
(for a) and the true g (for g)? On the other hand, what if
the "true" model were (2.4)? What would the estimates for g
in (2.1) look like in this case; this obviously depends,
at least partially, upon the "true" value for a. Although
some analytical work has been devoted to examining the problem
of incorrect functional form, especially in a least squares
context pox and Cox, 1964, Zarembka,1968], we chose to address this
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problem using Monte Carlo methods, by generating data using
one equation, (2.3) for example, and estimating coefficients
using the five different regression models. The behavior of
least squares and, more importantly, Huber "M" estimates was
compared by this process. Results of these studies are
reported in section 3 of this chapter.
Another specification problem arises if the error terms
in the equations are not independent. More specifically,
suppose the e in (2.1) are not independent but instead are
related by first order autocorrelation. Huber has said that
lack of independence of the error terms causes difficulties
for Huber "M" estimates — at least for deriving asymptotic
results [Huber, 1973
,
p. 804], Tests for autocorrelation in
a least squares context and correction to the functional form
based on the results of these tests have been used extensively
by econometricians [Kane, 19 6 8, pp . 364-37 3, Burbin, 1951, Theil, 196 1]
However, often these tests are inconclusive, and such tests
and adjustments are not well understood when Huber "M"
estimates are computed. Consequently, in order to examine
this problem and to ascertain its potential impact in the
specific situation being studied here (that is, Congressional
action on defense budgets), artificial data resembling the
actual RDTE data was generated using error terms related
through first-order autocorrelation. The effect on the
distribution of the Huber "M" estimates was assessed; results
will also be discussed in section 3.
V-'l

V.1.3. Confidence Interval Estimates
In Chapter IV, confidence intervals were estimated for
coefficients in equations (2.1) through (2.5) using
the jackknife. Also, confidence intervals
were constructed for the Huber "M" estimates using a finite
sample approximation to the asymptotic variance of the Huber
"M" estimate which was suggested by Huber [See Appendix D,
Chapter IV]. Several questions were left unresolved. First,
since no theory exists for jackknifing Huber "M" estimates,
was the procedure followed in Chapter IV justified? Even if
the procedure were justified, which method provides the
better estimate in terms of coverage of the true value of
the parameter and size, the estimate suggested by Huber or
the jackknifed estimate?
Again, these questions were investigated using Monte
Carlo techniques. Artifical data was constructed, using
Cauchy errors. Because the data were constructed artifically,
the true parameter value was known. Next, 95$ confidence
intervals were constructed for a number of samples of size
63, using the jackknife and using Huber 's suggested estimate.
The coverage and size of these confidence intervals were
compared. The results follow in Section 3 of this chapter.
V.2. Techniques
The artificial data set which was analysed was constructed
in the following way. The 63 RDTE observations provided the
values for the x variable inequation (2.3).
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The values for u
fc
were generated by sampling from a Cauchy
distribution. A value for 3 equal to .989 (the value
estimated for the real or non-artifical data using the
Huber "M" technique) was used as the "true" value for the
parameter. Using these three components (an assumed 8, the
x
t
values from the original data, the Cauchy distributed u.
values) sample y, values were generated.
The Cauchy random errors were assumed to have a value
of zero for their location parameter. The value for the
scale parameter which was used was the median absolute
residual for the original RDTE data when equation (2.3)
(in logarithmic form) was analyzed using the Huber "M"
approach. In those cases when the "true" model was assumed
to be (2.4) the values used for £ and a were 1.061 and .99
respectively, the estimated values for the original data
when the Huber "M" technique was applied to (2.4). The
scale parameter for the distribution of u, was set equal to
the median absolute residual for (2.4) when the Huber "M"
approach was applied.
The Cauchy errors were generated using a uniform random
number generator devised and tested by Lewis and Learmonth
[1973] and then applying an inverse transformation.
In some cases it was desired to introduce autocorrelated
errors. In order to to this, a basic Cauchy error, v^, was
generated for observation one. However, for observation two





















.5 v. . This produced a
sequence of correlated Cauchy errors {u, ,u„ , . . . ,Ug^} with










V.3.1. Huber "M" and Least Squares Estimates with
Artificial Data: Monte Carlo Sampling Properties
In the previous section we described the manner
in which artificial data were generated. A total
*This is true because the average of two independent
identically distributed Cauchy random variables is a Cauchy




of 1000 samples or histories of size 63 were generated. For
these samples, the coefficients in (2.1) through (2.5) were
estimated by least squares and the Huber "M" technique. The
empirical frequency distributions were examined and compared.
Table V.l gives the sample mean values for the coefficient (s
)
estimated for (2.1) through (2.5) using least squares and
the Huber "M" . Below these mean values are the sample standard
deviations
.
Huber "M" (c=1.0) Least Squares
3 a 3 a




(2.2) y t - Sxt + e t x t .990
NA NA
( .008)
(2.3) y, = Bx.e
Ut




(2.4) y^ = 3x "e t .993 1.000 3626. .997t t (.068) (.010) (6x10 5) (.247)
(2.5) y^ 6x^a e
Ut t
.992 1.000 .998 5.4l5
x
fc t (.068) (.010) (.187) (907.0)
TABLE V.l
For (2.1) and (2.2), using least squares, the distribution of
estimators was very skewed with approximately 3/4 of the observations
lying between .92 and 1.05 and the remainder scattered among
values greater than 1.05, some values being extremely large.
The few large values made the computation of a mean seem
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meaningless. Actually, when least squares Is applied, the
distribution of the estimated B has no finite expected value.
Recall from Chapter IV, Appendix C, that for the expected value
of the estimate for B in (2.3)
E(B) B E(e t )
However, if u is Cauchy distributed, then E(e z ) does not
w
exist. This explains the extremely erratic sample mean and
variances for (2.1) and (2.2) and the unusual values found
for (2.3) through (2.5)
.
On the other hand, it is not clear whether the expectation
of the Huber "M" estimator exists or not. The sample means
and variances derived were reasonable and in fact for (2.1)
through (2.5) the sample means came very close to equalling
the true parameter value, .989. It should be noted that the
v\ A,
mean values for B and a in (2.^) and (2.5) were .992 and
1.000. This is interesting since, in using (2.3) to generate
the data, a was implicitly set equal to 1.0. However, note
that the sample standard deviations for B in (2.1J) through
(2.5) were seven to eight times larger than the sample standard
deviations for B in (2.1) through (2.3). These facts indicate
that if data are generated by (2.3)> on the average the
estimated results will be the same no matter which equation
is assumed to be the correct model for estimation purposes.
However, it is not altogether unlikely on any one occasion
that the estimate values may differ considerably, with the
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estimate for g using (2.2) being near .998 and that for
(2.4) near 1.06. These two values are only one sample
standard deviation unit away from the sample means of the
respective equations.
For each equation (2.1) through (2.5) normal plots of
the 1000 estimates were constructed. Once again, the
rationale behind plotting the ordered estimates in this way
is that if the distribution of the estimates were normal,
then the plots would be approximately linear. The plots
for the Huber "M" estimates, found in Appendix A of this
chapter, appear to be almost perfect straight lines. Sample
skewness and kurtosis were also computed for each of the
sets of 1000 estimates and goodness-of-fit tests run on
each set [See Appendix A].
The least squares sample mean and variances were for
most cases useless as indicators of the location and scale
of the distribution of least squares estimates of $.
Alternative indicators of the location and scale of the
distribution are the median and semi-interquartile range.
The results are contained in Table V.2.
If one compares the least squares results in Table V.2
with the Huber "M" results in Table V.l it is seen that the
central tendency (measured by the sample mean) of the Huber
"M" results, for (2.1) through (2.5), is slightly closer to
the true parameter value of .989 than the central tendency

















Also the dispersion of each of the Huber "M" results (measured
by the sample standard deviation) is smaller than the
dispersion of the least squares results (measured by the
sejni-interquartile range).
V. 3.2. The Huber "M" and Specification Error
The remainder of this section will be devoted to further
discussion of Huber "M" estimates and the properties which
they demonstrate in the Monte Carlo studies. First the
question of specification error will be explored; then the
coverage of confidence intervals constructed by jackknifing
Huber "M" estimates will be compared to the coverage of
intervals constructed using Huber' s suggested estimate for
the standard error of an estimated coefficient.
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(i) Incorrect Functional Form
The first specification error problem is concerned with
what happens to the estimates for 3 if the data are generated
using (2.3) and coefficients are estimated using one of the
other equations. Table V.l contains some very interesting
results.
On the average, it appeared to make very little
difference which equation was used for estimation purposes.
There was almost no perceptible difference between the results
obtained when using equations (2.1), (2.2) or (2.3). These
estimates, on the average, were equal to the true value of
the parameter which generated the data. The distributions
of estimates when using (2.4) or (2.5) were somewhat more
widely dispersed than those for (2.1) through (2.3). (The
sample standard deviation for 3 using (2.3) was .008 while
the sample standard deviation for 3 using (2.4) was .068.)
Also, the estimates for 3 using (4.4) - (4.5) on the
average, were slightly greater than the true 3 value of .989.
In a way this is a tautology. If estimates are equal, then
there' is little to choose from for the models (2.3) and (2.4)
become equivalent.
In order to examine this question from another viewpoint,
data were generated using (2.4). Table V.3 contains sample
means and standard deviations of the distributions of 1000
estimates of 3 and a (where appropriate) using (2.1) through
99
T


































Means and standard deviations of
1000 estimates
Notice that on the average the estimates using (2.4) and
(2.5) were nearly equal to the true values for B and a of 1.061
and .990, respectively. The average estimates for B using
(2.1) through (2.3) were not equal to the average estimates
using (2.4) and (2.5), which is to be expected since if a / 1.0
the interpretation of 3 in (2.4) through (2.5) is different
from that in (2.1) through (2.3). On the other hand the
estimates for B using (2.2) and (2.3) were on the average
equal" to the values obtained from the real data when using
the Huber "M" . The average estimate for B using (2.1) was
close to, but not equal to, the value obtained when the Huber
"M" was applied to the real data. (That value was .977.)
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Another aspect of the results is that although true model,
the one which generated the data, was (2.4), the sample
standard error for the distribution of 6 when (2.4) was
used for estimation purposes was larger than that for 3
when (2.1) through (2.3) were used for estimation purposes.
This highlights the fact that if a J 1 in (2.4)-(2.5), the
parameter has a different interpretation from the
parameter 3 in (2.1)- (2. 3).
The results of the Monte Carlo studies of specification
error when the data was generated uisng (2.3) or (2.4), and
estimated using (2.1)-(2.5), help to clarify some of the
issues involved in model selection. Assuming one limits
his characterization of Congressional appropriations behavior
to models (2.1)-(2.5)j then if the estimates for £ in
(2.1)-(2.5) are the same, with a = 1.0 in (2.4)-(2.5), then
one is left with little choice but to characterize the usual
result of Congressional appropriations action as appropriations
being a fixed percentage of requests. However if the results
for (2.1)-(2.3) differ from those for (2.4)-(2.5), with
u / 1,0 for the latter models, there are two possible
explanations. The data could have been generated by a fixed
percentage model and the high dispersion of estimates (using (2. 4)- (2. 5)) for
8 and a resulted in values for a and B which did not characterize
appropriations as being a fixed percentage of requests as
estimated by (2.1)-(2.3). On the other hand, the Monte
Carlo studies appear to indicate that if the data were
V-14

generated by a variable percentage model like (2.4), then
the average estimates for (2. 4)- (2. 5) will differ from the
average estimate for (2.1)- (2. 3). The dispersion of the
estimates for (2.1)-(2.3) may be of assistance in this
case. Further studies, using different scale factors for
the errors indicate that in many cases when the true model
was (2.3) the estimates for 6 using (2.1)-(2.3) were much
less dispersed than those for 6 using (2.4)-(2.5), but when
the true model was (2.4), the estimates for B using
(2.1)-(2.3) were less dispersed than those for 3 using
(2. 4)- (2. 5) by a smaller margin. The problem of
specification error is one of the areas, requiring more
research.
(ii) Autocorrelated errors
Table V.4 contains the sample means and standard
deviations for 1000 Huber "M" estimates of 3 (and a where
applicable) when the artificial data was generated using
(2.3), but with autocorrelated disturbances, and (2.1)
through (2.5) were used for estimation purposes.
An interesting characteristic of Table V.4 is the small
effect the autocorrelated disturbances have on the means
or average estimates, affecting only (2.4) and (2.5)
slightly. However, note that autocorrelation does appear
to increase the dispersion of the estimates. The experiments
which were run using a second scheme (where errors took the
form u. = . 5u. -, + . 5v, ) further emphasized these conclusions
When this stronger autocorrelation scheme was used the









B a 6 a
(2.1) .990 NA .990 NA
(.01*0 (.009)
(2.2) .990 NA .990 NA
(.012) (.008)
(2.3) .989 NA .989 NA
(.012) (.008)
(2.10 .985 1.001 .993 1.000
(.098) (.014) (.068) (.010)
(2 5) .996 1.000 .992 1.000
(.113) (.015 (.068) (.010)
TABLE V.4
Affect of Autocorrelated Errors
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value for (2.1) through (2.5). However, the sample
standard deviations of the estimates all increased.*
Another point of interest is that while the normal plots,
when the u
t
's were independent, were very nearly straight lines,
this did not hold as true when autocorrelation was introduced,
especially for (2.4) through (2.5).
In summary, although the Monte Carlo studies of the effects
of autocorrelation which were reported, here were by no means
exhaustive, they do indicate that the effects of autocorrelation
will be mainly felt in the dispersion of the estimates rather
than in their location or central tendency.
*The autocorrelation schemes used were actually quite weak,




















Once again, results showed that the main impact of this strong





V.3.3. Huber "M" Confidence Intervals
In Chapter IV confidence intervals were constructed by
jackknifing Huber "M" estimates. In order to examine some of
the properties of jackknifed robust estimates, sampling
experiments were undertaken. Data was generated, as in the
u.
previous sections, by the equation y t =.989x.e , B = 0.989,
where the {u } were distributed as Independent Cauchy random
variables and the {x. } were the 63 appropriations requests
found in the RDTE data. A total of 1000 samples were drawn,
and jackknifed estimates for 3 (and a where applicable) were
derived for (2.1) through (2.5). Confidence intervals were
constructed, using the estimate of the variance of the jack-
knifed estimator employed in Chapter IV. In addition, for
these same 1000 samples, confidence intervals were constructed
using Huber' s suggested estimate for the variance of a robust
estimator, as discussed in Appendix D of Chapter IV.
When examining confidence intervals two questions are
most important: coverage and length. For one thousand samples
the percentage of time the intervals covered or included the
true parameter value was determined. Secondly, the mean and
standard deviation of the size of the confidence intervals
were used as measures of the length of the intervals. Of
course, the ideal interval covers the true parameter value
the fraction of time specified and is also short in length.
V-18

The confidence interval chosen was one for which coverage
assuming normality, is .9544.
Table V.5 contains a comparison of the coverage and
interval length for (a) confidence intervals constructed
using the jackknife, and (b) confidence intervals constructed
using Huber's suggested approach for computing an estimate
of the variance of a robust estimator. Recall that if the
estimator is normally distributed and if the estimate of
its variance is correct, one would expect the confidence
interval to cover the true parameter value approximately
95% of the time. Because of the size of our samples the
normal approximation should be adequate.
Several features of Table V.5 are worthy of note.
First, in many cases both confidence intervals, the
jackknifed interval and Huber's suggestion appear to be
conservative, covering more than 95$ of the time. The
coverage of the jackknifed interval is always greater than
that of Huber's suggestion. However, the length of the
jackknifed confidence intervals is slightly greater than
the length of the intervals constructed using Huber's
suggestion. In two cases, (2.1) and (2.5) the coverage of
V-19
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the jackknifed intervals is considerably greater than that
of Huber's suggested interval. However, in (2.5) the length
of the jackknifed intervals is also considerably larger.
To sum up the results of Table V.5, the following points
should be noted. The coverage of the intervals is very
encouraging, especially when one realizes that the errors
or disturbances were Cauchy distributed. Secondly, although
the coverage of the jackknifed generated intervals is greater
than Huber intervals, Huber's method produces shorter intervals
Considering the extra effort required to construct jackknifed
confidence intervals the expense may not be justified. The
exception to this is the case in which the data are generated
by means of (2.3) and the coefficients estimated using
equation (2.1): here the coverage of Huber's suggested
interval is quite low.
V.4. Congressional Moods or Eras and the Air Force
V.iJ.l. Background
In Chapters II and III, analysis of residuals indicated
that appropriations from fiscal 1969 to the present were
smaller than the estimated equations (2.1) through (2.5) would
indicate if one were to disregard the error or disturbance
components in those equations . It was suggested that possibly
budget outcomes after fiscal 1969 should be examined
separate from budget outcomes or appropriations prior to that
time. Also, recall that for some of the models, budget items
V-21

for years prior to i960 appeared in the Group 2 and Group 3
residuals a disproportionate number of times.. The tentative
conclusion was that pre-1960 items should be modelled differ-
ently from post-1960 items.
Another question which arose in the analysis of Chapters
II and III centered around the Air Force RDTE budgets between
1957 and 1969. During those years, the Air Force received
appropriations which were either larger than the corresponding
requests or nearly equal to them. This contrasted sharply with
the experience of the Army and the Navy. As a result, Air Force
RDTE items between 1957 and 1969 always yielded positive
residuals after the coefficients in the various equations
were estimated.
V.k.2. Breaking Up the Data by Years
The data were divided in several ways in order to examine
the question of possible changes in the regular or routine
pattern of budget outcomes in I960 and in 1969 . First , the data
from FY60 through FY68 were segregated and analyzed using the
Huber "M" technique. The remaining data were analyzed
as a block. Application of the Huber "M" technique to the
FY53-FY59 and FY69-FY73 data revealed that the Group 2 and
Group 3 residuals were always composed of items from the
Fifties. This led us to believe it may be useful for estima-





Since the data contains requests by the three services
by year, the number of data points for procurement in the
three categories were 22*, 36 and 20 respectively. Table
V.6 contains the results of the analysis of the three data
sets for procurement. Table V.7 contains nominal 95$
confidence intervals. These intervals were computed using
Huber's method. Although the sample sizes are such that the
normal approximation to the Student "t" is somewhat inaccurate,
the over-coverage of the intervals reported earlier in the
discussion of the Monte Carlo studies somewhat counterbalances
this inaccuracy.
The point estimates in Table V.6 are very revealing. For
the 1960-1968 time frame, the estimated 5 is about 1.01
(depending on the model used) while for 1969-1973 the estimated
3 for the fixed percentage models is approximately .90. This
represents a decrease of approximately .10 in the percentage
of requests which have been appropriated in the 1969-1973 time
period. For the fixed percentage models, (2.1) through (2.3)
>
the results for 1953-1959 lie between the 196O-I968 and 1969-1973
results. Also of interest in Table V.6 is the fact that for the
variable percentage models (2.4) and (2.5) using 1960-1968 data
estimated a is at or near 1.0. This says that the percentage
*The straggler 1953 PAMN was omitted from consideration
Also, 1953 Air Force Aircraft when appropriations totalled
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of the request appropriated is not sensitive to the size
of the request. Recall that for the analysis of specifica-
tion error the results using (2.1) through (2.5) were on
the average the same when the data were generated by (2.3),
a fixed percentage model. It appears that a fixed percentage
model is most appropriate for the 1960-1968 period.
The interval estimates in Table V.7 contain three
interesting results. (i) All of the confidence intervals
for (2.1) through (2.5) in the 1953-1959 period are quite
large. For example, the interval for in (2.3) is
(.865,1.049.), the interval for (2.4) is (.317,19-314).
Despite the fact that the Huber "M" technique was forcing
items like 1954 AF A/C (request of $4283 million and
appropriations of $2453 million) and 1959 PEMA (request of
$970 million and appropriations of $1669 million) into the
Group 2 and Group 3 residuals, the estimates for this period
are very unstable. While in general our models are probably
too simple to describe what is really happening, this is
especially true for the 1953-1959 time period in the procure-
ment area. There are a number of explanations for this.
First, this period includes the end of the Korean War and
the subsequent change in military policy to that of massive
retaliation [Crecine and Fischer ,1971 ,PP • 21-23] with less
emphasis on conventional forces. A Congress unwilling
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to completely adhere to such a policy might respond by adding
dollars in' the PEMA account and cutting some of the dollars
from the Air Force accounts. On the other hand, by i960 and
certainly during the first Kennedy budgets, the administration
policy provided for more dollars for all the Services [Crecine
and Fischer,1971,PP. 4-5]. This fact together with the Congres-
sional unwillingness to cut procurement during the Vietnam
conflict account for the greater stability of the 1960-1968
estimates. The 1953-1959 data may possibly be better explained
by a complex gaming model in which prior year cuts are taken
into account, although there is no special reason why this
should be the case. (ii) A second interesting aspect of
Table V.7 is the length of the intervals for (2.4) and (2.5)
for the 1969-1973 time frame. A comparison of these intervals
to those for (2.1) through (2.3) suggests that a fixed
percentage model may be most appropriate for this period, if
only because of the instability of the estimates for (2.1)
through (2.3). (iii) Finally, note that the intervals for
the fixed percentage models, (2.1) through (2.3), for 1960-1968
do not overlap with the intervals for 1969-1973. Although
this result does not represent the result of a classical
statistical test, it does strongly support the contention that in
the area of procurement the regular part of 1969-1973 budget
outcomes in procurement follows a pattern different from that






Tables V.8 and V.9 contain point estimates and nominal
95$ confidence interval estimates for the RDTE data when
broken into the segments 1953-1959, 1960-1968, 1969-1973.
The sample sizes were 21, 27 and 15 respectively. Again
the normal approximation causes some inaccuracy in
that the true coverage is not quite 95%, especially for the
sample of size 15. However, the over-coverage of Huber's
suggested technique for constructing confidence intervals
which was reported in previous sections somewhat counter-
balances this inaccuracy.
The results in Table V.8 show that the point estimates
for the 1969-1973 time frame in the fixed percentage models
are smaller by approximately 5 percentage points than those
for 1960-1968 (and 1953-1959). The positive elasticities
resulting from estimates of a in (2.4) and (2.5) of 1.05 in
the 1969-1973 data are somewhat puzzling. However, the
confidence intervals for a in Table V.9 are unusually wide,
which indicates that the estimates in Table V.8 should
probably not be taken too seriously. As with the procurement
data, the confidence intervals for 8 in (2.1) through (2.3)
for the 1960-1968 data do not overlap with the intervals for
the 1969-1973 data. Finally the similarity between the
estimates (point and interval) for I96O-1968 data and 1953-1959
data using (2.1) through (2.3), the fixed percentage models,
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estimates using ('2.4) and (2.5), the variable percentage
models. A further refinement of the data, that is separating
out 1957-1969 AF, will clarify the matter.
V.4.3. The Air Force and RDTE
Analysis of residuals in Chapters II and III has indi-
cated that Air Force RDTE 1957-1969 should probably be
separated fromthe rest of the data. In nine of these thirteen
years the Congress appropriated more than was requested.
Tables V.10 and V.ll contain point estimates and confidence
intervals for the following RDTE data groups: Air Force
(1957-1959), Army, and Navy (1960-1968), Army, Navy and Air
Force (1953-1959, except 1957-1959 Air Force), Army, Navy
and Air Force (1969-1973, except 1969 Air Force).
There are several interesting results in Tables V.10 and
V.ll which need elaboration. (i) For the first time in the
data analyzed thus far there is a noticeable difference in
the results for (2.1) and those for (2.2) and (2.3). For
the 1957-69 Air Force data, the estimate for 6 in (2.1) is
1.017 while that for (2.2) is 1.066. Examination of the data
points indicates that six of the thirteen x, values are
smaller than 1.6 billion (4 being less than .750 bill lion)
while the other seven x. values are greater than 3-0 billion.
This wide range of x, values leads us to believe that for this
data a model which allows some interdependence between x
fc
and the disturbance, like (2.2) or (2.3), may be preferable
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considering differences between the results for (2.4)-(2.5)
and those for (2.2)-(2.3). The variable percentage models
allow some interdependence between request size and the
percentage of the request appropriated. In most of the data
sets analyzed so far in this section, the request size has
not varied enough to lend credence to any estimated inter-
dependence. This is not true for the 1957-1969 Air Force
data. However, the confidence intervals in Table V.ll for
3 and a in (2.4) and (2.5) are rather wide when compared to
the intervals for 6 in (2.2) and (2.3). Although the Monte
Carlo studies reported earlier indicate that even if the data
were generated by (2.4) the value of the variance of B
when using (2.4) for estimation is higher than the value
Of the variance of 3 when using (2.2) or (2.3) for estimation.
the differences were not as great as those found in Table V.ll
(ii) A second interesting result is associated with the
1969-1973 data set. The elimination of one data point,
1969 Air Force, from the data set has a significant impact
upon the estimates for a and 6 in (2.4) and (2.5), and a
somewhat smaller impact on the estimates for 6 in the fixed
percentage models (2.1) through (2.3). [Compare Table V.10 with
Table V.8]. Of the fifteen data points between 1969-1973
all represented reductions by the Congress except for 1969
Air Force, where appropriations were $3.57 billion and the
request was $3.36 billion. The Kuber "M" technique made this
item a Group 2 residual, thus reducing its impact on the
estimate. However, as a comparison of Tables V.8 and V.10
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indicate, this observation still had a significant effect
on the estimates. This appears to be an instance where the
more severe <}> functions such as those suggested by Andrews
and Hampel or by Tukey [Andrews et al. , 1972] might
produce estimates which are preferable to the Huber estimates.
With respect to Table V.10 it should also be noted that for
the 1969-1973 data set (without 1969 Air Force) a fixed
percentage model appears to be most appropriate since the
estimates for a in (2.4) and (2.5) are approximately equal
to 1.0.
(iii) Insofar as confidence intervals are concerned, the
confidence intervals (using (2.1) through (2.3)) for the
1969-1973 data (without 1969 Air Force) do not overlap with
those for the 1960-1968 data (without Air Force) nor with
those from the 1957-1969 Air Force data. This reinforces the
contention that in RDTE, as well as in procurement, the
relationship of appropriations to requests changed in 1969
or 1970. Also, there is only a slight overlap between the
confidence intervals (using (2.2)-(2.3)) for the 1957-1969 Air
Force data and the confidence intervals for the 1960-1968 data
(without Air Force). The same holds true for the 1957-1969
Air Force data and the 1953-1959 data (without 1957-1959
Air Force)
.
(iv) Finally, the estimates (point and interval estimates) for
the 1953-1959 data (without 1957-1959' Air Force) and the 1960-1968
data (without Air Force) are very similar when using (2.1)
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through (2.3). However, this is not true for (2.4) and (2.5),
the variable percentage models. Closer inspection of the
data shows that the values for the requests in each data set
taken alone were all very similar. The requests in the
pre-1960 data were all less than 1 billion while those for
1960-1968 were all greater than 1 billion. It appears that
this small dispersion of the requests in each of these data
sets resulted in unstable and unreliable estimates for a and
B in (2.4) and (2.5). Table V.12 contains the results when
the 1953-1968 data (without 1957-1968 Air Force) were
analyzed as a unit. The small confidence intervals for all
of the coefficients leads us to believe that this data should
be treated as a unit. Of interest, also, is the fact that a
in (2.4) and (2.5) is estimated to be approximately equal to
1.0 which means that even though the data contained rather
widely dispersed x, values, the percentage of the request
appropriated did not appear to be sensitive to the size of
the request.
Some tentative explanations for the results in the RDTE
area are probably in order at this time. The three major
results are that for the 1957-1969 Air Force data the estimated
6 was approximately 1.06. For the 1953-1968 data (without
1957-1968 Air Force) the estimated 6 was near 1.0, while for
the 1969-1973 data (without 1969 Air Force) the estimated B
was approximately .9^. The first result, the 3 of 1.06 for
the Air Force in the 1957-1969 period, is probably associated
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the Soviets orbitted the first Sputniks and with the dispute
between Secretary McNamara and the Armed Services Committees
over the B-70 bomber in the mid-1960' s. The Secretary
believed the bomber was unnecessary while the Committees
disagreed. With respect to the apparent "rubber stamping"
in the 1953-1968 period, except for the 1957-1969 Air Force,
there are two possible explanations. The first is that prior
to fiscal 1963 authorizations were not required for RDTE
.
Consequently the Armed Services Committees were not examining
budget requests. Until recently, one of the characteristics
of RDTE budget requests was that it was difficult to pinpoint
and identify individual projects for which funding was being
requested. Finally, prior to the 1960's, RDTE was a small
percentage of the overall Defense budget request, especially
Army and Navy RDTE. Thus, since the Defense Appropriations
Subcommittees in the House and Senate were the only ones
examining the requests prior to 1963j since the requests did
not clearly identify projects to be funded and since the
amount of money involved was not too great, it is reasonable
to conclude that a subcommittee might essentially "rubber
stamp" a request. The 1964-1968 approvals of RDTE requests
are probably associated with the Congressional reluctance
to cut the Defense budget during the Vietnam buildup.
The third major result of the analysis of RDTE data was
the decrease in appropriations as a percentage of requests
in the 1969-1973 time frame. By 1969, the Armed Services
Committees had been reviewing authorization requests for
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five years and had developed some expertise in this area.
Also, by 1969 the budget backup data which stated what the
funds were to be used for was organized into a number
relatively visible and identifiable units [Armed Services
Committee Print]. These factors, together with public
dissatisfaction with military spending in general, appear to
have contributed to the change in 1969 and its persistence
up to the current time.
V.5. Summary and Conclusions
This chapter brings to a close our present exploratory
analysis of Defense appropriations in procurement and RDTE
as they depend upon requests. Alternative ways of specifying
what has been termed the regular aspects of budget outcomes
were discussed in Chapter II. The remainder of the analysis
has consisted of attempts to probe more deeply into the
questions of how to best specify these regular aspects and how
best to estimate them. The Ruber "M" technique was shown to
be, in many instances, quite suitable for estimation purposes
because of its designed insensitivity to unusual or irregular
data points or occurrences. The question of confidence
intervals was explored in Chapter IV, while small sample
properties and specification error were explored in the first
part of Chapter V. The discussion in IV .'4 in general favored
models which state that appropriations are a fixed percentage
of requests (2.1)-(2.3). The models (2.1)-(2.3) differ among
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themselves in the way the random disturbance enters their
specification. Tables V.13 and V.lH contain coefficient
estimates that were chosen as the most appropriate models.
The estimates in Tables V.13 and V.l4 in no way represent
the final word on the topic of Congressional appropriations
as a percentage of requests. Hopefully, future research will
probe more deeply into questions such as the following. Why
are the estimated percentages at, or near, the values in
Tables V.13 and V.14? What caused the change in 1969 and
can such changes be predicted? Why was the Air Force so
successful in 1957-1969 in the RDTE area?
This analysis has made no attempt to include formulations
which treat the percentage of the request appropriated in
year t as being related to the percentage appropriated in
year t-1. Formulations of this kind are a natural extension
of this analysis. Another area of future research is related
to individual committee action. Although this analysis has
examined appropriations granted by the Congress as a whole,
a similar analysis could be performed on Armed Services
Committee and Defense Appropriations Subcommittee recommendations
One very interesting question is concerned with the Kanter-
DDW dispute and probably offers one of the more promising
avenues for future research. Are the percentages in Tables
V.13 and V.Ik the result of a conscious effort on the part of
the Congress to make percentage adjustments in budget requests,
or are they the sum total of non-percentage type adjustments
V-40

Best Model and Estimate
1953-1959 None
1960-1968* (2.3) yt = Sx^ g = i.oio
1969-1973* (2.3) Jt = Bx^ 3 = .901
TABLE V.13
Procurement
*(2.2) and, to a certain extent (2.1), also provide adequate
representations of the data.
u„
1953-1968 (without (2.3) y<_ - Bx.e t 3 = ,.993
1957-1968 AF)* z r
a
U
t1957-1969 (2.H) y. = 3x. e z 3 = 1.919, a = -922
Air Force** t c
u.





1969-1973 (without (2.3) y. = 3x,e z




*(2.2) and (2.1) also provide adequate representations of
the data. The estimates for 3 using (2.2) and (2.1) were
equivalent to those of (2.3).
**(2.2) but not (2.1) also provides an adequate representation
of the data.
***The similarity between the results for (2.2) and (2.3) can
be explained by recalling the discussion in Chapter II of
these models. Recall that for (2.3)
2 3
J=3+3u+85T +e^T+... J while for (2.2) 2L = 3 + &JX C. m J I X
with u and e being random. The two representations are
very similar if 3 is near one, and u is small.
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in budget requests, or are they the sum total of non-percentage
type adjustments at a lower level of aggregation (i.e. cuts
in specific weapon systems) by a Congress which has only




In Section V.3, data was generated by (I) model (2.3),
(ii) model (2.4) and (ill) model (2.3) with autocorrelation.
The disturbances, u. , were Cauchy distributed in each case.
Estimates of the coefficient 8 (and a where appropriate)
were computed using (2.1)-(2.5). Since 1000 samples of
size 63 were generated, it was possible to examine the
distributions of the estimates for 8 (and a) . Probability
plots were constructed for the 1000 estimates of 8 (and a)
when using (2.1)-(2.5) under conditions (i),'(ii) and (iii).
Also, the- hypothesis tests, b^ and 7b, [Pearson and Hartley,
1966, pp. 67-68], were made in order to determine whether or
not it was possible to reject a hypothesis of normality.
In an extensive Monte Carlo study made by Wilk, Shapiro
and Chen [1968], l/b, performed well in comparison to other
standard goodness-of-fit tests for detecting non-normality
under a wide variety of circumstances. The test which
performed best was the W test [Wilk and Shapiro, 1965] . However
the'W test is designed for samples of 50 or less. In no case was
it possible to reject the null hypothesis, using b 2 or yb^ .
For example, when the data were generated by means of (2.3)
with autocorrelation and model (2.3) was used for estimation
purposes, the value obtained for bg-3, using the estimated
•- ft
coefficients from 1000 samples, was 7.1x10" . The upper
V-A-l

5% point, as tabulated in [Pearson and Hartley ,1966 ,p . 208]
is 2.6x10"
. This was typical of the results obtained from
the tests.
Examples of the probability plots are contained in this
appendix. The plots on pages A-3 and A- 4 are typical of
the plots obtained. Almost all of the plots appeared linear,
like that on page A-3, where the data was generated by (2.3)
and estimates computed using (2.3). The plots, like that on
page A-H were not quite so linear when autocorrelation
(data generated by (2.3) with autocorrelation) was introduced
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